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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
Clayton John Cleveland 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Political Science 
December 2012 
 
Title: Storming the Security Council: The Revolution in UNSC Authority Over the 
Projection of Military Force 
 
Why have states requested international authorization for their projections of 
military force more after 1989? One perspective suggests powerful states should not 
make such requests. Rather, they should look to their own power instead of international 
organizations. Another view suggests international authorization is a way to provide 
credible signals about state intentions. A third perspective suggests states view 
international authorization of military force as appropriate. I establish that states have 
changed their behavior, requesting international authorization more often after 1989. 
Then, I develop hypotheses involving material power, burden-sharing, informational 
signaling, and international norms. I assess their ability to explain the increase in 
authorization requests through evidence from over 150 military force projections by a 
wide range of states and through a detailed evaluation of United States behavior. The 
U.S. provides a strong test case for the theories evaluated, since powerful states should be 
least susceptible to pressures for requesting authorization, and yet it does so more 
frequently after 1989. I find the expectation that states should request international 
authorization emerged after the U.S. set a precedent during the Persian Gulf War. The 
end of the Cold War changed the perceived “viability” of different strategies for 
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projecting military force for U.S. policy-makers. Requesting authorization from the UN 
became a plausible alternative. The decision to request international authorization—and 
the justifications U.S. decision makers offered for doing so—led to the expectation by 
other states that the U.S. would do so for future projections of military force. This 
international norm helps explain the politics of international authorization for the 
airstrikes on Iraq (1998), the Iraq War (2003) and the Libyan intervention (2011). The 
response of other countries to the Clinton Administration’s failure to request 
authorization for airstrikes on Iraq in 1998 demonstrates that expectations regarding 
whether the U.S. should request authorization had shifted. The subsequent consolidation 
of the norm helps explain the requests for authorization by the Bush Administration for 
the Iraq War in 2003 and by the Obama Administration for Libya in 2011. The 
dissertation increases our understanding of the relationship, and the role of authority, 
between states and international organizations. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The victors of World War II formed the United Nations with the intent that the 
UN Security Council (UNSC) would regulate the use of military force by states. 
Experiences leading to the Second World War led them to believe that an organization 
whose members consisted of the most powerful states in the international system could 
prevent future wars and ensure international peace and security. This idealized vision of 
the role of the UNSC failed to materialize. When the UNSC did assume this role it did so 
through means not contained in the original Charter. After 1989 resolutions for 
international authorization became the primary mechanism for the UNSC to regulate the 
use of military force. This change was driven by the choices made by states. 
States face several options when projecting military force, some of which have 
been part of the decision making process and some of which have not been regularly 
considered. States can operate outside international organizations (IOs) either 
unilaterally, through ad hoc coalitions or through an IO. If they choose the IO route they 
can work through a regional international organization (RIO) or they can attempt to work 
through a global organization such as the UNSC. Options they have in the UNSC include 
claims to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, a resolution authorizing the 
projection of force or providing the necessary forces under the UN’s Military Staff 
Committee (MSC). 
Why did states’ use of UNSC resolutions become the preferred method for 
projecting military force in the aftermath of the Cold War? In this dissertation I construct 
the argument that states have followed a trail blazed by the United States. In the Persian 
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Gulf War, the U.S. set a precedent in requesting when they requested international 
authorization from the UNSC.1 This authorization delegated UNSC authority to member 
states to project military force to repel Iraqi forces from Kuwait. In making this choice at 
this point the U.S. set the standard for how states should use military force. I compare 
and test this explanation with others drawn from alternative realist, liberal, and 
constructivist perspectives. 
PROJECTING MILITARY FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL AUTHORIZATION 
The research question of this dissertation project is: “Why do states request 
international authorization to project military force more often after 1989?” I answer this 
question by looking at the actions of states and the justifications offered by their leaders. 
These leaders who claim to represent the state’s domestic populations are looking to 
international sources of authorization for their actions. Answering the question about why 
states turn to IOs when contemplating military force contributes to understanding state 
behavior. 
                                                 
1 The reference to the Persian Gulf War or Gulf War can indicate several different conflicts. For 
consistency in this dissertation the Persian Gulf War or Gulf War refers only to the conflict during 1990-
1991. The term Persian Gulf War refers to the entire episode and the politics of the situation between Iraq 
and Kuwait. This episode involves several military operations. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is analytically 
distinct from the operations undertaken by the U.S. and its allies. Operation Desert Shield refers to the 
placement of military resources to deter further aggression from Iraq while Operation Desert Storm refers 
to the offensive action taken by the coalition of forces to remove Iraq from Kuwait. There is also a naval 
interdiction operation to enforce the sanctions placed on Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait. These operations 
will be specifically referred to when the distinction is important. For instance, during the Persian Gulf War, 
the UNSC provided international authorization for offensive military action which came to be called 
Operation Desert Storm but did not need to provide authorization for the deterrent action of Operation 
Desert Shield. Other conflicts include the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) which has also referred to as the First 
Persian Gulf War and the Iraq War (2003-2011) which has been referred to the second Persian Gulf War. 
To avoid confusion these two conflicts will only be referred to as the Iran-Iraq War and the Iraq War 
respectively in this dissertation. 
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The argument I construct specifies a distinct mechanism through which an 
international norm has emerged.2 Generally, norms are thought to emerge because a 
specific actor, a “norm entrepreneur,” works to create and push others to accept and 
follow the norm (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). The emergence of the norm that states 
should request international authorization has emerged through a different mechanism. 
The precedent of distinctive action legitimized through practice is a different way for 
expectations to converge and regular behavior to become institutionalized (Kier and 
Mercer 1996). The norm of requesting international authorization has emerged through 
this mechanism, explaining why states request international authorization more often 
after 1989. The research question focuses on the change in state behavior which emanates 
from two factors. First, a norm of state behavior says that states should request 
international authorization from the UNSC to project military force. Second, this norm 
exists and states engage in the specific behavior on the belief that the UNSC is the proper 
authority to make decisions about the legitimacy of military force. The authority of the 
UNSC was enhanced by the practice of requesting international authorization. This 
mechanism is different than the actions of a norm entrepreneur who sets out to change the 
way others act. With precedent as the mechanism there is no original intent. Instead, the 
outcome is an unintentional consequence of a specific action. After precedent has been 
created, all actors can make use of the precedent when justifying their actions. Their 
justifications lend credibility to their initial action and legitimize emulation and 
                                                 
2 Conceptually, a norm is the “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given 
identity” (Katzenstein 1996, 5). 
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repetition. The projection of military force becomes a strong test of this mechanism for 
the emergence of an international norm. 
States make choices about how they project military force. One particular choice 
has become the more acceptable than others. States use military force to promote national 
security, economic and even humanitarian goals. Leaders construct plans to deploy 
military forces outside of their borders to address these interests. They are faced with a 
variety of methods for pursuing their goals when projecting military force (see Table 
1.1).3 This project focuses on the method of projection when states decide to use military 
force rather than on the decision to project military force itself. 
Leaders will face many decisions no matter what path they pursue when 
projecting military force.4 The decision-making model within Table 1.1 is a simplified 
                                                 
3 When faced with a situation where the projection of military force is a foreign policy option, states are 
faced with at least five options. The first is the simplest. When faced with a situation where the projection 
of military force may be a beneficial policy, the base policy is for a state to do nothing. In effect, doing 
nothing is to accept the changes introduced by other actors and the potentially damaging consequences of 
their challenges. This may be seen as preferable to the consequences of using military force or some other 
option. Two other options include diplomatic action and the attempt to exert economic influence through 
either positive or negative sanctions. These kinds of policy options can, of course, be used together and can 
include the threat of using military force, implicitly or explicitly. A fourth kind of policy option would be 
to attempt a form of covert action. This can include both covert military and nonmilitary action. 
Nonmilitary action would include espionage and other forms of spy or pseudomilitary activities. Covert 
military action as a form of military force would inherently be unilateral but would not be advertised. The 
remaining kind of policy option would be overt forms of military operations. These would include 
unilateral or multilateral options. Unilateral military options include immediate but not covert operations. 
Obviously, the military benefits of covert military actions and an immediate unilateral response are very 
similar. Immediate actions would not allow an opposition to consolidate its position and prepare its forces. 
Delayed and covert military action would still produce a context where soldiers would have to face these 
problems. An immediate unilateral military operation would not. Multilateral military options, as a 
different form of military action, would still face the difficulties of allowing an opposition to consolidate its 
position. A state facing the prospect of projecting military force may want to act in concert with other states 
for many different reasons. This can be an ad hoc coalition put together when the state is faced with 
circumstances which warrant the projection of military force or the state can pursue action through the 
framework provided by an IO. IO-based military operations would be through either an RIO or a global 
organization, the UNSC. These last two forms could include the participation in peacekeeping operations as 
well as standard military operations. 
4 Once the decision to use force has been made states must decide how they want to carry out this decision. 
This is consistent with poliheuristic decision making theory which suggests leaders use a two-stage 
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Table 1.1. Policy Responses 
Nonmilitary Military Actions 
Do Nothing Covert Action 
Political/Diplomatic Actions Overt Action 
Economic Actions  Immediate (Unilateral) 
 Positive Sanctions  Delayed 
 Negative Sanctions   Unilateral 
Nonmilitary Covert Actions   Ad hoc coalition 
 Espionage   RIOs 
 Pseudomilitary   UNSC 
 
ideal type separating out individual decisions for analytic purposes. Reality can be much 
more complicated, as often many of these steps are condensed into each other and 
sometimes assumed or skipped altogether. The decision to project military force involves 
assessing political and diplomatic consequences of multiple actions which are included in 
a state’s foreign policy. Despite this limited reflection of reality, the model can provide 
the basis for identifying the observable implications of competing explanations. 
Projecting military force includes several different possibilities (see Table 1.2). Outside 
options include unilateral military action or ad hoc coalitions with allies of the primary 
projector. States can secure international authorization for the projection of military force 
through RIOs. The United Nations system offers three nominal approaches which states 
can take. In response to attacks states can respond in self-defense under Article 51 of the 
UN Charter (UN Charter 1945). States can request specific resolutions to authorize the 
projection of military force, and nominally states can provide military assets and resource 
to the UN to be used by the Military Staff 
                                                                                                                                                 
decision-making process (Brulé 2008). The first step is to eliminate untenable alternatives and then to 
select among the remaining alternatives. For instance, President Clinton’s decision to project military force 
in 1999 exhibits this pattern (Redd 2005). 
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Table 1.2. Military Force Options 
Options  Example 
Outside  Unilateral-The United States 
   Ad hoc coalition-Vietnam War Coalition 
RIO   NATO airstrikes in Kosovo, 1999 
Article 51-Self Defense U.S. action in Afghanistan, 2001 
UNSC Resolution Persian Gulf War, 1991 
Military Staff Committee None 
 
Committee to protect international peace and security (Bailey and Daws 1998, 274).5 The 
existence of these options is consistent after 1945, albeit the viability of these options 
varies depending upon context. 
Regardless of the prospects of securing the support of an IO, the state can always 
fall back on its own capabilities and initiate a unilateral action to project military force. 
With the exception of unilateral action none of the other possibilities are guaranteed to 
happen. The possibilities of securing IO approval or gaining support from other states are 
not certain. Just because the state has the desire to use an RIO or the UNSC does not 
necessarily mean that it will gain the organization’s authorization for projecting military 
force. The ability of a state to secure IO approval depends upon many factors not the least 
of which is the nature of the proposed projection of military force and how other states 
view the intentions of the projector. Leaders consider these factors when deciding to 
project military force, including whether to use force unilaterally or through an IO. Many 
possible IOs could be approached to provide international authorization (see Table 1.3). 
                                                 
5 This option is the mechanism contained in the UN Charter. 
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Table 1.3. International Political and Security Organizations which Nominally Can 
Provide International Authorization 
International Organization Dates Region 
United Nations Security Council 1946-Present Global 
United Nations General Assembly 1946-Present Global 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1949-Present Europe & N. America 
European Union / European Community 1958-Present Europe 
Organization for Security and  1973-Present Europe 
Cooperation in Europe 
Council of Europe 1949-Present Europe 
Warsaw Pact 1955-1991 Eastern Europe 
Organization of American States 1948-Present Western Hemisphere 
Union of South American Nations 2008-Present South America 
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States 1981-Present Caribbean 
Baghdad Pact / Central Treaty Organization 1955-1979 Middle East 
League of Arab States 1945-Present Middle East 
Gulf Cooperation Council 1981-Present Middle East 
Arab Cooperation Council 1989-1990 Middle East 
Organization of the Islamic Conference 1969-Present Islamic Membership 
Organization of African Unity / African Union 1963-Present Africa 
Shanghai Five / Shanghai Cooperation 1996-Present Central Asia 
Organisation 
Collective Security Treaty Organization 1992-Present Post-Soviet States 
Commonwealth of Independent States 1992-Present Post-Soviet States 
Southeast Asian Treaty Organization 1954-1977 Southeast Asia 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations 1967-Present Southeast Asia 
EMPIRICAL PUZZLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
States have turned to the UNSC for international authorization with greater 
frequency after the end of the Cold War. From 1946 through 1989 states requested 
authorization five times (5%) but from 1990 through 2011, states sought authorization for 
projecting of military force twenty-one times (47%) (see Table 2.1). Figures 1.1 through 
1.3 show the distribution of choices made by the United States when projecting military 
force among the different options available. Each figure specifies a different time period. 
The U.S. has made use of these varied options as shown by Figure 1.1. The U.S. tends 
towards the use of outside options almost as often as the use of international authorization 
from the UNSC. However, the averages mask the frequency of change over time with 
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Figure 1.1. Percent of U.S. Projection Choices, 1946-2011 
 
Source: The data for this table is presented in Table 3.1. 
 
which the U.S. has resorted to the different options. Figure 1.2 shows that outside options 
were the course of action that the U.S. most frequently chose during the Cold War. The 
United States did not rely upon the use of international organizations, whether they were 
the UN or an RIO. This pattern changed after 1989. Figure 1.3 shows the U.S. relying 
more frequently upon resolutions from the UNSC when it decides to project military 
force. Chapter II examines this phenomenon in greater detail.  
I answer the research question through cross-case correlational analysis and 
within-case process tracing. Cross-case analysis is useful for identifying and explaining 
general patterns (Hempel 1942) and testing hypotheses by looking at evidence found 
across a series of cases (van Evera 1997, 50-51). However, the way a particular event 
influences subsequent outcomes cannot be tested in the same manner. Process tracing 
(George and Bennett 2005) offers the ability to connect these general patterns with the  
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Figure 1.2. Percent of U.S. Projection Choices, 1946-1989 
 
Source: The data for this table is presented in Table 3.1. 
 
Figure 1.3. Percent of U.S. Projection Choices, 1990-2011 
 
Source: The data for this table is presented in Table 3.1 
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specific action through identification of a specific mechanism (Elster 1998; Hedström 
and Swedberg 1998). Within-case analysis can contribute to a better understanding of 
causal inference (Mahoney 2003). When competing explanations predict the same 
outcome it is necessary to trace the process to determine which explanation is more 
accurate. By tracing the process within specific projections of military force by the U.S. I 
am able to gain greater leverage over the causal factors which produce the rise of 
international authorization. This latter method’s weakness is in establishing factors which 
contribute to the general pattern. By using the two in combination, I take advantage of the 
strengths of both while overcoming their weaknesses. Looking at both general patterns 
and mechanisms will provide greater leverage and more satisfying answers. 
This project employs a set of instances of military force projection after 1945. 
Each “case” is a particular state’s projection of military force. The purpose of this cross-
case comparison is to document a pattern in the changes of state behavior over time. 
These projections of military force will then be linked to the decision of these states to 
request authorization or not. From the pattern established by state behavior, other features 
can be identified. Indicators based on the potential explanations will be identified and 
then correlated with the features of state behavior. This method is limited to identifying a 
general pattern and may not be able to eliminate all competing explanations based on 
fine-grained evidence, but it should provide an indication about the existence of a change 
in the behavior of states and some of the factors which have influenced the decision to 
request authorization. 
The cross-case section provides two clear virtues. First, it provides leverage over 
whether or not the within-case represents processes similar to those occurring in other 
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states. If the U.S. is representative then other states will display identifiable processes 
with marked similarities. If the U.S. is not a representative case, then this study should be 
able to identify what is unique about the U.S. which leads its decision makers to request 
authorization. Examination of the multiple projections of military force does not provide 
a test of characteristics that are unique to this state. The cross-case approach will fill in 
this knowledge gap by identifying any unique U.S. characteristics. 
The second virtue is that factors may operate in states other than the U.S., which 
may influence their behavior. A cross-case analysis can identify these differences and 
suggest how they might operate in other states. Through this method the factors should 
become apparent when examined and compared with the U.S. cases. Thus, to provide 
greater causal leverage over the processes which affect the decision to request 
authorization, this study will look at cases beyond the U.S. The cross-case method helps 
to identify the scope conditions for the U.S. 
This study examines the U.S. in order to gain analytic leverage through which the 
theoretical explanations discussed earlier can be tested. The examination of different 
projections of military force by the U.S. can provide analytic leverage to evaluate 
competing explanations in the same way as a crucial case.6 Because the U.S. is not 
expected to request authorization for its foreign policy actions from an external actor, the 
examination of these decisions become a “strong test” of the proposed explanations (van 
Evera 1997, 30-31). The U.S. possesses a greater capacity to resist external influences 
and is very unlikely to subject its military force decisions to an external actor. Whatever 
                                                 
6 A crucial case is a case that, a priori, is likely to demonstrate the accuracy of an explanation or one that is 
unlikely to do so (Gerring and Seawright 2007, 115-122). The examination of a crucial case then can 
provide substantial support for, or disconfirm, an explanation. 
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might push the U.S. to request authorization despite its greater ability to resist likely 
would have an effect on less powerful states as well. Thus, if the processes occurring 
within the U.S. prompt its policy makers to request authorization, these processes are 
likely to be seen elsewhere.  
Focusing upon the U.S. also controls for several variables enabling greater 
leverage over causal inference. Since the U.S. is consistently democratic during the two 
time periods, regime type does not vary. Also, because of the U.S. position within the 
international system, the need for material resources does not change. In fact, the U.S. is 
the least likely state to require material resources from an external source to complete a 
proposed mission thus removing this motivation from consideration. For this component, 
the individual cases are the circumstances surrounding each instance of the projection of 
military force by the U.S. 
Multiple theories can explain the same pattern of behavior by the U.S. and its 
action when requesting UNSC authorization after the end of the Cold War.7 These 
overlapping predictions mean that a more nuanced approach is needed to determine 
differences among these potential explanations. Process tracing should illuminate the 
fine-grained evidence necessary to evaluate these competing theories (George and 
Bennett 2005; Gerring and Thomas 2007). Within-case analysis can aid in identifying the 
motivations of various actors despite the consistency of the overarching general action 
with multiple explanations. This analysis allows the evidence to be linked to hypotheses 
(which are set forth in Chapter II). The theoretical predictions are compared with the 
evidence to determine which of the competing explanations holds the most explanatory 
                                                 
7 This is the issue of “observational equivalence” (see Weingast and Moran 1983, 767). 
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leverage. This evidence will be used to test the hypotheses derived from the potential 
explanations of the emergent pattern of state behavior. The second part of this study then 
focuses upon within-case analysis to identify how the decision-making processes worked 
within the U.S. For this component, the individual cases are the circumstances 
surrounding each instance of projection of U.S. military force. The kinds of arguments 
that are plausible explanations necessitate the examination of several instances of the 
projection of military force to test their claims. These two components provide a research 
design capable of assessing competing theoretical explanations of requesting UNSC 
authorization. 
This dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter II lays out the potential 
explanations and the tests of their observable implications. The explanations which can 
be tested by cross-case evidence are covered in Chapter III which examines the patterns 
predicted by the explanations put forward in Chapter II. Chapters IV through VI turn to 
the United States. Chapter IV surveys the international authorization behavior of the U.S. 
between 1945 and 1989. This chapter shows that there was no norm of requesting 
international authorization and that the few instances where states did make requests, 
such as the Korean War, were political anomalies without lasting effect. Chapter V 
covers the Persian Gulf War. The end of the Cold War was a juncture or breaking point 
between the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. This juncture was a period of uncertainty 
about the structures of international politics and, in particular, how powerful states 
viewed international organizations. This chapter shows how the different explanations for 
why states request international authorization predict different choices for how the U.S. 
projected military force. Chapter VI compares three post-Cold War cases, revealing 
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variation in the key outcome of interest. Operation Desert Fox was undertaken in 1998 by 
the Clinton Administration without a request for international authorization. In 2003, the 
Iraq War was undertaken without international authorization but the Bush (41) 
Administration made a very strong effort to secure the authorization of the UNSC. The 
third case is the 2011 Libyan intervention where the Obama Administration undertook 
the enforcement of a no-fly zone and the protection of civilians under a mandate from the 
UNSC. These three cases illustrate the dynamics of international authorization and why 
states make the request. 
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CHAPTER II 
EXPLAINING REQUESTS FOR INTERNATIONAL AUTHORIZATION 
Why do states request international authorization for the projection of military 
force from international organizations (IOs) more often after 1989? I argue that 
international authorization for the use of military force by the UNSC became the tool of 
choice because the U.S. set a precedent when it requested international authorization in 
1990 for the Persian Gulf War. This seminal event created the conditions for establishing 
an international norm of UN-authorization. This norm created pressure for all states to 
request international authorization from IOs and enhanced the authority of the UNSC 
over state projection of military force. This norm helped to produce the observed change 
in state behavior where international authorization is requested more often after 1989. 
This chapter presents an evaluation of the merits of this research question. I then 
discuss the dependent variable which establishes the change in state behavior. Lastly, I 
present a discussion of the theoretical debates which produce varied explanations for 
states to request international authorization. Based on these theories I identify 
explanations for why states may do so and under what conditions they may do so more 
often. I compare my argument about the precedent from the Persian Gulf War with the 
expectations of alternative explanations drawn from this discussion. 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
The research question of this dissertation project is: “Why do states request 
international authorization for the projection of military force more often after 1989?” I 
answer this question by looking both to the actions of states and to the justifications they 
provide for their actions. This question contributes to the discussion of the nature of 
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relations among states and how they relate to international bodies. The move for states to 
request international authorization is interesting because it is a relatively new 
phenomenon in international relations. Historically, states considering the projection of 
military force have not looked to organizations outside their own borders.  
The argument I make about why states request international authorization 
contributes to an understanding of international relations by specifying a mechanism 
through which an international norm has emerged. Generally, norms are thought to 
emerge because a specific actor, a norm entrepreneur, works to create and push others to 
follow the norm (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). As other actors define the new standard 
of behavior as legitimate, the norm spreads (DiMaggio and Powell 1991a). The 
entrepreneur attempts to persuade or coerce others into accepting and following a 
standard which is preferred by the actor. Norm entrepreneurs use different frames to 
achieve their ends (Payne 2001). Norm entrepreneurs can be powerful actors who 
influence the beliefs of elites in other states (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). Reputation 
and prestige influence how effective these actors are in their efforts (Fordham and Asal 
2007). Other less powerful states can also act to promote norms (e.g., Björkdahl 2007). 
Other kinds of norm entrepreneurs can be from nonstate sources including prominent 
international actors including IOs (Gheciu 2005), parts of IOs such as the UN Secretary-
General (Johnstone 2006; Rushton 2008), nongovernmental organizations (Price 1998), 
and advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998). The moral authority of other actors has 
contributed to their ability to influence international outcomes and the dissemination of 
international norms (Hall 1997). These actors engage in strategic behaviors as they 
attempt to persuade others to adopt an international norm (Schimmelfennig 2003). 
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I posit a different model for the emergence of international norms through the 
precedent of distinctive action which becomes legitimated through practice. I argue that 
the norm of requesting international authorization has emerged through such a precedent. 
This project addresses the emergence of this norm. The research question focuses on the 
change in state behavior. I argue that this behavioral change emanates from two key 
factors. First, a norm of state behavior says that states should request international 
authorization from the UNSC for the projection of military force. Second, this norm 
exists and states engage in the specific behavior because the UNSC is seen as the proper 
authority to make decisions about the legitimacy of the projection of military force.8 The 
authority of the UNSC was enhanced by the practice of requesting international 
authorization after the end of the Cold War. This mechanism is different from a norm 
entrepreneur, who sets out to change the way others act. With precedent there is no intent. 
After precedent has been created the role of the actors involved is in justifying their 
actions. Their justifications lend credibility to their initial action and legitimize the action 
for subsequent emulation and repetition. 
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE: REQUESTING  
INTERNATIONAL AUTHORIZATION 
International authorization is a formal international organization’s sanction of a 
state’s projection of military force.9 I am interested in what has caused states to request 
                                                 
8 Legitimacy is the “belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed” (Hurd 1999, 381). The 
enhanced legitimacy of the UNSC increased its power because authority is legitimized power (Hall 2005, 
66; Hurd 2007, 3). 
9 A decision to project military force is the purposeful deployment of regular military forces of a state 
outside its internationally recognized boundaries which destroys, or prevents an adversary from using, 
some resource. Table 3.1 lists the specific instances of projection. See Appendix I for the concept formation 
of military force projection. 
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international authorization more often for their military actions. This question engages 
the reasoning behind specific instances of the projection of military force and reasons for 
the change in the general pattern of state behavior. Making a request is a form of state 
behavior that is different than making a claim about the authority of IOs. The request for 
international authorization may be evidence of the authority of the organization or it 
could be evidence of some alternative form of calculation as many of the alternative 
explanations suggest. This section establishes that states have changed their behavior 
toward IOs, and toward the UNSC in particular. States request international authorization 
for projections of military force more often after 1989 than from 1946 through 1989. 
What does this behavior look like? International authorization is most often a 
resolution, evaluation, or some other declaratory statement issued by the international 
body authorizing the projection of military force. A request means a representative of a 
state seeking to project military force asks the IO to issue such a statement. International 
authorization from the UNSC comes in two varieties. With the first, the UNSC passes a 
specific resolution which contains the authorization for state action, often using the now 
famous language “any necessary means” which is understood to include the use of 
military force.10 Alternatively, the UNSC can express its acceptance that the action met 
the requisites for a claim to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. This article 
recognizes the inherent right of individual states to act to preserve their own security. 
This expression of consent is exhibited during UNSC official meetings and may include a 
specific resolution. 
                                                 
10 With this form of international authorization, the UNSC delegates enforcement authority to member 
states. 
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A different mechanism, the Military Staff Committee (MSC), was envisioned 
under the Charter (Grove 1993). The MSC was organized to administer military units for 
collective security as proscribed by the UN Charter. This model of enforcement action 
failed to emerge due in large part because member states did not place military troops, 
equipment, or other resources under the control of the UNSC’s MSC, something which 
they are still unlikely to do to this day. The MSC was intended as an international 
military force under the control of the United Nations which could respond to threats to 
peace and security. The MSC still meets regularly as proscribed under the Charter, but is 
a committee lacking substantive importance. 
States have requested authorization more frequently since 1989 than they did 
before 1989.11 Between 1946 and 2011, state leaders made the decision to project 
military force a total of 153 times (see Table 2.1). These instances include circumstances 
where the leaders may have reasonably made the decision to request international 
authorization.12 From 1946 through 1989 states requested authorization five times (5%) 
but from 1990 through 2011, states sought authorization for the projection of military 
force twenty-one times (47%). 
Powerful states are not expected by international relations scholars to request the 
approval of an IO to obtain their foreign policy goals because of their direct and  
                                                 
11 Three kinds of state behavior are important to identify when attempting to answer the question posed in 
the introduction. The first form of behavior is the act of projecting military force. The second is the 
decision to request authorization from an IO for these actions, both anticipated and actual. The last form of 
behavior is receipt of authorization from an IO. This section focuses on the variance in the attempt to gain 
authorization for cases of projecting military force. 
12 The set does not include circumstances were a state defended itself from attack nor forms of civil war, 
albeit foreign intervention into a civil war may be included. For more on specific instances and their coding 
see Table 3.1 and Appendix A. 
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Table 2.1. State Requests for Authorization of the Projection of Military Force 
 Projection of  
Military Force 
IO Authorization 
Sought 
IO Authorization 
Granted 
IO Authorization 
Not Granted 
Total 153 (100%) 26 (17%) 29 (19%) 124 (81%) 
1946-1989 108 (  71%)   5 (  5%)   5 (  5%) 103 (95%) 
1990-2011   45 (  29%) 21 (47%) 24 (53%)   21 (57%) 
Table 2.2. U.S. Requests for Authorization of the Projection of Military Force 
 Projection of 
Military Force 
IO Authorizations 
Requested 
IO Authorizations 
Granted13 
IO Authorizations 
Not Granted 
Total 35 (100%) 17 (49%) 20 (57%) 15 (43%) 
1946-1989 15 (  43%)   3 (20%)   3 (20%) 12 (80%) 
1990-2011 20 (  57%) 14 (79%) 17 (85%)   3 (15%) 
 
potentially more effective tools of statecraft. As a powerful state, the U.S. merits close 
inspection. Table 2.2 shows the descriptive statistics for the U.S. From 1946 through 
1989, the U.S. sought authorization in only three cases (20%) but since 1989, the U.S. 
requested authorization in 14 of 20 instances where the state used military force (70%).14 
The U.S. began going to the UNSC with the embargo on Iraq in 1990 (see Table 2.3). 
The primary IO indicates the organization where the U.S. first put in a request for 
international authorization. The authorizing IO is the most significant organization to 
authorize the action. The U.S. held a preference for the UNSC for authorization, 
something which the UNSC has not always provided. 
                                                 
13 “Authorizations Granted” can exceed “Authorizations Requested” because states can receive approval 
without a request. For example, the U.S. did not formally request authorization from the UN for 
Afghanistan in 2001 but, nonetheless, received tacit approval for this force projection. 
14 Of the six instances after 1989 in which the U.S. projected military force without requesting 
authorization in any form, only two were controversial. Three of them fell under Article 51 of the UN 
Charter which guarantees individual states the right to defend themselves. These include the 1993 Raid on 
Baghdad, the 2001 intervention in Afghanistan against the Taliban, and the 2011 raid to kill Osama bin 
Laden. The U.S. missile strikes on June 26, 1993, were in response to an Iraqi plot to assassinate former 
President Bush. A primary motive in keeping the mission secret was military effectiveness (Jehl 1993). The 
controversial operation was the 1998 airstrikes on Iraq, Operation Desert Fox. It was seen as beyond simply 
enforcing the Iraqi no-fly zones without international authorization. 
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RECEIVING IO AUTHORIZATION 
It is also important to look at when states receive international authorization. 
States make requests because they want the benefits that come from international 
authorization, whether these benefits are material or ideational. A complete answer to the 
research question must look at the outcome of their requests. IOs are not consistent in 
their provision of authorization; sometimes they have provided international 
authorization and other times they have withheld it.15 This variation means that states 
cannot expect that an IO will always provide authorization when requested. Making a 
request thus involves the risk that the request will be rebuffed. And yet, despite the risk of 
being denied, states continue to make their requests when projecting military force. Table 
2.1 shows the statistics for when IOs authorized states’ projections. From 1946 through 
1989, a state received authorization from an IO for the projection of military force only 
five times (5%) but since 1989, IOs have authorized twenty-four projections of military 
force (53%). 
The change for the U.S. is even greater. Of the fifteen instances prior to 1990, the 
U.S. received IO authorization three times (20%), once from the United Nations and 
twice from the Organization of American States (see Table 2.2). After 1989, the U.S. 
decided to project military force twenty times. In all but four of these cases the U.S. 
received UN authorization (the exceptions being Iraq in 1996, 1998, and 2003, and 
Kosovo in 1999) and the U.S. did receive authorization from NATO for the 1999 air  
                                                 
15 There are instances when no specific request was made yet states have explicitly or implicitly received 
authorization. 
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Table 2.3. U.S. Requests for International Authorization 
Year Decision to Project Military Force Administration Request Primary IO Authorizing IO 
1950 Korean War Truman yes UN UN 
1958 Intervention in Lebanon Eisenhower 
1961 Deployment in Thailand Kennedy 
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis Kennedy yes OAS OAS 
1964 Bombing in Pathet Lao War Johnson 
1964 Vietnam War Johnson 
1965 Intervention in Dominican Republic Johnson yes OAS OAS 
1970 U.S. in Cambodia Nixon 
1975 Mayaguez Incident Ford  UN UN 
1980 Iran Hostage Rescue Mission Carter  UN UN 
1982 Intervention in Lebanon Reagan 
1983 Intervention in Grenada Reagan 
1986 Libyan Airstrikes Reagan 
1987 Persian Gulf Tanker Reflagging Reagan 
1989 Intervention in Panama Bush (41) 
1990 Embargo on Iraq Bush (41) yes UN UN 
1991 Persian Gulf War Bush (41) yes UN UN 
1991 Iraqi No Fly Zone Bush (41) yes UN UN 
1992 Somalia Bush (41) yes UN UN 
1992 NATO Embargo on the Former Yugoslavia Bush (41) yes UN UN 
1993 Bosnia Clinton yes UN UN 
1993 Baghdad Raid Clinton  UN UN 
1993 Macedonia Clinton yes UN UN 
1994 Haiti Clinton yes UN UN 
1995 Bosnia Clinton yes UN UN 
1996 Iraqi Airstrikes Clinton 
1998 Afghanistan/Sudan Clinton  UN UN 
1998 Iraqi Airstrikes (ODF) Clinton 
1999 Kosovo Airstrikes Clinton yes UN NATO 
1999 Kosovo Peacekeeping Clinton yes UN UN 
2001 Afghanistan Bush (43)  UN UN 
2003 Iraq War Bush (43) yes UN  
2004 Haiti Bush (43) yes UN UN 
2011 Libyan Intervention (NFZ) Obama yes UN UN 
2011 Osama Raid Obama  UN UN 
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campaign.16 Importantly, for this instance and the 2003 Iraq war, U.S. leaders did make a 
very strong attempt to acquire UN authorization and even framed their justifications for 
military action on existing UNSC resolutions, in an attempt to make the U.S. actions 
legal and to gain legitimacy.17 These two instances are remarkable because the U.S. failed 
despite its request. 
In some instances the U.S. did not put forth a request yet received international 
authorization, often when acting in self-defense. Such actions are authorized under 
Article 51 of the UN Charter. Despite the lack of attempt to secure prior authorization for 
the 1993 Bagdad Raid and Afghanistan in 2001, both were considered forms of self-
defense and covered under Article 51 of the UN Charter.18 Other instances include 
missile strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998 (UNSC Document 1998) and the 2011 
raid in Pakistan which resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden (UNSC 2011a).19 
                                                 
16 Frequently, more than one IO will express their support for a single projection of military force. For 
instance, NATO, the Arab League and the UNSC all formally expressed support for the airstrikes 
undertaken by the U.S. and its allies in Libya 2011. The operationalization of the dependent variable relies 
on the primary IO. 
17 In the aftermath of the decision to initiate the Iraq War, U.S. leaders recognized there was a role for the 
UN during the post-war occupation. The U.S. pushed to end sanctions and the acceptance of Iraq within the 
international community. The outcome was UNSC Resolution 1483 (2003) which recognized the U.S.-led 
occupation of Iraq. Concerns have arisen that UNSCR 1483 would legitimate the war itself. This does not 
seem to be the case and as will be discussed in later chapters, the legitimacy of the UNSC seems to be 
enhanced rather than diminished by resisting the demands of the U.S. in 2003. 
18 The U.S. was generally supported for the Baghdad Raid (Allies Back U.S. Strike 1993; UNSC 1993) and 
the action in Afghanistan was seen as legal and legitimate (Drumbl 2003; Franck 2001). The U.S. action 
also received support from the UNSC for resolutions passed on September 12, 2001 (UNSCR 1368 2001), 
and subsequently on December 20, 2001 (UNSCR 1386 2001). This latter resolution was passed after the 
initiation of actions but did express the support of the organization. It was passed under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter and included the pertinent language which authorized the projection of military force. 
19 The recent debate over the legality of the bin Laden raid did not substantially question the U.S. claim of 
its right to project military force based on self-defense. Instead it focused on the difference between 
arresting him and killing him outright rather than the right of the U.S. to act. Where the legality of the raid 
is being questioned is on the authority of the U.S. to kill bin Laden, or whether the U.S. should have taken 
him into custody to stand trial (Lewis 2011), marking the difference between arresting or assassinating bin 
Ladin. The administration claims that the raid was entirely legal (Bin Laden Death 2011). Some Pakistani 
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Secrecy was considered “indispensable” to the success of the Sudan and Afghanistan 
operation (Albright and Berger 1998). The ability to surprise an adversary can be an 
important factor in the decision to request international authorization. The decision to 
make a request means increased scrutiny forgoing the possibility of using surprise to 
military advantage. 
POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS 
Compelling potential explanations include those derived from realism, 
institutionalism, a mixture of realism and institutionalism, and versions of constructivism. 
The alternative explanations will be tested empirically against the constructivist argument 
I develop. The realist-based explanations are based on power calculations and the need 
for additional resources. Two explanations rely on institutions as a key component. The 
first suggests states with democratic domestic regimes follow international law and thus 
will request international authorization more than nondemocracies. The second 
explanation looks at the value of information signaled through formal IOs. An alternative 
constructivist explanation is also developed. The norm of multilateralism is offered as a 
reason for the changes in state behavior. After considering these alternative explanations 
I develop a constructivist argument about setting the precedent of requesting international 
authorization and the ways in which this precedent shaped decisions to project military 
force. I establish the general pattern of state behavior, decision-making, and discursive 
evidence, and international reactions predicted by each in turn. 
                                                                                                                                                 
leaders have expressed frustration and claimed that the U.S. violated their sovereignty (Perlez 2011a, b). 
However, this behavior follows an agreement established by George W. Bush with Pakistan in the 
aftermath of 9/11 if the U.S. were to pursue bin Laden into Pakistani territory (Walsh 2011). Even claims 
from bin Laden family members argue he should have been tried and do not address the authority of the 
U.S. to project military force in this situation (Shane 2011; Statement 2011). 
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Power: Basic Realism 
Realism is pessimistic about the importance of IOs in influencing world politics 
(Mearsheimer 1994/1995; Waltz 1979, 42, 164).20 Explanations are based on power and 
interests. All states have interests derived from their position in the international system. 
Power is typically measured in terms of control over material resources (Mearsheimer 
2001; Waltz 1979, 97-98).21 The international system is cast as an arena of self-help, and 
the most significant constraints on the actions of states are the power and interests of 
other states. States attempt to achieve their interests through the most effective means 
available to them within the constraints imposed by the international system. Military 
interests dominate other nonmilitary concerns (Mearsheimer 2001, 31). When 
considering whether to project military force states weigh the material costs and benefits 
of their actions in relation to the power and interests of other states (Miller 1998). 
Limitations of Basic Realism 
From the basic realist perspective, states should not request approval from other 
weaker actors. The famous realist maxim asserts, “the strong do what they can, and the 
weak submit” (Thucydides 1960 [1943], 267). Strong states should not request 
international authorization and certainly not from an IO such as the UNSC which does 
                                                 
20 For realism, IOs may operate as an intervening variable but not as an independent cause (Krasner 1982). 
Many variants of realism could be used to inform an explanation of the activities of states toward the 
UNSC. However, since structural realism is often considered to be a dominant theory of international 
politics (Wendt 1999, 2-3), I use this as a starting point to construct a realist account. Waltz’s structural 
realism shares many attributes with these different forms of realism. For typical accounts of defensive 
realism see Snyder (1991), van Evera (1999), and (Rendall 2006). For offensive realism see Mearsheimer 
(2001) and Elman (2004). For classical realism see Morgenthau (2006), Carr (1939) and Wolfers (1962). 
On the differences among these schools of realist thought see Brooks (1997) and Rose (1998). 
21 There are, of course, many forms of materialist-rationalist theories which attempt to explain state 
behavior which utilize other variables—including sectoral, class, and bureaucratic interests among other. 
These are not considered here because of their limited ability to systematically explain interactions between 
actors at the international level. 
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not control any meaningful material resources. Powerful states do not submit. The UNSC 
cannot compel any state to follow its resolutions through force. So, theoretically, the most 
basic form of realism suggests that powerful states should not subject their foreign 
policies to approval from an IO. This theory does not match the empirical record 
presented in the previous section which shows that states have increasingly requested and 
secured international authorization. This expression of the theory does not apply to the 
cases I examine. Since it does not offer much in the way of a coherent explanation of the 
observed behavior of states when projecting military force, I turn to a more sophisticated 
version of realism after considering basic realism’s observable implications. 
Basic Realist Tests and Observable Implications 
Basic realism suggests that power states do not submit to materially weaker 
actors. Weak actors submit themselves to more powerful ones. This can be stated as a 
general hypothesis. 
Basic Realism Hypothesis:  
A state’s control over fewer material resources increases its likelihood of 
requesting international authorization. 
This form of realism does not generate relevant testable expectations about international 
reactions, decision-making, or discursive evidence. Tests of this hypothesis focus solely 
on the pattern of state behavior. 
Basic Realist Patterns. Some states may need assistance more than others. Developed 
countries have access to more resources while developing states have greater need which 
may affect their ability to project military force. Some states may need to spread their risk 
by gaining allies at different times. Weak states are the actors most likely to request 
international authorization. States with less developed economies control less resources 
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than developed economies. The test is to examine whether the influence of the level of 
development of a state and whether this correlates with requests for international 
authorization, measured by whether the state in question is developed or developing. This 
measurement assesses the structural condition of the lack of resources available to states. 
The pattern suggested by this explanation is that developing states should be the ones 
requesting international authorization.22 The developing state should request international 
authorization to gain access to assistance including, in some cases, the material resources 
of a developed country which would allow the weaker country to project military force. 
Chapter III shows the results of the test to see if lesser developed states request 
international authorization more frequently than developed states. 
Power: Sophisticated Realism 
A sophisticated version of the realist explanation retains an emphasis on power. 
This explanation suggests that different structures of the international system are 
important in explaining international politics. In particular, the condition of unipolarity, 
in contrast to the bipolar world of the Cold War, offers the preponderant state less 
constraints on its ability to project military force (Brooks and Wohlforth 2002; Jervis 
2011; Wohlforth 1999). This perspective suggests that a powerful state can secure 
international authorization because powerful states have greater ability to secure 
international authorization compared to other, less powerful states. International 
                                                 
22 The notion that developing states should be making international authorization requests has two issues 
that should be noted. First, such a proposition is directly contradictory to the sophisticated realist 
explanation in the following section. Second, and more importantly, the empirical record presented earlier 
shows that developed states like the U.S. are the ones requesting international authorization. Powerful 
states are more likely to want international authorization for the projection of military force because they 
have the resources to conduct military operations. Such a pattern may not hold in other contexts where 
powerful and weak states are on more equal footing. 
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authorization thus reflects power. This kind of explanation could account for why a 
powerful state, such as the U.S., would turn to an IO for international authorization. 
International authorization offers a way to influence other states without the exercise of 
pure unadulterated power. Such authorization is useful to have and easier for powerful 
states to obtain from an IO. Powerful states have an interest in requesting international 
authorization and they have the means to do so. 
Limitations of Sophisticated Realism 
A realist perspective presents no theoretical reason why the sophisticated version 
should be better than the basic form at describing international politics.23 The realist 
perspective can lead to an argument in either direction.24 Powerful states should either 
request international authorization more often or less often based on an explanation 
which relies on state power. This perspective suggests preponderant states should face 
fewer constraints without subjecting its foreign actions to any kind of scrutiny, especially 
from a materially weak IO. Even if requesting authorization is simply a formal but 
insignificant hoop to go through, it still represents a step that a powerful state should not 
have to accommodate.25 On the other hand, a more powerful state should have greater 
control over the actions of others, including IOs, to produce an outcome from an IO that 
                                                 
23 Basic realism does not compete with the other explanations since it predicts a different outcome than the 
observed values of the dependent variable. 
24 If anything, the basic realist claim is internally coherent by comparison to the more sophisticated version 
which cannot account for why a powerful state would want international authorization in the first place. 
Realism cannot explain the creation of such circumstances. It purports to explain state behavior after these 
circumstances have been created. Basic realism suggests that these circumstances should never have come 
about in the first place. If the sophisticated realist is correct that the rise of international authorization is 
uniquely reflective of state power, it still fails since it denies any account leading to this rise. 
25 If a state does not submit before it became powerful there is no reason to expect that a state should 
submit when it grows in strength. 
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is in the favor of the powerful state. Theoretically from a realist perspective there is no 
reason to prefer one line of argumentation about why states turn to IOs for international 
authorization. At this point the only reason to prefer a sophisticated realist explanation is 
because of the empirical record of the dependent variable presented in the previous 
section. Realism does not suggest why this empirical pattern exists rather than a different 
one. The lack of motive inherent in this brand of theorizing does not present a satisfying 
explanation.26 
Sophisticated Realist Tests and Observable Implications 
The sophisticated realist explanation addresses the characteristics of the projector, 
ranging from powerful to weak. Powerful states are states which hold more material 
resources compared to others. In particular, a state is powerful when it holds more 
material resources than the other members of an IO. States that are weak hold less power. 
Since military power is more important for realism than other forms of resources, I focus 
on military expenditures which can be used to compel other states to act when they would 
not otherwise. States that devote more resources to the military are more powerful than 
others.27 Powerful states should be able to acquire international authorization from IOs 
                                                 
26 The sophisticated realist explanation does make more sense out of the empirical pattern of state behavior. 
The pattern it predicts may be observationally equivalent to other competing explanations. If these other 
explanations account for more of this pattern of state behavior and asses the motive behind this action they 
are, by definition, a more complete explanation. Even if realism can predict the pattern of state behavior it 
cannot provide an account of why the circumstances came into existence in the first place. 
27 This is an imperfect measure and ignores many different forms of power, including situational forms. 
Often economic power is incorporated into this kind of measure since to have resources to devote to the 
military requires economic surplus which can be transferred. Of course, different theoretical traditions 
would use a different interpretation of power and necessitate a different measure when considering the 
strength of one actor over another (Barnett and Duvall 2005). 
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while weak ones should not.28 When confronted by other powerful states, international 
authorization should not be forthcoming even for a dominant power if other states that 
carry enough weight oppose a projection of military force. We should see that the 
dependent variable matches up with the ability of the projector to compel other states. 
When powerful states hold an interest in projecting military force, we should see their 
request and the corresponding international authorization from an IO for this action. This 
explanation can be stated as a general hypothesis. 
Sophisticated Realism Hypothesis: 
A state’s greater control over material resources increases its likelihood 
of requesting international authorization. 
The case studies control for the power of the projector by focusing on the United States 
which has held a position of power within the international system since at least 1945 and 
a preponderant position since 1989. Chapter III tests the influence of military power on 
whether states request international authorization. 
Sophisticated Realist Patterns. The sophisticated realist explanation suggests that the 
dependent variable’s pattern should show powerful states requesting international 
authorization more often than weaker states. States should be seen to request international 
authorization from the IO over which they hold influence as the forum of choice. 
Powerful states request and are provided international authorization when they have an 
opportunity to project military force. There should be no instances where IOs deny 
                                                 
28 Powerful states have the capabilities to project military force. Weak states often do not have the capacity 
to project military force because of a lack of material resources which would allow them to do so. Weak 
states are less likely to have the capabilities to project military force without assistance. The next section 
examines the need for additional resources as a motive to request international authorization. 
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international authorization to powerful states unless authorization is opposed by other 
powerful states. 
Sophisticated Realist Decision Making and Discourse. Decision making in this model 
focuses on the power of other states. We should see decision makers focus on 
geopolitical concerns. The decision to project military force would be considered 
independently from the decision to request international authorization. Only after the 
decision to project military force has been made would decision makers turn to the issue 
of international authorization. Decision makers should consider the leverage they have 
over the membership of the IO including what kinds of side payments and threats they 
may need to use to prevent other powerful states from blocking their proposal and to 
secure international authorization. This process of acquisition of international 
authorization should occur in parallel to the planning of the projection of military force 
rather than either being contingent on the other. Military decisions should guide the 
timing of the projector’s diplomatic tactics. Delays should not be allowed for diplomacy 
when military concerns dominate. 
The powerful state should receive sanction from an IO to pursue the goals as 
initially set by the projector. This model does not allow negotiation over what will be 
authorized, and the powerful state should not accept more limited goals. Powerful states 
are not expected to change their goals to suit less powerful states. The powerful state that 
has to limit its goals it indicates a projector who is unable to exercise power to achieve 
the desired ends. 
Sophisticated Realist International Reactions. Observer states will respond to the 
projection of military force based on their self-interest rather than on the basis of whether 
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a state acquires international authorization. If international authorization has been 
provided to the projector, and if observer states respond as realist theories suggest, then 
those states that have an interest in the projection of military force will respond 
favorably. Those who have interests against the projection will respond unfavorably. 
Under the circumstances where international authorization is not forthcoming, this theory 
would suggest that the response from foreign leaders would be the same. 
Burden-Sharing 
Rather than the use or threat of power playing the primary role to explain the 
changes in international authorization, the impetus to reduce costs could provide the 
motive to request international authorization. This explanation shares some of the 
features of a power-based explanation but focuses instead on how international 
authorization is seen by the leaders of states as a way to share the burden of projecting 
military force. Any attempt to project military force is a costly endeavor and carries many 
risks. A burden-sharing perspective suggests that states’ leaders should request 
international authorization when they need help from other states to achieve their goals, 
or reduce costs and when they think securing authorization will translate into 
opportunities to gain the needed assistance from other states (Kreps 2011, 6).29 To 
achieve some goals states need allies and want others to share their burden (Bennett, 
Lepgold, and Unger 1997). A state would accept costs imposed by an IO as long as its 
leaders think they will gain more material support by acquiring international 
authorization. For instance, more powerful states tend to have the ability to contribute 
                                                 
29 Many studies have concluded that this motivation is insufficient to explain why, for example, the U.S. 
turned to the UNSC despite shouldering the bulk of the burden for the Persian Gulf War (Thompson 2006, 
15). 
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more equipment and material resources which can be used directly for the projection of 
military force while smaller states tend to contribute more to protection missions such as 
civil crisis management (Dorussen, Kirchner, and Sperling 2009). Smaller states have an 
incentive to gain assistance from more powerful states that have the capabilities to carry 
out projections of military force. Reducing or sharing the burden of using military force 
is a relevant motivation for states to request authorization from an IO that needs to be 
examined. 
Limitations of Burden Sharing 
If international authorization functions to reduce the costs of an operation, then all 
states may request international authorization when they want to project military force 
since authorization can reduce their costs. Theoretically, then, we need a way to identify 
variance in the need for burden sharing if this factor is to explain the changes in the value 
of the dependent variable. A way to do this may be to distinguish intensity the need for 
additional resources. A projector may have an interest in projecting military force but 
without specific means to do so. The economic motivation does not account for another 
kind of burden sharing which includes the need to gain allies who provide specific 
advantages such as interoperability, basing, or fly-over rights which are necessary to 
conduct a successful military operation which maybe unrelated to the state of the 
projector’s economy. Acquiring international authorization may be necessary in order to 
act multilaterally and secure allies for the military operation to take place (Jentleson 
2003/2004, 9). Such incentives should be apparent in decision-making discussions which 
focus upon what the projector needs to successfully conduct the military operation. 
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An additional problem for this kind of theorizing is that international 
authorization has value which cannot be reduced to material factors. As purposeful 
actors, the leaders of states should engage in strategic reasoning that if they acquire 
international authorization they gain access to more material resources than they would 
without the authorization. Even powerful states which request international authorization 
percieve value in acquiring international authorization; otherwise they would not request 
international authorization. The problem with this reasoning for realism is that the value 
of international authorization is inherently nonmaterial. The only way in which 
international authorization leads to greater access to material resources is if other actors 
view international authorization as a reason to give more material resources to a 
projector. International authorization can provide legitimacy to a state’s foreign policy. 
Other actors may provide a projector with basing and fly-over rights because a projection 
of military force has received international authorization. The intent of the projector may 
be to gain access to material resources, but the rationale for how securing international 
authorization translates into access is through a nonmaterial mechanism. The strategic 
calculation may look like a form of cost-benefit analysis but by necessity it includes 
nonmaterial concerns. 
Burden Sharing Tests and Observable Implications 
Generally speaking, states either need assistance or they do not. If states need 
assistance they should turn to an IO in the hope of gaining access to additional resources. 
The explanation of burden sharing for the changes in state behavior can be put forward as 
the general hypothesis: 
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Burden Sharing Hypothesis: 
The need for help with material costs of the proposed action increases the 
likelihood of requesting international authorization. 
The need for material assistance can be measured in two ways to evaluate its influence on 
the outcome of interest.30 The first measure is to assess the condition of the projector’s 
economy. The second is to assess the expected size of the projection of military force 
compared to the size of military and other resources needed to project military force. 
These factors suggest that a distinct pattern should emerge in the relationship between the 
ratio of available resources to expected projection size and decisions to request 
international authorization. This explanation does not offer unique predictions about 
decision making or international reactions to a projection of military force. 
Burden Sharing Patterns. The first way to test for the need of a state is to assess the 
economic condition of the projector. This can help identify the intensity of the projector’s 
need for additional resources. If burden sharing makes a difference when states request 
international authorization, we should see an increase in requests when the projector’s 
rate of growth is shrinking. If this perspective is correct about the politics of international 
authorization, we should see states which need assistance submitting their request for 
international authorization with the hope that authorization will yield allies which have 
the resources to carry out their proposed projection of military force. Periods of economic 
decline should see more instances of requesting international authorization. 
                                                 
30 The level of economic development may be a third way to assess the influence of this factor. The tests 
for basic realism assess the relationship between economic development and international authorization 
requests. If the level of economic development is negatively related to international authorization request 
then the pattern is observationally equivalent for both basic realism and burden sharing explanations. If this 
is the case then we would need to turn to other tests from tracing the decision making process and 
international reactions to the projection. If there is no relationship, further testing is not warranted. 
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The second test of the burden sharing explanation looks at the size of the 
proposed projection of military force and compares it to the size of the projector’s 
military and the other resources needed to project military force. Military operations such 
as airstrikes require fewer resources than full-scale, boots-on-the-ground invading forces. 
If resources are a determining factor, we should see larger operations associated with 
requests. 
This hypothesis is evaluated in Chapter III. The case studies in this dissertation 
control for the level of development and the need for allies to successfully conduct a 
military operation by focusing on the U.S. As the world’s most powerful country, the 
U.S. has sufficient material resources to conduct its missions. It is able to conduct 
military operations anywhere on the globe, independently and without assistance. The 
motivation to gain access to material resources to conduct the necessary military 
operations to achieve the mission goals may make UNSC authorization desirable for 
states other than the U.S. 
Regime Type: Democracy and the Rule of Law 
The democratic peace theory is a perspective which proposes that domestic 
institutions influence the external behavior of states (Doyle 1986). This perspective 
suggests that an explanation for the decision to request international authorization is 
based on domestic democratic regimes. Democratic regimes are less bellicose in their 
foreign behavior (Russett and Oneal 2001).31 Following the same logic, states with a 
                                                 
31 At least democratic states are claimed to be less bellicose towards other democracies. Whether there is a 
democratic peace and the precise mechanisms by which the democratic peace thesis operates is subject to 
much debate (see, for instance, Adler and Barnett 1998; Barkawi and Laffey 1999; Boehmer, Gartzke, and 
Nordstrom 2004; Chan 1997; Chernoff 2004; Gartzke 2007; Thompson 1996). An evaluation of the 
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strong commitment to the rule of law are more likely to comply with international 
agreements (Kelley 2007). Democracies are more likely to consult international 
organizations about their foreign policies. This formulation suggests that states with 
democratic regimes are more likely to request international authorization to project 
military force from international organizations. The UNSC is the primary security 
organization in the international system. When states signed the UN Charter they agreed 
that the UNSC is responsible for keeping international peace and security.32 This variable 
is controlled for in the case study the regime of the U.S. has had no meaningful change 
between the Cold War and the post-Cold War time periods that would affect the 
dependent variable. However, this factor may influence states other than the U.S. which 
can be examined through the cross-case portion of this project in Chapter III. 
Limitations of Regime Type 
Theoretically, regime type cannot account for the variance in requests made by a 
single state when there is no change in its regime type. Additional factors would be 
necessary to explain why under some conditions the U.S. does not request international 
authorization for the projection of military force or why it may request international 
authorization from varied organizations. 
                                                                                                                                                 
democratic peace is beyond the scope of this project and is thus not covered here. The important aspect is 
whether domestic regime influences the decision of states to request international authorization. 
32 This leaves aside the issue of whether states have agreed to the specific mechanism of international 
authorization through the UNSC when projecting military force. As discussed in Chapter I, this mechanism 
was not contained in the UN Charter so it could be argued that states never committed to this particular 
form of behavior prior to using military force. When ratifying the UN Charter, states did commit to 
decisions of the UNSC made under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as binding on all members of the UN. 
When the UNSC acts under Chapter VII its resolutions commit member states to specific actions. That 
requesting international authorization has become standard practice is part of a different theoretical 
explanation which does not rely on domestic regime type to explain international behavior. This 
explanation is discussed under the authority of the UNSC later in this chapter. 
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Regime Type Tests and Observable Implications 
The influence of democratic institutions upon the decision to request international 
authorization can be stated as a general hypothesis.  
Regime Type Hypothesis: 
A democratic regime increases the likelihood a state will request 
international authorization for projecting military force. 
The influence of democracy on the decision to request international authorization can be 
tested using scores from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). This dataset 
codes democratic and antidemocratic characteristics along a continuum from -10 to 10, 
with 10 being the most democratic. The expectation from this perspective is that higher 
numbers will be associated with request for international authorization. The decision-
making or international reaction tests will not be included in Chapter III on cross-case 
assessments. These tests will be examined for the U.S. in the case studies. The patterns 
predicted by this explanation will be evaluated in Chapter III. 
Regime Type Patterns. The pattern predicted by this explanation suggests that 
democracies will request international authorization more often than nondemocracies. 
Democracies will go to formal IOs of which they are members. Nondemocracies will use 
other criteria to determine when they should request international authorization, if at all. 
The pattern nondemocratic states should exhibit should have no relation to their regime 
type. Democratic projector s should request international authorization from a single IO 
which is the legal international source of authorization for this state. This kind of state 
should not request international authorization from different fora since it would not match 
up to their notions of the rule of law. International law claims that there is one legal 
source of international authorization for the projection of military force, the UNSC. Other 
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fora do not hold the same legal status and are questionable. The pattern should show that 
democracies make requests more often than other states. 
Regime Type Decision Making and Discourse. If this explanation about how the 
decisions are made is correct then leaders will focus on the legality of their action and on 
meeting their obligations under international law. As long as the actions are legal the 
leaders of projectors will be reluctant to alter their goals to accommodate the interests of 
other states. Leaders of democratic states should connect their decision to project military 
force with the prospect of acquiring international authorization. If authorization is not 
likely to be forthcoming the leaders will try to avoid projecting military force. Legal 
advisers are the likely source pushing the projector to make a request for international 
authorization. In public statements about the decision to project military force the 
projector’s leaders should describe the IO, where requests for international authorization 
are made, as the legal and democratic forum to make such a decision. 
International Reactions to Regime Type. According to the logic of the democracy-
based explanation, regime type determines foreign behavior. Democratic states should 
react differently than nondemocratic states to success or failure of a projector to gain 
international authorization. The leaders of democratic observer states should not express 
concerns about the intentions of the projector prior to a projection of military force. 
Instead they should claim that the projector needs to acquire international authorization 
before projecting military force because that is what democracies do. Their concern is 
that authorization be given according to the projector’s obligation under international 
law. Criticism would not be based on the multilateral character of the projection of 
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military force. This explanation suggests that leaders of democratic observer states are 
more likely to provide support for democratic projectors who follow international law. 
Information Transmission: Signaling and Political Costs 
Now consider what might be observed if, rather than a material or restraint 
motivated world, we inhabited a place better described by theories which emphasize the 
flow of information as an explanation of why states decide to pursue international 
authorization. This perspective focuses on the role of IOs in providing information about 
a proposed use of military force. This perspective holds that audiences who are concerned 
about the projection of military force want reassurance about the consequences of the 
action (Voeten 2005).33 International authorization signals to these audiences that the 
consequences of the action will be benign (Chapman 2011; Thompson 2006, 2009). As 
independent actors, IOs can transmit credible information about the relative merits of a 
proposed projection of military force. If leaders think the political costs of their proposed 
action will be high and they are willing to pay the costs of acting through the IO, they 
will request international authorization to reassure audiences (Thompson 2006, 2009).34 
The theory of strategic information transmission incorporates the political costs and 
constraints from IOs to explain the motives of leaders who requests international 
                                                 
33 Target audiences may also include domestic elites such as the U.S. Congress (Schultz 2003) or the 
domestic public (Chapman 2009, 2011; Fang 2008). 
34 If the situation is one in which the action itself is seen widely as a legitimate action (i.e., situations such 
the U.S. in Afghanistan in 2001) there is no need to request authorization. Very low political costs are thus 
anticipated, but at the same time since the political costs are so low the constraints to be imposed by the IO 
would thus be correspondingly small as well. An alternative situation, at the other end of the spectrum, is 
where the action is extraordinarily controversial. Under these conditions the prospect for authorization by 
the organization are very low since it is a dubious prospect to project military force. This suggests that only 
within the particular middle ground of political costs would leaders request international authorization. 
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authorization.35 The value of the transmission of information for leaders is a function of 
the expected political costs of the action, compared to the costs they would incur to 
secure international authorization from the IO. This section focuses on anticipated 
political costs, while the next one addresses the issue of IO constraints. 
The commitment to the process of acquiring international authorization generates 
audience costs if a potential projector were to break this commitment (Slantchev 2006). 
This process, which reassures target audiences, can include targeting either foreign elites 
(Fearon 1997) or the general public within foreign states (Thompson 2009).36 Foreign 
leaders and their populations may be concerned when other states decide to project 
military force beyond their borders since this action signals to others that a projector is 
not content with the status quo and the action may have harmful consequences. The 
endorsement of a neutral organization signals the projector’s benign intentions and 
suggests that the action will have limited consequences. The effect of securing 
international authorization is to provide a “second opinion” about a proposed projection 
of military force confirming their support (Grieco et al. 2011). For instance, the UNSC’s 
endorsement provides credible information to foreign audiences because of its 
institutional features and diverse membership (Thompson 2009, 39). IO support has an 
effect on the domestic support for the projection of military force. 
                                                 
35 The argument is best expressed in Thompson (2009), which stresses that the anticipation of high 
international political costs and a low sensitivity to the requirements of acquiring international 
authorization will lead states to the UNSC. If one of these conditions is absent then the projector will turn 
to an RIO, if available, for international authorization. This situation is addressed later in this chapter. 
36 Foreign policy actions require some level of support beyond the set of policy makers in democratic and 
autocratic states. Democratic states require greater support from the citizenry. The channels of influence 
that the mass public has on autocratic leaders may be weaker and much more complicated than in 
democratic states. 
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This perspective is consistent with the notion that a powerful state would benefit 
from working through an IO, part of international political order, to project military force 
(Ikenberry 2001). Doing so restrains the preponderant state in exchange for the promise 
that other states will cooperate in the future. Working through an IO signals to other 
states that the powerful state will account for their interests in maintaining international 
order. 
Limitations of Political Costs 
An explanation based on transmitting information does have some limits. If this 
explanation best describes the pattern of requests for international authorization, then 
anticipated political costs during the Cold War were very low. According to this theory, 
low political costs lead to few requests for international authorization, as we saw during 
the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, anticipated political costs for projecting 
military force should have risen and thus there were more requests for international 
authorization. Missing from this explanation is an account of how political costs were 
lower during the Cold War creating the pattern of state behavior describes by the 
dependent variable. 
The second issue concerns the expectation that independent or even hostile 
organizations should be approached. Hostile organizations conceivably would not be 
expected to provide international authorization. According to this approach, meaningful 
information is conveyed by the endorsement of an organization which is not expected to 
endorse a proposed projection of military force. If an IO is expected to endorse the 
projection of military force, then a target audience has not gained any new information 
about the consequences of a proposed operation. Conservative, independent organizations 
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are unlikely to endorse a projection of military force which would have negative 
consequences (Thompson 2009, 34). Since these organizations are not expected to 
endorse military force, there is no political downside to asking (Chapman 2011). The 
UNSC and the Arab League are conservative organizations for the U.S. which are not 
expected to authorize a U.S. projection of military force. Getting rejected is without 
political significance to any target audience but getting the authorization from a 
conservative IO yields great political benefits because its endorsement goes against 
expectations.37 On the other hand, NATO is a less conservative organization where the 
U.S. is expected to get a more favorable hearing. Rejection in this forum can provide new 
information about the proposed operation which target audiences did not have prior to the 
IO authorization. 
Theoretically, if rejection does not involve any cost then projectors should always 
request international authorizations from organizations which they expect will not 
provide support. Taken to its logical and absurd conclusion, a state should request 
international authorization from organizations which are openly hostile to its interests 
since to do so could only yield benefits. The U.S. should have sought international 
authorization from the League of Arab States or the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War.38 
                                                 
37 The effect of confounding expectations is that credible information is provided to target audiences. This 
transmission occurs when membership of an organization is composed of either diverse states who hold 
preferences which can be in opposition to the projector or like-minded states who hold similar preferences 
but are likely to be opposed to the projector (Thompson 2009, 38-39). This effect emerges because of the 
difference between like-minded and difference-mined actors and their judgments. Difference-minded actors 
are those who by virtue of their expected opposition to the projector’s policies make a difference by voicing 
their support for the projector. Like-minded actors make a difference if they voice their opposition. Both of 
these rely upon the actor voicing an unexpected opinion. 
38 While the U.S. is not a member of the Arab League, it has endorsed U.S. military action in some 
situations. These endorsements include the Persian Gulf War and the Libyan Intervention in 2011. 
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A rejection would have no significance to any audience which the U.S. would want to 
court so it encounters no political risk. While there is a rationale to this kind of strategy 
for the leaders of states when contemplating the projection of military force, empirical 
evidence does not suggest that this is what has taken place or that leaders have any 
similar strategy when contemplating a request. IOs tend serve the interests of their 
members, so it makes sense that the other members of the organization would share 
similar preferences. The fact that these absurd predictions logically and reasonably flow 
from the assumptions made within this explanation suggests that at a certain point it no 
longer makes sense to approach a hostile organization. But there is no theoretical 
justification about where this threshold should exist. The choice of which IO to approach 
must include some possibility that it will provide international authorization but not for 
every proposed military action. This is increasingly relevant for organizations which, 
under different conditions, may endorse the policy of an actor which they would not have 
even contemplated at a previous time.39 
A third issue arrises when more than one IO endorses a projection of military 
force. If an organization is not expected to provide its authorization, then it should serve 
the political purposes of the projector. The expectation should be that the acquisition of 
international authorization from this organization should be enough, and the projector 
would stop pursuing international authorization from other organizations.40 Empirically, 
                                                 
39 For instance, the League of Arab States is an organization which is generally perceived as hostile towards 
the U.S., but has also endorsed projections of military force by the U.S. 
40 If an organization meets the criteria set by the authors of this argument, then it should be used as they 
suggest. Thompson (2009) and Chapman (2011) claim that based on the institutional design the UNSC is 
an IO which holds the ability to transmit credible information about a proposed projection of military force. 
The institutional design features concern composition of the membership and decision-making procedures. 
These features are important only in conveying credible information because they make it unlikely for the 
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this does not seem to be the case. One example of this would where an organization such 
as the Arab League provides authorization for an intervention against an Arab state 
(Thompson 2009, 39). We should expect that the U.S. upon receiving their endorsement 
would not need to turn to any other organization since this endorsement provides the 
political cover necessary to conduct military operations without international opposition. 
If the Arab League provides endorsement we should not expect the U.S. decision makers 
go to a different forum. However, in several instances, the U.S. has projected military 
force where the blessing of the Arab League came prior to the authorization from the 
UNSC. This includes U.S. actions in the Persian Gulf (1991), in Libya (2011) and even in 
the situation with Syria and the Arab Spring.41 Theoretically distinguishing between 
organizations which meet the criteria to convey credible information is a difficulty for 
theoretical explanations which focus on the transmission of information from 
international organizations. 
Fourth, this kind of explanation does not provide a rationale for why turning to an 
IO is the way the decision-making process should proceed over other methods to reduce 
political costs. It does not specify why leaders expect IOs to be better at reducing costs 
than other means. An attempt to reduce political costs comes from the reason why the 
action is controversial. For the use of military force the trend comes from the goal or 
                                                                                                                                                 
organization to support projections of military force. If an alternative organization holds similar features or 
is expected not to support a projection, then it should logically convey credible information at the same 
level as the UNSC. Other organizations which are unlikely to support the U.S. include the League of Arab 
States, the Gulf Cooperation Council or the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation. All of these at one 
point or another have lent support to U.S. military action. 
41 Calls for intervention by the Arab League also have more recently included calls for the UNSC to step in 
to authorize intervention (e.g., Stack and MacFarquhar 2012). NATO has done the same thing in its 
assessment of when military force can be projected (Knowlton 2011). 
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intentions of the projector. Goals, such as regime change, are very controversial and fit 
the reason why there were problems with securing international authorization against Iraq 
under the presidency of George W. Bush. Other means can be used to reduce the 
international political costs which include forming rhetorical reassurances such as 
increasing transparency in policy making, notification procedures, forms of credible 
commitments, and accepting more limited goals including limitations on troop 
movements. These forms of means have the ability to successfully signal to other states 
the projector’s intentions (Fearon 1997). 
Political Costs Tests and Observable Implications 
Anticipated political costs as a variable are assessed as high, medium and low 
anticipated political costs and assessed through qualitative means. Rather than material 
resources stressed by realism, this explanation focuses on political concerns and can be 
stated as the proposition: 
International Political Costs Hypothesis:  
The anticipation of high political costs for the proposed projection of 
military force increases the likelihood of projectors requesting 
international authorization. 
Specific observable implications of this explanation can be assessed and are identified in 
the remaining parts of this section. They are used to test this hypothesis that high 
anticipated political costs drive the decision to request international authorization. 
Political Costs Patterns. The pattern of behavior which this explanation predicts is 
based on IOs reducing the political costs of a projection of military force. Global 
organizations, such as the UNSC, and regional ones have the ability to reduce these costs. 
According to this explanation the pattern of state behavior should show that many 
different organizations are approached to authorize the projection of military force since a 
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multitude of IOs can reduce political costs. While the decision to request international 
authorization may be based on the particulars of each instance, the overarching pattern 
should display varied use of IOs. 
Political Costs Decision Making and Discourse. The decision to request international 
authorization would be primarily a political decision about how to bolster support for the 
policy. Political advisers should be the source of the pressure within the administration to 
request international authorization.42 The process should compare different IOs and their 
relative merits. The decision makers will settle on the IO which can best work for the 
political purposes of the executive administration. IOs would be viewed as a tool which 
can be used to solve political problems rather than a hurdle to get through. These foreign 
policy advisors should focus upon the mandate of the IO, and how to reduce political 
problems. Discussion of how to sell the mission would be privately espoused by 
comments to other political advisers. Military advisers should focus on the operational 
aspects of the proposed use of military force rather than political issues. Military advisers 
should exhibit concern about the constraints of working through an IO and altering the 
policy to suit the concerns of other states. (The next explanation offers a discussion on IO 
constraints.) 
The place where the diplomatic work takes place should vary depending on the 
anticipated political costs. If the anticipated political costs are high, then the drafting of 
statements and resolutions should be by the high ranking executive administration 
officials. If costs are thought to be low, then it should take place within the diplomatic 
                                                 
42 If there are alternative methods of lowering the political costs without resorting to international 
authorization, then political advisers should prefer the alternative since it means avoiding the costs of 
working through an IO. 
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mission to the international organizations. After securing international authorization, 
leaders in the intervening state should stress the informational attributes of the 
organization in their public remarks. They should discuss the neutrality and varied 
membership of the IO. The leaders should affirm that this is a clear signal that the 
projection of military force is justified and will not have harmful consequences.  
International Reactions to Political Costs. Leaders of observer states should discuss the 
information they receive from the IO and what can be inferred from others’ use of the 
same organization. Prior to the projector securing international authorization, observer 
states should express their concerns about the intentions of the projector. These leaders 
should express their support for the projection of military force in the aftermath of 
authorization which correspond to their “before” concern. They should suggest that the 
IO’s authorization demonstrates benign intentions. Their “before” concerns should reflect 
their criticism after a projection of military force without international authorization. 
IO Constraints: Reasons to Avoid Making a Request 
While signaling may be a reason to go to an IO, we turn to a perspective that 
suggests that the decision is dominated by concerns about reasons not to make a request. 
Assessing the costs of acquiring international authorization influences this decision 
(Kreps 2011; Thompson 2009). Decision makers may view the acquisition of 
international authorization as having benefits that need to be considered in light of the 
downside of international authorization. Any decision to request international 
authorization compares the benefits to the costs of international authorization. The costs 
of international authorization represent constraints on the projector’s freedom of action 
and as organizational costs to conduct the operation. This perspective suggests the 
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benefits of international authorization come, at least in part, from the projector’s 
willingness to pay these costs before engaging in a projection of military force. 
Organizational requirements are separate from the costs required to make policy 
and run the military operation—costs which come from working through the organization 
that do not directly affect the specific decision making. Two important organizational 
costs are scrutiny costs (Thompson 2009, 62) and transaction costs (Keohane 1984, 89-
92). Scrutiny costs are incurred through the process of gaining authorization from an IO 
by making public the details of the policy. Because the projector goes through an IO for 
authorization, other states get the opportunity to review the interests, intentions, and 
methods of a foreign policy action. Public discussion and deliberation focuses on the 
details of the proposed military action. The process of requesting international 
authorization increases the scrutiny costs since it affords the opportunity for other states 
to closely examine the proposed policy action. This public scrutiny becomes an 
opportunity for many to criticize the projector and raises the political price if the policy 
fails (Baum 2004). Transaction costs include efforts to gain authorization which include 
the diplomatic efforts to persuade others to vote in favor of international authorization.43 
International institutions can lower transaction costs by providing a permanent setting for 
diplomatic interactions (Keohane 1982), but they can also increase certainty by raising 
them as well. The diplomatic initiatives such as side payments and threats also fall into 
this category of cost. All of these efforts to secure international authorization require time 
                                                 
43 This activity may be lower in comparison to a world without the specific organization but there are still 
forms of transactions involved in the diplomatic negotiations which require states to put resources into their 
effort to attempt securing international authorization.  
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spent which can stall other actions. Delaying the proposed projection of military force is 
seen by many as the most significant cost paid for international authorization. 
Constraints limit a projector’s freedom of action when it works through an IO to 
project military force. This process complicates policy making, reduces autonomy from 
unilateral action, and can bind the projector to a specific policy or face the domestic costs 
of breaking its commitment (Fearon 1997). These constraints are a form of policy making 
cost (Thompson 2009, 59) which forces the projector to change goals, methods, and often 
the timing of action when conducting military operations. Adjustments are made in 
conducting the military operation to account for other actors’ contributions to the 
operation. Contributing to an operation provides the coalition member with the right to 
voice how the operation should be run, thus increasing the influence costs where the 
projector needs to gain approval of (or explicitly reject pressures from) other coalition 
members at each decision point (Thompson 2009, 59).44 Compromises in the projector’s 
policy increase the costs of the operation and may threaten the projector’s interests 
(Kreps 2007). Interoperability of the various military units is also an issue for the 
coalition. Each additional member makes working as a coherent whole more complicated 
and thus difficult to manage (Kreps 2007). International authorization commits the 
projector to a specific policy. If the projector were to deviate from this policy it would 
face increased costs based on what the projector has already committed to enact.45 These 
                                                 
44 At a minimum the projector would need to inform its allies of any changes in plans. 
45 The U.S., France, and the United Kingdom have faced this problem in their interactions with Russia over 
the Arab Spring movement in Syria. Russia has claimed that the U.S. and its allies exceeded the UNSC 
mandate to use force in 2011 Libya (MacFarquhar 2012; Russian diplomat: Moscow will block any UN 
resolution urging Assad to step down 2012). The Russian Federation is reluctant to support criticism of the 
Syrian regime and is even willing to veto resolutions that do so. This is an international diplomatic cost 
regarding cooperation on Middle East politics. 
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contributions to a military operation limit the autonomy of a projector in making and 
carrying out a projection of military force. 
Limitations of IO Constraints 
The costs of projecting military force through an international organization 
demonstrate similar problems to that of anticipated political costs. If the constraints of 
IOs explain the rise of international authorization, then a dramatic shift in these 
constraints must have taken place. During the Cold War, constraints imposed by IOs 
must be substantially greater than after the end of the Cold War.46 Empirically, the 
pattern which should emerge should show something that makes IOs more lenient during 
the post-Cold War period. The constraints imposed may reflect the hostility the IO or its 
members have towards either the projector or the action which is under evaluation. As 
political institutions, IOs may not evaluate the actual legitimacy of the projection of 
military force at all. Members of the IO may take their positions only based on politics.47 
The influence of this variable is different from the others discussed in this chapter. 
The presence of this variable pushes states away from requesting international 
authorization rather than drawing them in. This factor is influential if the decision makers 
include the costs of working through the IO as their reason for not making a request when 
they otherwise would do so. Hence there needs to be other factors pushing the state to 
request international authorization. If these factors are present and the costs are seen to be 
too high for the decision makers, then we should still see the state project military force 
                                                 
46 Empirically this may be the case for the UN for either of the major Cold War combatants. However, 
other IOs which have only the U.S. or the USSR should be approached. The Warsaw Pact or NATO should 
serve as an adequate venue for a potential projector. 
47 This perspective suggests that a diverse membership reduces the potential bias of an IO. 
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without international authorization. IO constraints have to be weighed in consideration 
with the benefits of international authorization. Even if costs are very small but benefits 
are lacking, a rational calculation would still suggest that a projector will not put forward 
a request. However, it is not clear when the costs of international authorization exceed the 
threshold that would deter a projector from making a request. 
IO Constraints Tests and Observable Implications 
When sensitivity to IO constraints becomes high the projector will be less likely 
to request international authorization. If sensitivity to these costs is low a projector is 
more likely to pursue international authorization through the IO. This explanation focuses 
on costs paid for working through an IO rather than material or political costs which 
drive a state to request international authorization. This explanation can be stated as a 
general proposition. 
IO Constraints Hypothesis:  
The insensitivity to constraints imposed by IOs increases the likelihood 
leaders will request international authorization. 
This explanation does not offer any predictions about the international reactions of 
observer states. The remaining parts of this section examine the observable implications 
of the behavioral patterns and decision-making predictions from this variable. 
IO Constraints Patterns. As with anticipated political costs, the IO constraint 
perspective suggests that projectors should request international authorization from many 
different IOs. The attempt here is to reduce the constraints on the projector. Different IOs 
may place different degrees of constraints upon the projector. It would make sense to see 
the projector asses which IO constrains the least. We should see different IOs approached 
to provide international authorization. 
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Based on this explanation a secondary pattern in state behavior should be 
apparent. Decisions to request international authorization should display a clustered 
pattern where international authorizations appear in groups rather than in isolated 
instances. The decision to request international authorization is dependent upon the 
sensitivity of the leaders in the intervening state to constraints. Some of leaders are more 
sensitive than others but the executive administration should have a similar disposition 
when contemplating different instances when the same administration has an opportunity 
to project military force. President Reagan’s Administration should not substantially 
change its sensitivity to IO constraints while in office. The Reagan Administration held a 
similar disposition towards IO constraints the entire time Reagan was in office. The 
Clinton Administration should hold a consistent disposition toward IO constraints when 
contemplating the projection of military force in 1993 compared to the disposition of the 
administration in 1998, and so on. The decision to either request international 
authorization or not is dependent upon the disposition of the administration and should be 
correlated with each executive leader so that requests are clustered together. 
IO Constraints Decision Making and Discourse. Within the decision-making process 
when IO constraints are the primary issue, sovereignty and autonomy should be identified 
as major concerns while decision makers plan the projection of military force and 
determine whether to request international authorization. If sensitivity to IO constraints is 
high, decision makers will not want to modify their goals for others even when pressed 
by strong allies. If they are not sensitive they will be more willing to alter their goals to 
accommodate others. However, the decision to project military force should not be 
connected to the prospects of acquiring international authorization. The decision should 
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be seen as separate by decision makers. When sensitivity is high, delays for diplomatic 
activity would be highly criticized. This explanation does not make predictions about 
where the support for requesting IA should come from but it does make predictions about 
where opposition should come from. The opposition should come from operators 
including military advisers who should be the most sensitive to the constraints of IOs.  
If decision makers are concerned about the costs of IO constraints as a high 
priority, it would make sense that they would discuss the costs of requesting international 
authorization from different fora. The next section discusses what this would look like. 
Permutations on Politics and Constraints: Forum Shopping 
Proponents of the theory of strategic information transmission suggest that 
considering sensitivity to IO constraints and anticipation of high political costs together 
will produce an outcome different than if either is considered independently. Thompson 
(2009) asserts that the presence of only one of these factors leads projectors to look for an 
RIO for international authorization. The anticipation of high international political costs 
and a low sensitivity to the requirements of acquiring international authorization will lead 
states to the UNSC. The UNSC is the most effective IO for this purpose of lowering 
political costs of the projection of military force (Chapman 2011; Thompson 2006, 2009). 
The UNSC has design characteristics which boost political support when it provides an 
operation with international authorization. If a projector’s leaders anticipate low political 
costs there is no need to turn to an IO for international authorization. If only one of these 
variables points in the direction for a projector to request international authorization then 
the projector should turn to an RIO, if one is available, rather than to the UNSC. RIOs are 
thought to impose fewer constraints on a projector. If the sensitivity to IO constraints are 
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high and the anticipated political costs are as well, then an RIO may offer lower 
constraints and still be able to reduce the political costs faced by the projector. 
Limitations of Forum Shopping 
The logic of this explanation does contain a problem. The choice between a global 
IO (the UNSC) and a RIO is not well explained. That projectors would pursue RIO 
authorization may make logical sense. If, as this explanations suggests, decision makers 
are concerned about the political costs of projecting military force and IO constraints, 
then they should always prefer an RIO to the UNSC. They should do this since projecting 
military force is always politically risky. So, the notion of anticipating political costs 
which can be ameliorated by a formal IO should always be present. And, if state leaders 
are also concerned with sovereignty and autonomy then they would prefer a less 
constraining IO. To some degree this concern resides in all political leaders who want to 
remain in power as political leaders. The qualities of RIOs should make them the 
preferred solution to the issue of the combined tensions of anticipated political costs and 
IO constraints. Political costs will be reduced so that the projector reaps the benefits of 
the IO’s authorization and the constraints are lower than they would be if the projector 
sought authorization from the UNSC. RIOs can more easily be controlled by the 
projector, yet they have political benefits which would make them the preferred choice to 
reduce political costs anticipated by the leaders of a projector. 
Forum Shopping Tests and Observable Implications 
The expectations or predictions based on this variant of information transmission 
do not make any unique predictions about international reactions. The unique predictions 
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are based on when leaders anticipate high political costs but do not want to pay the costs 
of IO constraints. The outcome can be presented as a general hypothesis. 
Forum Shopping Hypothesis:  
Anticipation of high political costs of a projection of military force and 
high sensitivity to IO constraints will increase the likelihood that leaders 
will request international authorization from a RIO. 
Forum Shopping Patterns. As with the anticipated political costs and IO constraints, 
many IOs should be considered by the potential projector. The forum which suits the 
immediate political purposes of the projector will be the one selected for any given 
instance. This will show up in the pattern of state behavior. If the limitations of this 
explanation hold, RIOs should be the preferred source of international authorization. We 
should see states requesting international authorization from RIOs more frequently than 
from either the UNSC or failing to request authorization. 
Forum Shopping Decision Making and Discourse. Decision makers should discuss the 
costs and benefits of different IOs. The issue of which IO would constrain the projector 
the least should emerge when discussing the prospects of projecting military force. The 
cases from both time periods, during and after the Cold War, include enough variation to 
ensure that the factors which may influence “IO constraints” unique to each time period 
should not bias any results. 
Norms and an Era of Multilateralism 
Moving away from more “materialist” explanations, this next section takes us into 
a realm where an ideational factor, the norm of multilateralism, describes why leaders 
decide to request international authorization. According to the logic of this explanation, 
states should request authorization because of the perceived appropriateness of the 
approval from a formal international organization and related procedures a projector must 
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go through when projecting military force (Finnemore 2003). Proponents of this theory 
argue that a growing norm of multilateralism emerged after the Second World War 
(Ruggie 1992), prompting increased authorization requesting in state behavior.48 This 
norm is durable despite changing circumstances, including differences in the material 
distribution of power within the international system (Weber 1992). Fundamental 
changes in the normative framework used to evaluate the projection of military force took 
place after the end of World War II which required a more substantive form of 
multilateralism when conducting operations to project military force (Finnemore 1998). 
The projection of military force became acceptable if it was conducted through 
multilateral procedures rather than unilateral actions of a single state (Finnemore 2003).49 
Projecting military force with the authorization of a formal IO is seen as the correct way 
to do so. 
The logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1998) forms the basis of this 
theoretical explanation.50 Multilateralism is seen as a good in itself as opposed to any 
potential material benefits of acting multilaterally. The process of working through a 
                                                 
48 There is a difference between ‘substantive’ multilateralism which emerged after the end of World War II 
and formal forms of multilateralism which existed previously (Ruggie 1992). This understanding of what is 
multilateral changed in substantive qualitative ways from the 19th century producing the effect that 
coordination through a formal international organization is a necessary step for multilateralism and thus the 
legitimacy of the intervention itself. Substantive multilateralism requires working through an international 
organization while a formal form of multilateralism merely requires the cooperation of more than two 
states. Such an interpretation suggests that ‘formal’ multilateralism would include two armies fighting the 
same enemy but without any form of coordination or adaptation of policy to account for the other army. 
49 An additional change in the normative framework happened along with the move to substantive 
multilateralism. The normative understanding of who is human changed to include nonwhite foreign 
citizens (Finnemore 1996). While this altered when states decided to project military force this aspect of the 
normative framework does not influence the means by which states decide to project military force. 
50 The logic of consequences suggests actors view their action based on consequences in contrast to the 
logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1998). 
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formal IO opens the process for other states to see the actions taken by the primary 
projector and to criticize aspects of the policy prior to its implementation. This process of 
working through a formal IO thus legitimates the policy to member states.51 Their ability 
to voice their opinion enhances the legitimacy of the policy. This explanation suggests 
that multilateralism is the proper way to pursue goals when projecting military force. 
Limitations of Multilateralism 
This perspective suggests that the norm of multilateralism has grown stronger 
since the end of World War II. A particular difficulty for this theory of the rise of 
international authorization is the dramatic change between the Cold War and post-Cold 
War eras. To explain this difference the theory of the norm of multilateralism would have 
to become substantially stronger right at the end of the Cold War, and evidence of this 
should be clear that the multilateralism norm is connected to the behavior of states. 
However, this explanation suggests that most formal international organizations would 
meet the needed procedural requirements of the norm. The expectation is that many 
different IOs would be used by states requesting international authorization for normative 
reasons.52 
                                                 
51 Criticism does not have to be given for the process to legitimate the action. It is merely enough to 
provide the opportunity for other states to criticize the potential action. This reaction occurred during the 
formation of the United Nations as smaller states objected to the right of the veto but acquiesced to its 
inclusion in the UN Charter in part because they had the opportunity to register their objections (Hurd 
2007). 
52 This is in contrast to the authority of the UNSC discussed in the next section. 
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Multilateralism Tests and Observable Implications 
The potential values of a norm of multilateralism for projecting military force can 
be strong, weak or not present. The strength of the norm can be assessed and the general 
proposition will be tested. This can be stated as a general hypothesis. 
Multilateral Norm Hypothesis:  
The high value projectors’ leaders place on the process of multilateralism 
increases the likelihood of requesting international authorization. 
The remainder of this section examines the observable implications of this explanation 
and develops tests for the norm of multilateralism. 
Multilateral Patterns. Several techniques can be used to test this explanation of the rise 
of international authorization. The pattern of state behavior should display an increase in 
the frequency of multilateral operations for the projection of military force. The increase 
should be gradual as the multilateral norm gathers strength. Projectors should request 
international authorization from different sources since the procedure required of a norm 
of multilateralism is that the projection be approved by a formal international 
organization. The global security organization, the UNSC, or RIOs with a security related 
focus suit this purpose and can be used by projectors to authorize their projections of 
military force. Both are available and should be seen in the pattern of requests. 
Multilateral Decision Making and Discourse. The decision-making process should 
display a consideration and emphasis on multilateral procedures. Leaders of projectors 
should request international authorization because of their sense of procedural 
correctness. This concern should be evident in planning meetings. Most decision makers 
will view it necessary to consult with major allies and raise the issue through an 
institutionalized organization such as NATO, the UNSC, or other multilateral fora. 
Leaders should be willing to modify their goals to accommodate other states as this may 
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be necessary for them to secure international authorization. Accommodating other states’ 
interests indicates the value of the institution of multilateralism over the parochial 
interests of individual states. This decision to project military force is connected to the 
prospects of acquiring international authorization. 
Organizational bodies should be described by leaders both in their public remarks 
and in planning meetings as legitimate fora for international authorization and their 
related procedures. The source of the push to request international authorization should 
come from many sources since this is a norm that guides the leaders of the projector. 
When the norm is contested the sources should primarily be political but as the norm 
becomes stronger we should see others joining the support for requesting international 
authorization. The last holdouts should be those who are ideologically opposed. The 
diplomatic work should take place within the diplomatic mission when the norm has 
become consolidated. The process assumes a “taken-for-granted” quality as the act of 
making a request for international authorization becomes less controversial until it 
becomes a regular habit of projectors. 
International Reactions to Multilateralism. When international authorization has been 
granted, observer states should justify their support by stressing the multilateral character 
of the action and the organization to bestow international authorization. Leaders of 
observer states should suggest that the projector act multilaterally. As the norm gathers in 
strength pressure from foreign leaders should increase as well. The intentions of the 
projector are not relevant for a process based account. This is an explanation based on the 
norm of the projector following proper procedures. Foreign leaders should not be 
concerned with the consequences of the action itself. Support for the projection of 
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military force should increase with international authorization. Foreign leaders should 
justify their support or opposition to a proposed projection of military force on the basis 
of following the proper procedures contained in the international authorization. 
A good way to identify a functioning multilateral norm is by examining responses 
when the norm has been violated. Foreign leaders’ response to a lack of authorization by 
characterizing it as a violation of the proper procedures of multilateralism will 
demonstrate support for this explanation. Characterizing the lack of authorization as 
against their interests or for some other reason will cast doubt on this as a reason for the 
rise of international authorization. 
UNSC Authority 
A different form of constructivist explanation holds that decisions to request 
international authorization after 1989 are due to a dynamic of UNSC authority over a 
state’s projection of military force rather than variables such as the value of the 
information signaled. This perspective suggests that the greater authority of the UNSC 
emerged as a consequence of the U.S. decision to request international authorization from 
the UNSC during the Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991. This explanation posits that 
requesting international authorization became the model for projecting military force in 
the post-Cold War international environment. The Persian Gulf War was seen as a 
success both in terms of international cooperation and for the goals set during this 
military action. In contrast to the alternative explanations discussed earlier in this chapter, 
this explanation takes a different perspective on causality. It stresses the path-dependent 
characteristic (Pierson 2004, 17-55) of this institutionalized model which emerged from 
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an historical event.53 Once a choice has been made, subsequent decisions face constraints 
which provide incentives for remaining on the same ‘path’ which has already been 
marked. The U.S. acted during the uncertainty accompanying the end of the Cold War, 
reinforced its action by using rhetoric which attributed authority to the UNSC, and then 
continued to act as if the UNSC held this authority. This argument requires two parts. 
First, there is a period of time where there is uncertainty and, as a consequence of this 
uncertainty, greater opportunities for action. At this point in time new, different, or 
experimental actions can be undertaken.54 Second, within this time period a precedent is 
created which breaks from previous modes of behavior. A precedent is “an act or 
statement that serves or is intended to serve as an example, reason, or justification for a 
later one” (Kier and Mercer 1996, 79).55 The precedent is reinforced and becomes the 
foundation of an institutionalized model of state behavior (Kier and Mercer 1996). 
Precedents shape the way we think about similar events or later acts. It is reinforced 
through rhetoric, where actors claim the necessary of requesting international 
authorization before projecting military force and through action. Actors may engage in 
strategic behavior for instrumental advantage, and many may do so because they see this 
is how it has been done before.56 Actions are more likely to become precedents under two 
                                                 
53 This comes from the notion that any decision to project military force is influenced by the events which 
surround previous decisions to project military force. 
54 These junctures are often referred to as critical junctures (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007) or turning points 
(Abbott 1997). 
55 Precedents are not new to international politics. Thomas Schelling (1966) identifies precedent as an 
important part of conflicts including the Cold War. Precedents distinctively “…will be the more expectable, 
the more recognizable, the more natural and obvious, the more people have got used to recognizing it in the 
past” (Schelling 1966, 138). 
56 One problem in demonstrating that norms or ideas matter for individuals is that strategic action is often 
seen as an indication that a norm is not functioning. Change in cultural structures often includes at least 
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conditions: when they are undertaken under conditions of uncertainty and when they are 
viewed as successful. Uncertainty about the prevailing structures means that actors are 
looking for guideposts to the expectations of what others will do. Actors are willing to 
mimic others’ actions in a response to uncertainty, ensuring that the legitimacy of the 
action spreads (DiMaggio and Powell 1991b, 67). Thus, precedent starts a path-
dependent process that produces a behavioral norm. 
The first part of this argument is that the end of the Cold War was a time of 
uncertainty. In an environment of uncertainty decisive action can change the trajectory of 
subsequent events (Sewell 1996a). The alternative explanations, offered earlier in this 
chapter, start from a conception of temporality which holds the structure which constrains 
social interactions as constant and universal.57 Adopting an “eventful” conception of 
temporality suggests that historic events contribute to the shape of structures (Sewell 
1996b).58 Events are capable of changing both the composition of causal forces and the 
logic by which these structures operate (Sewell 1996b, 263). In other words historical 
events have the capacity to change the constraints faced by individuals by changing the 
                                                                                                                                                 
three groups: those who oppose the change outright, many who are “true believers,” and those who follow 
the new pattern of behavior for instrumental reasons (Eckstein 1988). In a sense, the behavior is followed 
by both “true believers” and by those who do not believe that it is appropriate but who act strategically and 
instrumentally because it benefits them. In addition, differing standards of appropriateness can be 
strategically employed by actors such that they put forth different claims about ideational standards of how 
action should take place. Decision to claim one over another can be made on the basis of the strategy used 
by various actors who are attempting to achieve specific goals. 
57 One exception is the norm of multilateralism which views social structure as gradually changing over 
time. This approach does not require a break from previous modes of human action. 
58 The debates over agency and structure are present in sociological literatures (Granovetter 1985; Sewell 
1992) as well as discussions of international politics (Bieler and Morton 2001; Clark 1998; Dessler 1989; 
Wendt 1987; Wight 1999) and even studies of foreign policy (Carlsnaes 1992).  
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location of the various structures and, equally  important, how these structures constrain 
different actors. 
Crafting an explanation about changes in international structures means adopting 
a more historic or “eventful” view of causality. The explanation of the frequency of 
international authorization holds that the greater authority of the UNSC motivated 
changes in state behavior after the Cold War. These changes occur because of decisive 
action taken by a notable actor under conditions of uncertainty.59 The end of the Cold 
War created a juncture where actors were unsure how they should act towards the UN 
Security Council. An eventful juncture occurs when structural constraints on the options 
for political action are relaxed (Capoccia & Keleman 2007).60 During such a juncture, 
expectations of how states would behave were unclear. Under such conditions decisive 
and successful policy actions can provide long lasting changes in the expectations of how 
actors are supposed to behave. The actions taken are strategic for immediate purposes. In 
                                                 
59 This decisive action came to be seen as legitimate. Legitimacy is especially important for the study of the 
UNSC as the Council does not control any of the means of coercive force within the international realms. 
This connection between legitimacy and the UNSC is not something new. Inis Claude (1966, 1967) 
introduced the concept of “collective legitimation” whereby policy statements from some actors become 
authoritative. Scholars who have discussed “collective legitimization” and the role of the UNSC in 
producing a legitimation effect include institutionalists (Keohane 2006; Thompson forthcoming; Voeten 
2005), constructivists (Hurd 2007), and legal scholars (Welsh 2004), among others (Luard 1984). This use 
of collective legitimation focuses upon the effect of the statements by UNSC. However, collective 
legitimation as an explanation for the behavior of states towards the UNSC does not account for the 
variance in state behavior between the Cold War and post-Cold War time periods. A theory based on 
collective legitimation would hold that the authoritativeness of the UNSC is constant and thus would 
require additional factors to explain the variance. A precedent-based account can be built upon this 
foundation as legitimacy has been recognized by those involved in UN peacekeeping operations as a 
significant aspect of peacebuilding (Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2008). 
60 Capoccia and Keleman (2007) use this definition to identify “critical” junctures. I use their definition to 
identify “eventful” junctures where multiple choices which were previously unavailable become viable. 
Junctures of this nature become critical based on their effects. A choice which creates a different pathway 
can then be described as “critical” in that the juncture resulted in a different trajectory from the previous 
path. An uncritical juncture is a point where opportunities for change occur but the actors involved make 
the decision to continue to act as before the juncture was reached. In effect, these look as if no change from 
the previous pattern has occurred. 
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effect they use “strategic action [to] make transformative events possible in the first 
place” (Sewell 1996b, 271). Such action requires both rhetoric about the appropriateness 
of the category of action and follow-up action where the same actor sought authorization 
using the same model of behavior, this time when attempting to intervene in subsequent 
projections of military force. 
This contingent causal story is one where the initial act occurred during a time 
where the state’s relations with the UNSC were uncertain. Requesting UNSC 
authorization set a precedent which could provide justification for later actions. At the 
time, it represented a potential institutional model which then became a standard to 
evaluate how future uses of projections of military force should take place. Actions taken 
under conditions of uncertainty can set standards for appropriate behavior, but these 
precedents require reinforcement (Kier and Mercer 1996). Especially an action seen 
positively by observers can be used as a standard and hold its appeal as a model for 
subsequent action. Reinforcement takes place when future actions are taken in a similar 
manner to the initial act and reference is made to the original as a reason to act this way. 
If an act is not repeated or used as justification, it stands as an anomaly rather than as 
precedent. Subsequently, anomalies can be disregarded, having failed to transform 
political structures. 
Authority Tests and Observable Implications 
I develop two key claims about the UNSC. The first is that the end of the Cold 
War was a juncture for the UNSC and the United States. The end of the Cold War did 
represent a large change for the international system (Holsti 1994; Ikenberry 2001; 
Ruggie 1994). The end of the Cold War fundamentally changed the relationship between 
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states and the UNSC. The second claim is that UNSC authority has changed. This section 
develops tests of these changes. 
I argue that states request authorization from the UNSC because of the enhanced 
authority of the UN Security Council. Crafting tests of this explanation is more difficult 
than the identification of an eventful juncture. Ian Hurd (2008) suggests three ways to 
identify the authority of the UNSC: state compliance with UNSC rules; the way states 
justify their behavior; and the inclusion of the UNSC in the strategic calculations of 
states. Hurd concludes that this last option is not a very good indicator. The inclusion of 
the UNSC in strategic calculations is observationally equivalent to alternative 
explanations. State compliance and justifications can help identify the authority of the 
UNSC. While each has limitations, examining the justifications used by states has the 
best possibility of identifying the changes in authority. This concept is a difficult to 
measure, and it is difficult to remove confounding influences in any assessment of its 
leverage over an outcome of interest (Hurd 2008, 37). However, strategies exist based on 
the comparative method which can increase the leverage of these tests to assess the 
influence of the UNSC’s authority in a way that can be used to answer the research 
question. 
The first way Hurd discusses to identify the UNSC’s approach is through state 
compliance. If states follow the rules put forth by an IO, this compliance could be an 
indicator that the IO holds authority over the state. This indicator presents problems. 
Compliance with international rules and treaties is a misleading category when evaluating 
causal effects (Martin 2011). While compliance may be an indicator of the authority of an 
IO, compliance failure may not be the result of strategic calculations made by states 
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(Chayes and Chayes 1993). States may not comply because of alternative structural 
reasons that prevent their compliance. 
Often the notion of compliance is taken to indicate that a state should exhibit a 
taken for granted quality rather than a strategic or instrumental approach (Hurd 2008, 33). 
Many assessments of the influence of the UNSC take strategic and socialized rule 
following as mutually exclusive categories (e.g., Chapman 2009; Thompson 2006, 2009). 
This unreasonable standard places the notion of following rules in a position where the 
actor becomes unthinking or reasoning. If rule-followers were simply automatons this 
standard would make sense; however, real people are not. “Reputation, status, and social 
standing are all derived from appropriateness, and all enter into strategic thinking” (Hurd 
2008, 34). Decisions to comply are in fact strategic. Decision to employ symbolic 
standards, such as following UNSC rules, can be strategic decisions (Hurd 2002). When a 
teenager makes the decision to comply with a curfew imposed by her parents, 
enforcement power and authority can both be present in the teenager’s calculations about 
whether to follow the rules. Enforcement can be present because of the fear of grounding, 
and even the desire to avoid disapproval is a strategic calculation which is not based on 
the enforcement powers of the parents. The issue of being grounded would qualify as a 
form of parental hard power, while the issue of the approval of a parent would certainly 
be a soft, intangible, ideational form of power. Compliance involves issues of 
appropriateness. In fact, this example illustrates that compliance is observably equivalent 
to other relations of power (Hurd 2008, 37). Using compliance as a standard for authority 
is thus problematic. 
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The traditional approach to assess such issues is to disentangle compliance as 
motive from compliance. Motive comes from normative pressures while complaince 
comes from material interest. Such a form comes in when leaders discuss whether to 
request international authorization compared to the decision-making discussion where the 
leaders, accepting that they have to make a request, discuss how they want to announce 
their policy of making the request. The latter is often thought of as coming from a 
normative point. The problem with this characterization is that both are actually mixed-
motive discussions. Both decisions include considerations based on material and 
ideational classifications. “Should we request UNSC authorization,” involves the idea of 
good behavior (i.e. “good states go the UNSC”). This is an appropriateness issue but the 
answer includes assessing both material and ideational interests. The latter intersts 
include intangible political issues such as domestic public support and different 
normative standards of behavior. The notion of that leaders consider that “we have to go 
to the UNSC, but how do we talk about it” shows that leaders want to rationalize their 
actions in particular ways. In both kinds of discussions leaders express what they deem 
important when framing their public statements. Strategic behavior includes normative 
frames and competing ideas. Simply identifying compliance without understanding 
motives does not provide much leverage in understanding why states act the way they do. 
The second way to identify authority is based on “examining evidence that actors 
feel the need to justify their behavior to the institution” (Hurd 2008, 34, emphasis in the 
original). If the UNSC had no authority, states would have no reason to justify their 
actions to the organization (Hurd 2008, 35). Justifications used by states may point the 
way towards understanding the operation of UNSC authority. Thus, do the leaders of 
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intervening states justify their decision to request authorization for the international use 
of force in terms of the authority of the UNSC? Evidence of such a proposition includes 
the terms in which leaders frame their decisions to project military force. If the leaders of 
both observer states and projectors frame their decisions in terms of legitimacy and the 
UNSC in their public statements, such framing would corroborate the explanation that the 
authority of the IO matters. The rhetoric used justify previous actions can be used to 
justify their latter actions. Leaders’ use of normative arguments should indicate different 
options and discuss the value of acting multilaterally and the inherent value of 
multilateral action. After the crystallization or institutionalization of the normative 
behavior leaders should then justify their decisions in terms of the international 
community and the appropriateness of projecting military force through the UNSC. This 
can also be stated as a general hypothesis. 
Authority Hypothesis 
Greater authority of the UNSC increases the likelihood of requesting 
international authorization. 
This testable proposition will aid in assessing the causal influence of the authority of the 
UNSC but particular strategies must account for the problems identified by Hurd. First, it 
is necessary to assess the justifications provided in comparable cases. Similar cases 
which control for confounding influences can be used to assess the degree of authority 
present in justifications. Secondly, evaluating the changes in justifications over time can 
provide even greater leverage in one case over another. This can aid in identifying 
variance in the authority and suggest areas where the authority of the UNSC has made a 
difference on the foreign policies of the U.S. and other states. A third strategy is to 
identify circumstances when competing explanations suggest an outcome different than 
the one predicted by the authority of the UNSC. This would provide compelling evidence 
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that the authority of the UNSC is what made a difference in the decisions to pursue 
international authorization for the projection of military force. 
Authority Patterns. Confirming evidence of the change in authority of the UNSC and 
the corresponding change in requests for international authorization should be displayed 
as two different patterns in the two time periods. The first pattern exists until an abrupt 
precipitates a new pattern. Initially, IOs should be used sporadically until crossing a 
threshold. Then there should be an increasing trend towards using the UNSC by the U.S. 
and other states. Justifications for requesting authorization should also change over time. 
When looking at the initial decision to request authorization the justification should be 
based on instrumental calculations rather than authority or precedent. Subsequent 
instances should become increasingly bound by previous decision. This process can 
explain the observed variance in authorization requests between the Cold War and after. 
In the pattern of state behavior which follows from the authority of the UNSC, projectors 
first request international authorization from a single IO which holds authority over the 
projection of military force. This perspective explains both the preference of acquiring 
international authorization from the UNSC and why states will continue to request from 
this source despite receiving authorization from other IOs. 
Authority Decision Making and Discourse. If a model of UN authorization is 
functioning properly, decision makers should discuss prior actions as part of their 
justifications for current policy. Their diplomatic, military, and political advisers should 
make reference to the way the state has acted before and should act again. There should 
be little discussion about deviating from this pattern when the precedent is consolidated. 
Rhetoric reflecting the authority of the UNSC should be present in policy planning 
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meetings such as meetings of the U.S. National Security Council and in the diplomatic 
exchanges within UNSC meetings. The concerns of decision makers should include how 
the UNSC and the international community will react to their plans. The prospects for 
securing international authorization should be linked with the decision to project military 
force. 
If decision makers place great importance on the authority of the UNSC, the 
diplomatic work should take place closer to the center of state foreign policy making 
power, primarily within the executive administration. The significant policy advisers 
should aid in coordinating the activities of the IO diplomatic mission but there should be 
substantial input taken by the executive of the government should provide substantive 
imput for any IO outputs including resolutions. The public messages delivered through 
the UNSC meeting provide a forum for states to put forth notions of what is appropriate 
state behavior. Leaders should characterize the UNSC as authoritative and legitimate in 
their public remarks. The projector would suggest that the UNSC should authorization 
this projection of military force and that the decision will show a clear signal of 
legitimacy of their action. 
Decision makers may discuss alternative fora but only if either of two conditions 
are met. The first is would be during the phase when the norm is still contested. While the 
norm of UNSC authorization is contested some decision makers may suggest that the 
UNSC does not hold the authority necessary to make decisions about when states can 
project military force. This makes sense as the norm itself should be challenged during 
this phase by those who hold opinions in opposition. Some will have instrumental reasons 
to oppose the norm, but as it gains strength some will act in support of the norm for their 
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own instrumental reasons before the norm is consolidated. The second condition under 
which decision makers would discuss alternative fora is if the projector has no prospects 
of securing international authorization from the UNSC. In this case decision makers may 
want to approach a RIO to bolster their case at the UNSC. 
International Reactions to UNSC Authority. Observer state responses are an important 
aspect of the projector’s decision to request international authorization from the UNSC. 
Other states’ expectation of a request for international authorization, it increases the 
prospects of the projector doing so. Leaders of observer states should suggest that the 
projector needs to request international authorization from the UNSC specifically prior to 
projecting military force. They should do so in their public statements and communicate 
this sentiment to the projector’s leaders. UNSC meetings include statements which are 
designed to be public positions of the member states. The representatives to the UNSC 
should discuss the appropriateness of going to the UNSC for authorization to project 
military force. If authorization is given by the UNSC, both foreign leaders and their 
respective publics should increase their support for the proposed projection of military 
force. These groups should justify their support in terms of the authority of the UNSC. If 
a prospective projector fails to secure international authorization from the UNSC, then 
these groups should justify their opposition in the same terms. Other international 
organizations should suggest that the UNSC is the appropriate place to provide 
international authorization over RIOs. 
CONCLUSION 
This project looks at why states request international authorization for the 
projection of military force more often after 1989. This chapter presented the changes in 
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states’ requests for international authorization and put forth the possible explanation for 
this change. States have significantly altered their practices by requesting international 
authorization more frequently after 1989. Several competing explanations for this 
phenomenon draw from different theoretical traditions including realism, institutionalism, 
and constructivism. In presenting these competing explanations I develop the criteria to 
empirically test them. I argue that the constructivist explanation based upon the precedent 
of the U.S. request for international authorization offers the most compelling answer to 
the research question. This explanation contributes a nuanced perspective on how actors 
make strategic use of norms bridging the divide between rationalist and constructivist 
understandings of international politics. 
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CHAPTER III 
PATTERNS OF STATE BEHAVIOR, INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND THE PROJECTION OF  
MILITARY FORCE AFTER 1945 
States do request international authorization for the projection of military force 
and they do so more often after 1989. The previous chapter documented circumstances 
when states requested international authorization from IOs. This chapter provides 
evidence that the rise in international authorization is not solely a “U.S.-centered” 
phenomenon and tests competing hypotheses about the patterns of state authorization 
requesting behavior. The testing compares across different states while later chapters hold 
the projector of military force constant through an in depth examination of the U.S. The 
hypotheses developed and presented in Chapter II from basic and sophisticated realism, 
burden-sharing, and rule of law are tested. These tests show support for the sophisticated 
realist, burden-sharing and regime type hypotheses. While, the UNSC authority 
explanation does hold up, distinguishing between these explanations requires more fine 
grained process tracing. 
INTERNATIONAL AUTHORIZATION AND REQUESTS 
This cross-case data includes projections of military force in which decisions 
could have been made to request international authorization. Table 3.1 shows the 
decisions to project military force.61 The projections in the set span 65 years, covering the 
                                                 
61 The set of cases where states have made the decision to project military force includes all of the cases I 
am aware of after a survey of the literature. This may be an incomplete set as there may be instances 
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time period from 1946 until 2011, including 153 instances where leaders of the primary 
projector made the decision to project military force. The previous chapter indicates for 
the full time period that 27 requests for international authorization were made, the 
majority of which took place after 1989. This table includes the year, the title of the 
decision to project military force, the primary projector, the primary IO, and the mode of 
projection. The year indicates the calendar year in which the initiation of the projection of 
military force took place. The primary projector indicates the only the state, and not its 
allies, which initiated the projection of military force. The primary IO indicates the 
international organization which provided international authorization for the projection. 
The mode indicates the choice made for how the projection took place. This is 
categorized as Outside, RIO, Article 51, UNSC Resolution (UNSCR), or MSC. RIO 
indicates a projection was made with international authorization from a regional 
international organization. Article 51 indicates an accepted claim to self-defense under 
Article 51 of the UN Charter for a projection of military force. UNSCR indicates that the 
projection of military force was authorized through specific resolution from the UNSC. 
MSC indicates when the projection of military force was undertaken by the Military Staff 
Committee which controls military forces provided to the UNSC to enforce its resolution 
in the event of a breach of the peace. Blank entries under mode indicate that the 
projection was either unilateral or with allies but took place without formal IO 
authorization entirely. 
                                                                                                                                                 
beyond my knowledge that have yet to be identified. This selection of instances is as complete as I can 
make it at this point in time. 
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Table 3.1. Decisions to Project Military Force, 1946-2011 
Year Decision to Project Primary Projector Primary IO Mode 
1946 Corfu Channel Incidents Albania   
1947 Kashmir Clashes India   
1948 Berlin Blockade USSR   
1948 Intervention into Costa Rica Nicaragua   
Civil War 
1948 Israel War of Independence Egypt   
1948 Hyderabad India   
1950 Tibet China   
1950 North Korean Invasion North Korea   
1950 Korean War United States UNSC UNSCR 
1951 Tel Mutillah Battle Syria   
1953 Deception Island United Kingdom   
1953 Gaza Strip Border Clashes Israel   
1954 Quemoy Bombing China   
1955 Buraimi Oasis Oman   
1955 Enosis United Kingdom   
1956 Yemen Anti-British Campaign North Yemen   
1956 Hungarian Intervention USSR   
1956 Suez Crisis Israel   
1957 Golan Heights Conflict Syria   
1957 Ifni War Morocco   
1957 Imam's Rebellion United Kingdom   
1957 Border Dispute with Honduras Nicaragua   
1958 British Intervention in Jordan United Kingdom   
1958 China's 2nd 'offshore China   
islands' crisis 
1958 Snipe Island Incidents Argentina   
1958 French Bombing of Sakiet France   
1958 U.S. Intervention in Lebanon United States   
1959 Vietnamese Civil War North Vietnam   
1960 Congo Belgium   
1960 West Irian Conflict Indonesia   
1961 British assistance to Kuwait United Kingdom   
1961 Malay Confrontation Indonesia   
1961 Invasion of Goa India   
1961 Tunisia Tunesia   
1961 Deployment in Thailand United States   
1962 Intervention in Guinea-Bissau Cuba   
1962 French in Senegal France   
1962 Iraqi Air Raids Iraq   
1962 Yemen-Aden War Egypt   
1962 Sino-India War China   
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis United States OAS RIO 
1963 Algeria-Morocco Dispute Morocco   
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Table 3.1. Decisions to Project Military Force, 1946-2011 (Continued) 
Year Decision to Project Primary Projector Primary IO Mode 
1963 Syrian Air Attacks on Kurds Syria   
1964 British Suppression of United Kingdom   
African Mutinies 
1964 Rwandan Raids in Burundi Rwanda   
1964 U.S. Bombing in the United States   
Pathet Lao War 
1964 France in Gabon France   
1964 Vietnam War United States   
1965 Iraqi-Kurdish War Iraq   
1965 United States intervention in United States OAS RIO 
the Dominican Republic 
1965 Second Kashmiri War Pakistan  
1966 UK Embargo on United Kingdom UNSC UNSCR 
Southern Rhodesia 
1967 Six Day War Egypt  
1968 Egypt-Israel Egypt  
1968 Israel-Lebanon Israel  
1968 Seizure of Pueblo North Korea  
1968 French Intervention in the France  
Chad Civil War 
1968 Czechoslovakia USSR Warsaw Pact RIO 
1969 China-Soviet Border Clashes China  
1969 Football/Soccer War El Salvador  
1970 United States in Cambodia United States  
1970 Black September Syria  
1971 Occupation of the Tumbs Iran  
1971 Indo-Pakistani War Pakistan  
1972 Oman-South Yemen Iran  
1972 Iran-Iraq Border Clashes Iran  
1973 Yom Kippur War Egypt  
1974 Cypriot Intervention Turkey  
1974 Indo-Pakistani War Pakistan  
1975 East Timor Indonesia  
1975 Laos-Thailand Border Clashes Thailand  
1975 Lebanon Civil War Syria  
1975 Western Sahara Morocco  
1975 Mayaguez Incident United States  
1975 Angola-South Africa Clashes South Africa  
1976 Rhodesian War Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)  
1976 Intervention into the Morocco Algeria  
-Mauritania Dispute 
1977 Mozambique Civil War Mozambique  
1977 Ogaden War Somalia  
1977 Intervention in Ethiopia USSR  
78 
 
Table 3.1. Decisions to Project Military Force, 1946-2011 (Continued) 
Year Decision to Project Primary Projector Primary IO Mode 
1977 Shaba I incursion Angola  
1977 Intervention into the France  
Morocco-Mauritania Dispute 
1978 Chad France  
1978 Zaire France  
1978 Invasion of Lebanon Israel  
1978 Uganda-Tanzania Border War Uganda  
1978 Invasion of Cambodia Vietnam  
1978 Shaba II Incursion Angola  
1979 China-Vietnamese Skirmishes China  
1979 Central African Republic France  
1979 North v. South Yemen North Yemen  
1979 Intervention in Afghanistan USSR  
1980 Iran Hostage Rescue United States  
1980 Iran-Iraq War Iraq  
1981 Paquisha Incident Ecuador  
1981 Osirak Reactor Raid Israel  
1982 Chad-Libya Conflict Libya  
1982 Falkland Invasion Argentina  
1982 Second Lebanon Invasion Israel  
1982 Intervention in Lebanon United States  
1983 Chad France  
1983 United States in Grenada United States  
1985 Anti-ANC Raids South Africa  
1985 Agacher Strip War Mali  
1986 France in Chad France  
1986 Togo France  
1986 Libyan Airstrikes United States  
1987 Persian Gulf Tanker Reflagging United States  
1989 Comoros France  
1989 Panama Intervention United States  
1990 Gabon France  
1990 Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait Iraq  
1990 Embargo on Iraq United States UNSC UNSCR 
1990 Rwanda France  
1991 Persian Gulf War United States UNSC UNSCR 
1991 Benin France  
1991 Djibouti France  
1991 Zaire France  
1991 Enforcement of Iraqi No Fly United States UNSC UNSCR 
1992 Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict Armenia  
1992 Sierra Leone France  
1992 Somalia United States UNSC UNSCR 
(UNITAF & UNOSOM II) 
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Table 3.1. Decisions to Project Military Force, 1946-2011 (Continued) 
Year Decision to Project Primary Projector Primary IO Mode 
1993 NATO Embargo on United States UNSC UNSCR 
the Former Yugoslavia 
1993 Bosnia United States UNSC UNSCR 
1993 Baghdad Raid United States UNSC Article 51 
1993 Macedonia United States UNSC UNSCR 
1994 Georgia Russia UNSC UNSCR 
1994 Rwanda France UNSC UNSCR 
1994 Intervention in Haiti United States UNSC UNSCR 
1995 Alto-Cenepa War Ecuador  
1995 Comoros France  
1995 Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR) United States UNSC UNSCR 
1996 Invasion in First Congo War Rwanda  
1996 Airstrikes on Iraq United States  
1997 Intervention in Congo Angola  
1997 Albania Italy UNSC UNSCR 
1998 Second Congo War with Angola  
Foreign Intervention 
1998 Eritrea-Ethopia Eritrea  
1998 Afghanistan/Sudan Bombing United States UNSC Article 51 
1998 Operation Desert Fox United States  
1999 NATO Kosovo Air Campaign United States NATO RIO 
1999 Kargil War Pakistan  
1999 Peacekeeping in Kosovo United States UNSC UNSCR 
1999 East Timor Intervention Australia UNSC UNSCR 
2000 Sierra Leone United Kingdom UNSC UNSCR 
2001 Intervention in Afghanistan United States UNSC Article 51 
2003 Côte d'Ivoire France UNSC UNSCR 
2003 Iraq War United States  
2003 Democratic Republic of Congo France UNSC UNSCR 
2004 Haiti United States UNSC UNSCR 
2006 Lebanon Israel  
2007 Airstrikes on Syrian Reactor Israel  
2010 North Korean Artillery Attack North Korea  
2011 Bahrain Saudi Arabia GCC RIO 
2011 Libyan No-Fly Zone United States UNSC UNSCR 
2011 Osama Raid United States UNSC Article 51 
Sources: (Allcock et al. 1992;  "Appendix A, Clarke & Herbst" 1997;  "Appendix II: 
Multinational Operations Tasked and Authorized by the UN, 1945-2003" 2004; Ayissi 
1999; Bailey and Daws 1998; Bakri 2011; Bennett 1999; Bercovitch and Jackson 1997; 
Blanchard et al. 2011; Bush 1993; Bush 2007; Chapman 2011; Chivers 2010; Ciment 
1999a, b; Clarke 1997; Connaughton 2002; Davidson 1987; Doerr 2008;  "Editorial 
Note" 2005; Erlanger 2007; Freedman and Karsh 1993;  "Georgia (UNOMIG, CIS, 
OSCE, EUMM)" 2009; Gertler 2011; Goldich 1992; Gregory 2000; Grimmett 2010, 
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2011; Hendrickson 2002a, b; Hendrickson and Gagnon 2008; Holt and Berkman 2006; 
Jessup 1989; Johnston and Dagne 1997; Joyner 1984; Kampfner 2003; Kershner 2007; 
Lawson 1984; Le Vine 2004; Leurdijk 1986; Lewis 1992;  "List of Armed Conflicts and 
Crises, 1945-2006" 2008; Lowenthal 1992; McDonald 2010; Multinational force begins 
Albania tasks 1997; O'Rourke 1992; Odom 1992; Paul 1971; Pipes 1983; Prados 1992; 
Reagan 2007; Reisman 1994; Roberts 1995-1996; Sanger and Mazzetti 2007; Sanger and 
McDonald 2010; Sarkees and Wayman 2010; Schachter 1989; Schultz 2003; Skutsch 
1999; Slovenia 1998; Sullivan 1992; Sutter 1992; Thompson 2006, 2009; Tillema 1991; 
Tripodi 2002; Tucker 2008; UN Endorses Russian Troops 1994;  "UN-Authorized 
Military Operations, 1945-2006" 2008; UNSC 1971; UNSC Document 1958, 1972, 1989, 
1990a, b, 1996a, b, c, 1998, 2011b; UNSCR 82 1950; UNSCR 83 1950; UNSCR 84 
1950; UNSCR 425 1978; UNSCR 426 1978; UNSCR 488 1981; UNSCR 502 1982; 
UNSCR 517 1982; UNSCR 713 1991; UNSCR 925 1994; UNSCR 929 1994; UNSCR 
937 1994; UNSCR 1529 2004; Weller 1999; Westcott 2011; Western 2002). 
Cases involving the United States as the primary projector make up the bulk of 
both the projections of military force and requests for their international authorization. 
The data shows that the U.S. has more cases of projections and more instances of 
international authorization than any other actor in the international system. However, this 
description of the pattern of state behavior is only part of the story. States with the ability 
to project military force have made contributions to many authorized military operations. 
The small number of non-U.S. projections with international authorization belies the fact 
that these states have undertaken projections of military force as supporting or secondary 
projectors. In the post-Cold War international environment, undertaking military 
operations without international authorization has become the exception. 
The rest of this section describes operations undertaken by states other than the 
United States. The states discussed were chosen because they engaged in a projection of 
military force as the primary projector which they undertook with international 
authorization or because of domestic legal requirements placed on their decisions to 
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project military force.62 The contributions to projections of military force show a distinct 
pattern that secondary projectors are contributing to projections authorized by the UNSC. 
Despite exceptions, in general states are not taking action without UNSC authorization, 
revealing the general pattern of state behavior. After discussing the contributions 
secondary states make to projections I then test many of the hypotheses developed in 
Chapter II to see if the patterns they predict are present in the cross-case evidence. 
International authorization does increase contributions and support for projections of 
military force. 
The United Kingdom 
There are two patterns which become apparent by looking at the evidence of 
projections of military force by the United Kingdom displayed in Table 3.2. The first is 
that the United Kingdom has contributed as the secondary state more frequently after the 
end of the Cold War than before. The United Kingdom no longer takes on the role as the 
primary projector of military force as often as it did in the 1950s and 1960s. The second 
pattern which is apparent is that while the United Kingdom does not take on the role of 
primary projector, it is willing to undertake the projection of military force in a secondary 
capacity when there is international authorization. There are only two cases after 1966 in 
which the United Kingdom contributed to a projection of military force without the 
authorization of an international organization. Both of these cases target Iraq where the  
                                                 
62 The United States is discussed in the chapters following this one. The People’s Republic of China then is 
the only remaining permanent member of the UNSC which is not discussed. This is not an oversight. China 
has not contributed to delegations of the authority to project military force. The China projected military 
force six times. All took place prior to the end of the Cold War. Since 1989, China has not done anything 
more than sabre rattle or swagger. China is a major player and its position must be taken into account by 
other states contemplating the projection of military force, especially in Asia, but this actor has not made 
great contributions to others’ projections of military force. 
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Table 3.2. United Kingdom Contributions to Projections of Military Force63 
Year Projection of Military Force Decision Role Authorizing IO 
1950 Korean War Secondary UNSC 
1953 Deception Island Primary 
1955 Enosis Primary 
1957 Imam’s Rebellion Primary 
1958 Intervention in Jordan Primary 
1961 Assistance to Kuwait Primary 
1964 Suppression of African Mutinies Primary 
1966 Embargo on Southern Rhodesia Primary UNSC 
1990 Embargo on Iraq Secondary UNSC 
1991 Desert Storm Secondary UNSC 
1991 Iraqi No Fly Zones Secondary UNSC 
1992 Somalia Secondary UNSC 
1992 NATO Embargo on the Former Yugoslavia Secondary UNSC 
1993 Bosnia Secondary UNSC 
1994 Georgia Peacekeeping Operation Secondary UNSC 
1995 Bosnia Secondary UNSC 
1998 Operation Desert Fox Secondary 
1999 East Timor Secondary UNSC 
1999 Kosovo Airstrikes Secondary NATO 
1999 Kosovo Peacekeeping Operation Secondary UNSC 
2000 Sierra Leone Primary UNSC 
2001 Afghanistan Secondary UNSC 
2003 Iraq War Secondary 
2003 Democratic Republic of Congo Secondary UNSC 
2011 Libyan Intervention Secondary UNSC 
 
United Kingdom acted in a supporting capacity to the United States. Operation Desert 
Fox was undertaken in 1998 without express authorization from the UNSC. An irony of 
this particular incident is that the U.S. and the UK did express their conviction that they 
were acting in support of resolutions passed by the UNSC which Iraq had violated. The 
second case is the Iraq War in which the UK contributed to the U.S. invasion in 2003. 
Later chapters include an exploration of the role of international authorization in the U.S. 
                                                 
63 Tables 3.2 through 3.8 include information about the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Russia, Australia, 
and Germany for their respective contributions to the projection of military force. Each table includes the 
year of the military operation, the label of the projection, the role played by the state in the operation, and 
the authorizing international organization. The role played by the state indicates if the state was the primary 
projector of military force or if it played a secondary and supporting role in the projection. 
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decision to project military force. That incident includes a very strong effort for the U.S. 
to secure international authorization. 
France 
French decisions to participate in the projection of military force do display a 
similar pattern in that they project military force more frequently after 1990 with 
international authorization from the UNSC. The projections are described in Table 3.3. In 
several instances the French projected military force as the primary projector in 1991 and 
1992 without international authorization. The only other case in which France did so is in 
1995 when it projected military force targeted at the Comoros, a former French colony. It 
also contributed to the NATO airstrikes in Kosovo in 1999. The pattern here is one where 
France acts with the authorization of the UNSC more frequently after 1989 including a 
deployment in 1994 in Rwanda (Barnett 1998). 
Soviet Union/Russia 
The Soviet and Russian pattern of contributions to military force projections is 
more difficult to assess since there are certainly fewer incidents upon which to base an 
evaluation of the role of international authorization (see Table 3.4). However, even in the 
1990s Russia contributed as both primary and secondary projector to military operations 
under the authorization of the UNSC. Russia did engage in other military operations in 
the post-Cold War time period but those operation are not projections of military force 
since either they occur within the Russian Federation (Chechnya) or were provoked 
defensive operations (Georgia).64 The lack of military force projections may be due to 
                                                 
64 The Russian conflict with Georgia in 2008 is one which the U.S. administration mischaracterized 
(Chivers 2010). Rather than an operation prompted by the Russian military this operation was provoked by 
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Table 3.3. French Contributions to Military Force Projections 
Year Projection of Military Force Decision Role Authorizing IO 
1950 Korean War Secondary UNSC 
1958 Bombing of Sakiet Primary 
1962 Senegal Primary 
1964 Gabon Primary 
1968 Intervention in Chad Civil War Primary 
1977 Intervention in Morocco-Mauritania Dispute Primary 
1978 Chad Primary 
1979 Central African Republic Primary 
1982 Lebanon Intervention Secondary 
1983 Chad Primary 
1986 Chad Primary 
1989 Comoros Primary 
1990 Gabon Primary 
1990 Rwanda Primary 
1990 Embargo on Iraq Secondary UNSC 
1991 Desert Storm Secondary UNSC 
1991 Benin Primary 
1991 Djibouti Primary 
1991 Zaire Primary 
1991 Iraqi No-Fly Zones Secondary UNSC 
1992 Sierra Leone Primary 
1992 Somalia Secondary UNSC 
1992 NATO embargo on Former Yugoslavia Secondary UNSC 
1993 Bosnia Secondary UNSC 
1994 Rwanda Primary UNSC 
1995 Bosnia Secondary UNSC 
1995 Comoros Primary 
1999 Kosovo Airstrikes Secondary NATO 
1999 Kosovo Peacekeeping Operation Secondary UNSC 
2001 Afghanistan Secondary UNSC 
2003 Democratic Republic of Congo Primary UNSC 
2003 Côte d’Ivoire Primary UNSC 
2004 Haiti Secondary UNSC 
2011 Libya Intervention Secondary UNSC 
Table 3.4. Soviet/Russian Contributions to Projections of Military Force 
Year Projection of Military Force Decision Role Authorizing IO 
1948 Berlin Blockade (USSR) Primary 
1956 Hungarian Intervention (USSR) Primary 
1968 Czechoslovakia Intervention (USSR) Primary Warsaw Pact 
1977 Ethiopia (USSR) Primary 
1979 Afghanistan (USSR) Primary 
1994 Georgia Peacekeeping Operation (Russia) Primary UNSC 
1995 Bosnia [IFOR & SFOR] (Russia) Secondary UNSC 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Georgian military actions prompting a Russian deployment in response. This does not qualify as a 
projection of military force as it is not a purposeful deployment on the part of the Russian military. 
85 
 
Russia’s preoccupation with several internal military operations such as that in Chechnya, 
a weakened geopolitical position at the end of the Cold War, or simply the random 
chance of fewer opportunities for military adventurism. Regardless of the rationale the 
Russian Federation has made the decision to request and acquire international 
authorization for projections of military force which occur outside their borders notably 
for its lead role in the Georgian peacekeeping mission in 1994 (Barnett 1998). 
Italy 
The Italian contributions are described in Table 3.5. The pattern of military force 
projection for Italy displays the same emphasis on the UNSC for international 
authorization. Italy has rarely been the primary projector (only one instance), but it has 
contributed to many military operations as the secondary projector of military force. The 
notable exception to this pattern of international authorization when projecting military 
force is the 2003 Iraq War, where where the attempt to acquire international authorization 
was a high priority for the primary projector of military force. The pattern here shows 
projections occurring after the end of the Cold War under the auspices of the UNSC. 
Table 3.5. Italian Contributions to Projections of Military Force 
Year Projection of Military Force Decision Role Authorizing IO 
1950 Korean War (Medical Support) Secondary UNSC 
1982 Lebanon Intervention Secondary 
1991 Desert Storm Secondary UNSC 
1991 Iraqi No-Fly Zones Secondary UNSC 
1992 Somalia Secondary UNSC 
1992 NATO Embargo on Former Yugoslavia Secondary UNSC 
1993 Bosnia Secondary UNSC 
1995 Bosnia Secondary UNSC 
1997 Albania Primary UNSC 
1999 Kosovo Airstrikes Secondary NATO 
1999 Kosovo Peacekeeping Operation Secondary UNSC 
2001 Afghanistan Secondary UNSC 
2003 Iraq War Secondary 
2011 Libya Intervention (No-Fly Zone) Secondary UNSC 
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Australia 
Australia’s contributions are detailed in Table 3.6. Australia participated in the 
intervention in East Timor in 1999 as the primary projector of military force. This 
projection took place after the NATO airstrikes in Kosovo without UNSC authorization. 
The UNSC did provide international authorization for the majority of the projections 
made by Australia. The Iraq War is a notable exception for Australia as it is for other 
contributors to this military force projection after 1989. The decision for Australia to lead 
the intervention in East Timor required UN authorization before committing to the 
mission (Coleman 2007, 262).65 During the 1990s, Australia did contribute in a 
secondary role to UNSC authorized projections.  
Table 3.6. Australia Contributions to Projections of Military Force 
Year Projection of Military Force Decision Role Authorizing IO 
1950 Korean War Secondary UNSC 
1964 Vietnam War Secondary 
1991 Desert Storm Secondary UNSC 
1991 Iraqi No Fly Zones Secondary UNSC 
1992 Somalia Secondary UNSC 
1994 Haiti Secondary UNSC 
1995 Bosnia (SFOR) Secondary UNSC 
1999 East Timor Primary UNSC 
2003 Iraq War Secondary 
Canada, Germany, and Japan 
The remaining discussion concerns three states which have not made led 
projections of military force. Two of these states have altered their laws to condition their 
support and contributions on international authorization. These laws may take various 
forms but their content is that international authorization is needed for the projection of 
                                                 
65 Australia did contribute to the U.S.-led Iraq intervention in 2003 with troops for the invasion and 
insurgent conflict. Australia withdrew these troops in 2008, in part, because of a change in government 
which held a different disposition on the justifications for the original intervention (Australia Ends Iraq 
Combat Role 2008). 
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military force before support is given. Germany and Japan have conditioned their 
participation in UN peacekeeping missions upon UNSC authorization (Voeten 2005, 
532). These two states have legacies which have lasted since their defeat in World War 
II. The remaining state discussed in this section, Canada, has contributed to missions 
authorized by IOs but has not initiated any of its own. These actors are influential states 
in their regions and have contributed to the pattern of international authorization and state 
behavior towards IOs. 
Canada has conditioned future contributions to projections of military force upon 
the approval of the UNSC. Table 3.7 lists projections for which Canada has made 
contributions. All of these operations were authorized by IOs. Most of these operations 
take place after 1989. The lack of UNSC authorization drastically increases the domestic 
political costs of Canadian contributions to any form of force projection (Hampson 2003, 
152). In general this pattern of international authorization for the projection of military 
force across sovereign borders in the post-Cold War period of time tends to confirm the 
importance of the IOs, and the UNSC, in particular as a source of authorization. 
Table 3.7. Canadian Contributions to Projections of Military Force 
Year Projection of Military Force Decision Role Authorizing IO 
1950 Korean War Secondary UNSC 
1991 Desert Storm Secondary UNSC 
1992 Somalia Secondary UNSC 
1995 Bosnia Secondary UNSC 
1999 Kosovo Airstrikes Secondary NATO 
1999 Kosovo Peacekeeping Operation Secondary UNSC 
1999 East Timor Secondary UNSC 
2001 Afghanistan Secondary UNSC 
2003 Democratic Republic of Congo Secondary UNSC 
2004 Haiti Secondary UNSC 
2011 Libya Intervention Secondary UNSC 
Germany may have gone further than any other state in the world for its reliance 
on international authorization (Nolte 2003). Table 3.8 describes the contributions 
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Germany has made to projections of military force. After the end of World War II, 
Germany has been reluctant to deploy its military forces outside its borders, in effect 
relegating military force to only territorial defense in an effort to prevent fears of its 
remilitarization (Hellman 1997). This is evident in the German contribution to the Persian 
Gulf Conflict in 1990-1991. Germany limited its contribution to only financial assistance 
with the claim that it would not deploy troops outside its own border and that it was 
focused upon its recent re-unification. Russian fears of German remilitarization emerging 
from the unification of East and West were alleviated, in part, by the inclusion of the 
unified country in NATO (Ikenberry 2001, 217). German deployment of troops outside 
its border was considered a violation of its constitution (Kinzer 1991). However, in 1994 
the German constitutional court ruled that it could deploy military force but only when 
authorized by an international organization under international law. The UNSC is a 
legitimate source of international authorization for Germany to deploy its military forces 
(Nolte 2003, 239).66 Since the constitutional ruling the projection of military force has 
become a significant part of German foreign policy which contributed to the decision to 
deploy military forces in the Balkans and Afghanistan in 2001 (Noetzel and Schreer 
2008). 
Like Germany, Japan’s pacifism has been very important for its domestic 
population and its neighbors. The projection of Japanese military force has been a 
contentious political issue. To alleviate some of these concerns Japan has conditioned its  
                                                 
66 The constitutionality of Germany’s contribution to the NATO airstrike operation in Kosovo is 
ambiguous. The source of the international authorization is the collective security organization, NATO, 
which may not meet the standard set by the constitutional court for international authorization (Noetzel and 
Schreer 2008, 239-240). The UNSC is clearly a legitimate source of international authorization for the 
German projection of military force but the issue of alternative IOs has not been considered by the German 
constitutional court. 
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Table 3.8. German Contributions to Projections of Military Force 
Year Projection of Military Force Decision Role Authorizing IO 
1991 Desert Storm (Financial Assistance) Secondary UNSC 
1995 Bosnia (SFOR) Secondary UNSC 
1999 Kosovo Peacekeeping Operation Secondary UNSC 
2001 Afghanistan Secondary UNSC 
 
participation in peacekeeping missions upon UNSC authorization (Shibata 2003). Article 
9 of Japan’s constitution renounces militarism and has been seen as a limit on the 
deployment of its military forces abroad. In 1992, the Japanese legislature adopted legal 
measures to provide a framework for Japanese contributions to peacekeeping missions 
(Ishizuka 2005). Under this and subsequent constitutional revisions, Japan has increased 
its participation in UNSC peacekeeping operations with international authorization. 
Unlike Germany, Japan has been reluctant to make contributions to projections of 
military force outside the realm of peacekeeping operations. It limited its participation to 
a reluctant financial contribution to the Persian Gulf War (Unger 1997) and increasing 
participation in peacekeeping. 
TESTING EXPLANATIONS 
The remainder of this chapter tests the hypotheses developed in the previous 
chapter with the expected patterns of behavior. These include the pattern of behavior of 
states compared to the expectations of basic and sophisticated realism, burden-sharing, 
regime type, strategic information transmission, multilateral norms, and UNSC authority. 
These tests support the explanations of sophisticated realism, burden-sharing, regime 
type, and UNSC authority. International political costs, IO constraints, basic realism, and 
the multilateralism norm receive weak or no support from the evidence. 
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Basic Realism 
Basic realism suggests that resources available to a state should influence the 
decision to request international authorization. States with more resources should not 
need to request international authorization because they are more powerful. Control over 
material resources should mean not having to submit to the will of other actors. The 
predictions of basic realism suggest that weaker states, with less control over material 
resources, should request international authorization more often than more powerful 
states. Fewer resources should mean weaker states must submit their actions to the 
approval of more powerful actors. 
Test: National Income 
The amount of resources available for the projection of military force should be 
greater with a larger national income. To test for the available resources for the entire 
state I look at national income as well, drawing from data available for 114 states during 
the year they projected military force (see Figure 3.1). Basic realism suggests that states 
with smaller economies should request international authorization since they have fewer 
economic resources to draw upon. Again I divide the sample into two groups, of larger 
and smaller economies, each with 57 instances (see Table 3.9). Basic realism predicts the 
pattern that smaller economies should request international authorization to project 
military force more often than the larger economies. The evidence presented here does 
not support this hypothesis. The 57 larger economies requested international 
authorization more frequently than smaller economies. The large economic group 
requested international authorization in twenty-seven instances (47%) while smaller 
economies did so in only three cases (5%). 
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Table 3.9. Projection Requests by GDP 
 Large Small 
Projections of Military Force      57      57 
Requests for International Authorization      27 (47%)        3 (  5%) 
Projections without Requests      30 (53%)      54 (95%) 
Source: GDP from the World Bank (WDI n.d.-b). 
Figure 3.1. Projection Requests by GDP 
 
Source: GDP from the World Bank (WDI n.d.-b). 
Looking at the sample without the U.S., to see if the U.S. is driving the data, 
yields similar findings to the entire sample. Without the U.S., there are 78 instances of 
military force projection (see Figure 3.2). Dividing this in half between larger and smaller 
economies shows that no small economy made any request for military force projection. 
Larger economies requested international authorization in 9 (23%) instances (see Table 
3.10). This evidence supports the notion that larger economies support the development 
of military resources which can be used to project military force. States with fewer 
resources do not have opportunities to projection military force and do not make requests 
for international authorization. 
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Figure 3.2. Projection Requests by GDP (without U.S.) 
 
Source: GDP from the World Bank (WDI n.d.-b). 
Table 3.10. Projection Requests by Economic Size (without U.S.) 
 Large Small 
Projections of Military Force      39    39 
Requests for International Authorization        9 (23%)      0 (    0%) 
Projections without Requests      30 (77%)    39 (100%) 
Source: GDP from the World Bank (WDI n.d.-b). 
Test: Per Capita Income 
Per capita income is used as a proxy for resource power to test if the pattern 
predicted by basic realism for international authorization is present. This test uses the 
World Bank’s “income” classification for states (World Bank n.d.-a). Using this 
classification I create two categories: high income countries which have large economies 
and a the low income category.67 High income countries are those which have high per 
                                                 
67 The World Bank groups countries into high, middle and low income. For this project I group middle and 
low income into the low or not ‘high income’ category. 
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capita incomes and thus are resource abundant. The sample neatly divides into 78 
projections in each of these categories for all states in the sample for which data was 
available. Figure 3.3 shows the number of projections for each group. The high income 
group displays 34% more requests (see Table 3.11). The two instances of a low income 
state requesting international authorization are the Soviet Union in 1968 and the Russian 
Federation in 1994. The Soviet Union was the lead state in projecting military force for 
the Warsaw Pact intervention into Czechoslovakia to reverse reforms during the Cold 
War. The second low income request was the 1994 deployment of 3,000 Russian 
Federation troops to Georgia which was authorized by the UNSC. While these two 
instances come from states which are classified as “low income,” they are also considered 
to be great powers. Russia inherited the Soviet Union’s control over nuclear weaponry 
and holds a great deal of international political power.68 This test does not support the 
hypothesis that having access to greater resources leads to fewer requests. Figure 3.3 
shows the changes between the Cold War and post-Cold War periods based on income. 
While the total number of military force projections is the same for both categories, the 
changes show that low income states are projecting force less often after the end of the 
Cold War, resulting in fewer opportunities for a low income state to request international 
authorization for the projection of military force.  
Inclusion of the United States in the sample may be driving the data. When the 
U.S. is removed from the sample the high income grouping has 43 projections of military 
force (see Figure 3.4). Projections by low income states stays the same, but projections  
                                                 
68 In the section on Sophisticated Realism, I use a measure of control over material resources which is a 
more accurate depiction of the power resources available to Russia and the Soviet Union. The measurement 
of per capita income relates to the general availability of resources to individuals within a state. 
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Table 3.11. Projection Requests by Per Capita Income, 1946-2011 
 High Income Low Income 
Projections of Military Force      78      78 
Requests for International Authorization      29 (37%)        2 (  3%) 
Projections without Requests      49 (63%)      76 (97%) 
Source: Income classification from the World Bank (WDI n.d.-b). 
Figure 3.3. Number of Projections by Per Capita Income, 1946-2011 
 
Source: Income classification from the World Bank (WDI n.d.-b). 
 
by high income states do change, with requests 15% higher than for the low income 
grouping. Table 3.12 shows high income states are more likely to request international 
authorization for the projection of military force than low income states. This test does 
not provide support for basic realism. Income classification does not display the pattern 
of international authorization requests predicted by basic realism. 
Sophisticated Realism 
The sophisticated realist explanation for requests suggests that there should be a 
pattern of the behavior of states. This pattern is based on the control of material  
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Table 3.12. Projection Request by Per Capita Income (without U.S.) 
 High Income Low Income 
Projections of Military Force      43      78 
Requests for International Authorization        8 (19%)        2 (  3%) 
Projections without Requests      35 (81%)      76 (97%) 
Source: Income classification from the World Bank (WDI n.d.-b). 
Figure 3.4. Projection Requests by Per Capita Income (without U.S.) 
 
Source: Income classification from the World Bank (WDI n.d.-b). 
 
resources. States with greater control over material resources are more powerful and 
should be able to get more of what they want. When powerful states want to get 
international authorization they should be able to get it. States with greater control over 
material resources should be seen to request international authorization more often than 
less powerful states. This test uses data on the share of the world’s material resource from 
the Correlates of War Project on National Material Capabilities (Greig and Enterline 
2010) which updates the data from Singer, Bremer and Stuckey (1972) and Singer 
(1988). The National Material Capabilities composite score incorporates six indicators of 
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control of material resources for states in the international system. The score is a relative 
measure as it indicates the share of material resources controlled by the state in a given 
year. Data is available for 150 instances of military force projection. Again, I divided the 
sample into two groups based on their composite score, greater and lesser. The pattern 
predicted by sophisticated realism is upheld by the empirical evidence. States with 
greater control of material resources do request international authorization more often 
than those who control fewer material resources. Of those states with greater material 
resources, twenty-four (32%) made requests when they projected military force compared 
with only four (5%) of those who controlled fewer resources (See Table 3.13). When the 
U.S. is removed from the sample the pattern is generally the same. States with greater 
material resources produce eight instances (14%) requests for international authorization 
compared to only one (2%) in the lesser group (see Table 3.14).  
Table 3.13. Projection Requests by Control of Material Resources 
 Greater Lesser 
Projections of Military Force        75      75 
Requests for International Authorization        24 (32%)        4 (  5%) 
Projections without Requests        51 (68%)      71 (95%) 
Source: Control of Material Resources from Greig & Enterline (2010). 
Table 3.14. Projection Requests by Control of Material Resources (without U.S.) 
 Greater Lesser 
Projections of Military Force        58      59 
Requests for International Authorization        8 (14%)        1 (  2%) 
Projections without Requests      50 (86%)      58 (98%) 
Source: Control of Material Resources from Greig & Enterline (2010). 
Burden-Sharing 
The explanation posited by burden sharing suggests that needing help with a 
projection of military force should prompt states to request international authorization. 
This test looks at the pattern of requests based on the rate of economic growth. Looking 
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at the rate of growth can allow us to assess the implications of an economy that is either 
growing or shrinking. The assumption made here is that in a growing economy the 
intensity of need for additional assistance is not as great as when an economy is slowing 
or shrinking. The rate of economic growth is taken from the World Bank which compares 
the contemporary year with the previous to identify the change in the size of the economy 
of the state. Data on economic growth was available for 111 of the instances of projection 
of military force in the sample. This data was then divided in two groups based on their 
rate of growth. Table 3.15 shows the descriptive statistics for this sample. The high rate 
group included fifty-five instances. Within the high rate group there were eleven (20%) 
requests for international authorization. The low rate group includes fifty-six instances. 
Lower or negative economic growth shows more requests with ninteen (34%) of the 
cases. This provides some support for the notion that states push for international 
authorization when they need assistance to share the burden of projecting military force. 
Table 3.15. Requests by Rate of Economic Growth 
 High Rate Low Rate 
Projections of Military Force      55      56 
Requests for International Authorization      11 (20%)      19 (34%) 
Projections without Requests      44 (80%)      37 (66%) 
Source: Economic Growth Rate from the World Bank (WDI n.d.-b). 
Table 3.16 presents the data without the United States to see if the data is driven 
by this state. Without the U.S. in the sample there are seventy-five projections of military 
force for which economic growth data was available. When the U.S. is not in the picture 
the implications of the rate of growth is more difficult to assess. There is a difference in 
the frequency with which growth rate is associated with a request for international 
authorization. The high rate group includes thirty-seven instances. There are three 
requests (8%)  in the high rate group compared to six (16%) in the low rate group. The 
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low rate is twice the size, but with the small numbers of requests in both groups more 
testing should be done before drawing strong conclusions about the burden sharing 
alternative hypothesis. 
Table 3.16. Requests by Rate of Economic Growth (without U.S.) 
 High Rate Low Rate 
Projections of Military Force      37      38 
Requests for International Authorization        3 (8%)        6 (16%) 
Projections without Requests      34 (92%)      32 (84%) 
Source: Economic Growth Rate from the World Bank (WDI n.d.-b). 
Democracy and the Rule of Law 
The alternative hypothesis about the influence of domestic institutions suggests 
that regime type matters for states’ decision to request international authorization. The 
pattern of state behavior should show that democracies request international authorization 
more often than nondemocracies. This test uses data from the Polity Project (Marshall 
and Jaggers 2002) to assess the regime type of a state. If the state held a positive policy 
cumulative score during a given year I coded the state as democratic. If the state had a 
zero or negative cumulative polity score during a given year I coded the state as 
nondemocratic. Table 3.17 shows the requests for international authorization for the two 
groups. Democratic states are more likely to request international authorization compared 
to nondemocracies. Democratic states requested international authorization in twenty-
nine cases (32%) compared to only two for nondemocracies (3%). This ressult fits the 
pattern expected by this explanation. 
Table 3.17. Requests by Regime Type 1946-2011 
 Democracy Nondemocracy 
Projections of Military Force      90      66 
Requests for International Authorization      29 (32%)        2 (  3%) 
Projections without Requests      61 (68%)      64 (97%) 
Source: Regime Type is from Polity IV (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2010). 
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When removing the U.S. from the sample the test shows similar results (see Table 
3.18). Democratic states still request international authorization more often than 
nondemocratic states. Democratic states requested international authorization in 8 (15%) 
of the cases. These tests show support for the hypothesis that regime type is associated 
with requests for international authorization. Further testing is warranted. 
Table 3.18. Requests by Regime Type 1946-2011 (without U.S.) 
 Democracy Nondemocracy 
Projections of Military Force      55      66 
Requests for International Authorization        8 (15%)        2 (  3%) 
Projections without Requests      47 (85%)      64 (97%) 
Source: Regime Type from Polity IV (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2010) 
Information Transmission and Political Costs 
The political costs explanation predicts a pattern where states request international 
authorization when its leaders antivipate political costs for projecting military force. This 
pattern is consitent with the presentation of the dependent variable. This is an explanation 
of why states make the decision to request international authorizaiton rather than an 
explanation of what kind of IO is approached. The forum shopping explanation focuses 
on explaining the variance among IO selections. The pattern predicted by a political costs 
explanation is observationally equivalent with the patterns predicted by the other 
explanations. The cross-case analysis cannot be used to distingush this explanation from 
the others. This explanation is evaluated in later chapters. 
IO Constraints 
The IO constraint-based explanation suggests that constraints imposed by IOs 
deter leaders from requesting international authorization. Two patterns of state behavior 
are suggested by this explanation. First, different IOs should be approached since IOs 
vary in the constraints they impose. Table 3.19 indicates that the empirical record does 
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not strongly support this alternative hypothesis. Few IOs are approached. Rarely do state 
select anything other than the UNSC when requesting international authorization. 
Table 3.19. Frequency of Primary IO Approached 
International Organization Authorizations 
UN Security Council 24 (83%) 
Organization of American States   2 (  7%) 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization   1 (  3%) 
Gulf Cooperation Council   1 (  3%) 
Warsaw Pact   1 (  3%) 
European Union   0 (  0%) 
African Union   0 (  0%) 
Arab League   0 (  0%) 
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States69   0 (  0%) 
The second pattern should display a clustering of request for international 
authorization based on specific leaders who have the disposition to request international 
authorization. Leaders who are more willing to accept constraints imposed by IOs, all 
else being equal, should request international authorizaiton more often than those who are 
unwilling to accept IO constraints. The pattern should show requests clustered according 
to the executive administrations in the respective states. A change in administration may 
cause a change in the sensitivity to IO constraints and thus we should see changes 
between different administration requests international authorization. Table 3.20 shows 
the executive administrations of the U.S. and their statistics for international 
authorization. This table includes the requests, international authorization secured, the 
number of projections of military force, and the percentage of projections authorized 
according to executive administration. There is clustering but it does not seem to be 
based on individual executive administrations. Post-Cold War presidential administration 
                                                 
69 The U.S. did claim the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) did provide the U.S. with 
international authorization for the Grenada Invasion in 1983. However, the OECS did not meet nor hold 
any vote on this projection of military force. See Chapter IV for a discussion of the U.S. projection of 
military force in Grenada. 
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are more likely to request international authorization than those before 1989. Unlike their 
predecessors, all post-Cold War administrations do request international authorization for 
most of their projections. The pattern of requests and authorization does not display great 
variation among the different post-Cold War administrations, reducing support for the 
notion that IO constraints drive leaders to request international authorization. 
Table 3.20. United States Executive Administrations 1945-2011 
Executive Administration Requests Authorization Projections % 
Truman 1 1 1 100% 
Eisenhower 0 0 1 0% 
Kennedy 1 1 2 50% 
Johnson 1 1 3 33% 
Nixon 0 0 1 0% 
Ford 0 1 1 100% 
Carter 0 1 1 100% 
Reagan 0 0 4 0% 
Bush (41) 5 5 6 83% 
Clinton 6 8 10 80% 
Bush (43) 2 2 3 67% 
Obama (through 2011) 1 2 2 100% 
Totals 17 20 35   
 
Forum Shopping 
This explanation suggest that the combination of the anticipation of political costs 
and fear of IO constraints is supposed to produce a drive for leaders to seek out 
authorization from RIOs rather than the UNSC. To test the expectation that states prefer 
RIOS when the sensitivity to IO contraints are high and high international political costs 
are anticipated this test looks at the organizations approached for international 
authorization. In many instances, multiple IOs provide support for a single projection. 
The evidence for this test uses the primary IO or most significant source upon which the 
projector relies for the projection of military force. For instance, the UNSC, NATO, and 
the Arab League all may support the creation of a no-fly zone and its enforcement 
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through the projection of military force. This test includes the UNSC as the primary IO 
when there are other sources of international authorization. 
As point out before, Table 3.19 indicates the frequency with which the varied 
organizations were approached. The results indicate that out of the twenty-nine cases 
where IO authorization was given, twenty-four cases (83%) international authorizaiton 
came from the UNSC. This displays that the UNSC is the dominant international security 
organization to authorize the projection of military force. Other organizations are used 
infrequently but they have been used.The remaining five cases are divided between the 
OAS, NATO, the GCC, and the Warsaw Pact. The OAS—the only other organization 
approached more than once provided authorization two times during the Cold War for the 
U.S. action during the Cuban Missile Crisis and later during the intervention in the 
Dominican Republic. This test does not provide support for the explanation based on the 
anticipated political costs and sensitivity to IO constraints. Proponents of this explanation 
of state behavior claim that the UNSC is the best international organization for providing 
credible information to target audiences (Chapman 2011; Thompson 2009); explaining 
why the UNSC is the IO approached most often. Curiously, RIOs which can reduce 
political costs were not used more often in situations where the UNSC was 
unapproachable or unavailable, as was the case throughout the Cold War.  
Multilateralism 
The Multilateral Norm explanation suggests a pattern where a specific form of 
behavior is exhibited with increasing frequency over time. This increasing frequency 
should be evident because the norm of multilateralism should gather strength until it 
becomes dominant. Ideally a gradual increase would become evident over time in the 
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number of requests for international authorization for the projection of military force. 
Figure 3.5. shows projections of military force for each year between 1946 and 2011 in 
five-year increments. The bars in red indicate when a state has requested international 
authorization for a projection. This pattern does not look like a norm gathering strength 
since 1946. The pattern displayed suggests a threshold was crossed in 1990. A threshold 
pattern does not support multilateralism but it does not disprove it either. Perhaps the 
norm of multilateralism grew in strength to the point where it reached the threshold and 
in crossing it became the dominant pattern of state behavior.  
The lifecycle model of norm suggests this sort of tipping point should exist 
between the emergence of a norm and its cascade throughout the system (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998). This description for the projection of military force present two problems. 
First, for a behavioral norm to influence actors it has to be practiced. Between 1968 and 
1990 no state approached an IO to authorize a projection of military force. This is a very 
long period of time for states to not practice a behavior if a norm has was gathering 
strength. Second, this description of the behavior of states better describes the emergence 
of the norm as starting in 1990 when states began to actively promote the idea that states 
should go to a multilateral organization. Also, as indicated above, projectors do request 
international authorization from multilateral sources but not from different multilateral 
sources for different projections of military force. The UNSC is the specific IO of choice 
for international authorization. Requests for international authorization do not display a 
pattern which is consistent with the emergence and strengthening of a norm of 
multilateralism after 1945. However, to determine the strength of this hypothesis more 
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fine-grained evidence is needed. These tests are develeoped in subsequent chapters which 
look at the U.S. projections of military force and international authorization. 
Figure 3.5. Projections of Military Force and International 
Authorization Requests by Year 
 
Source: Data presented in Table 3.1 
UNSC Authority 
The explanation which uses the authority of the UNSC to explain the change 
around international authorization predicts a distinct change from one pattern of behavior 
to a distinct but different pattern of behavior. This pattern should have an easily 
identifiable point of abrupt change or a break from one mode of behavior to another. 
When the threshold is crossed a different pattern of behavior emerges to become 
dominant. As discussed in the previous section, the evidence shows that there is a distinct 
break from one pattern of behavior to another. While not conclusive evidence of this 
explanation, it does provide support for the explanation that the enhanced authority of the 
UNSC drive states to change their behavior to begin requesting international 
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authorization for the projection of military force more frequently. This explanation does 
make sense of the anomalies such as the lack of requests to RIOs during the Cold War 
and why the change in authorization requesting behavior begins in 1990. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter puts forth two arguments and evaluates the patterns of state behavior 
of requesting international authorization for the projection of military force. The first 
argument is that despite the overt evidence that the U.S. is the state which requests 
international authorization the most, this is not solely a U.S. phenomenon. Other states 
are involved in projecting military force with international authorization to the point 
where projecting without international authorization is the exception. Other states are 
faced with constraines similar to the U.S. when making decisions to projection military 
force. The trend indicates that states generally are more likely to project military force 
with international authorization or contribute to operations which have been authorized 
by a formal IO. 
The second argument advanced is that the authority of the UNSC explains the 
pattern of states requesting international authorization. This chapter tests the pattern of 
state behavior expected by the explanations discussed in the second chapter. This chapter 
has the finding that the need for resources does not predict when states will request 
international authorization. Control of more material resources is correlated with 
requsting authorization. This finding is perhaps driven by the notion that having access to 
material resources is a prequisite to having the ability to project military force. Thus, 
having more material resources affords more opportunities to project military force and 
also more opportunities to request international authorization. 
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This chapter also demonstrates that democracies do request international 
authorization more often than nondemocracies. Access to material resources also tends to 
be correlated with democracy as many industrialzed states have democratic regimes. If 
the explanatory factors are correlated the patterns is observationally equivalent to many 
explanations. There is some support for the sophisticated realist, burden sharing, the 
regime type and political cost hypotheses. Further testing of these explanations is 
warranted. In order to distinguish between explanations more fine-grained process tracing 
is necessary. The next chapters are devoted to this task where I examine the U.S. and its 
decisions to request international authorization for the projection of military force. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PRIOR PRACTICE: THE UNITED STATES AND THE PROJECTION OF 
MILITARY FORCE DURING THE COLD WAR 
Optimism about the potential role of the UNSC in securing international peace 
and stability after the end of World War II was soon overshadowed by the concerns of the 
Cold War and the security concerns between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Even before 
it could take substantial action the UNSC became a forum paralyzed by the veto wielded 
by both the U.S. and USSR against each other’s interests. Rther than looking to the 
authority of the UNSC, the pattern of reliance on the resources controlled by the U.S. for 
its foreign policy was established as the state of affairs. There were no expectations that 
the U.S. would request international authorization from the UNSC. This chapter 
documents U.S. practice towards the UNSC during the Cold War. 
THE UNSC AND U.S. RELATIONSHIP 
What was the relationship between the U.S. and the United Nations during the 
Cold War? The UNSC/U.S. relationship is a strong test of changes in international 
politics it is a central location for Cold War politics; some would say the relationship was 
a victim of the politics of the time. Expectations about the UN and the trust the U.S. holds 
towards member states, especially the Soviet Union, were low. Before examining what 
changed after the end of the Cold War we must establish what the relationship was during 
this period. The U.S. should exhibit a relatively constant policy towards the UNSC when 
it comes to making decisions about projecting military force. However, Chapter II 
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identifies a substantial change. This chapter turns to identifying the relationship between 
the U.S. and the UN over the projection of military force.  
Mechanisms operate within structures to reproduce institutional relationships. 
During the Cold War, a particular set of relations operated between the USSR and the 
U.S. to produce a pattern. The end of the Cold War held ramifications for international 
order as these were the two most powerful collective actors in the international system at 
the time. However, it is not clear why this should necessarily have ramifications on the 
pattern of relationship between the U.S. and the United Nations. 
The United States faced many choices over the method of projecting military 
force during the Cold War. Table 4.1 shows the different U.S. executive administrations 
and their decisions to project military force between 1946 and 1989, drawn from the 
listing put forth in Table 3.1. The U.S. did not request international authorization from 
the UNSC or any other IO with great frequency during the Cold War. The notable 
exceptions are the Korean War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Dominican Republic 
intervention, and two acts of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The 
Korean War is the only example of the U.S. requesting a specific resolution from the 
UNSC for the projection of military force. During the Cuban Missile Crisis and the 
Dominican Republic intervention the U.S. acquired international authorization from a 
regional organization, the Organization of American States (OAS). These two incidents 
stand as the only times when the U.S. acted under the OAS without sanction from the 
UNSC. After the end of the Cold War the UNSC and the OAS both authorized 
projections. The Korean War and the Dominican Republic projections are briefly 
discussed and compared with the U.S projection in Grenada 1983. 
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Table 4.1. Decisions to Project Military Force by the United States of America, 1946-1989 
Year Decision to Project Military Force Administration Request Authorization Mode 
1950 Korean War Truman Yes UN UNSCRs 83 (1950) & 84 (1950) 
1958 Intervention in Lebanon Eisenhower    
1961 Deployment in Thailand Kennedy    
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis Kennedy Yes OAS RIO (See Rusk 1962) 
1964 Bombing in Pathet Lao War Johnson    
1964 Vietnam War Johnson    
1965 Intervention in Dominican Republic Johnson  OAS RIO 
1970 U.S. in Cambodia Nixon    
1975 Mayaguez Incident Ford  UN Article 51 
1980 Iran Hostage Rescue Mission Carter  UN Article 51 
1982 Sinai Multinational Force Reagan    
1982 Intervention in Lebanon Reagan    
1983 Intervention in Grenada Reagan    
1986 Libyan Airstrikes Reagan    
1987 Persian Gulf Tanker Reflagging Reagan    
1989 Intervention in Panama Bush (41)    
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The Korean War, 1950 
The delegation of enforcement authority to a coalition of states through 
authorization was used for the first time in the Korean War in 1950. 70 UNSC resolutions 
authorized collective defensive action and a unified command under the U.S. for the 
Korean War. When looking for a response to North Korean aggression, the U.S. did not 
have to contend with the threat or use of a Soviet veto. The Korean War was a UN 
authorized operation under the command of the U.S. military. The outcome within the 
Security Council was based on a peculiar context where the Soviet Union refused to 
attend the UNSC meetings in protest over the lack of recognition for the communist 
government of China. For this empirical event the voting rules of the institution played a 
role in producing the UNSC approval of the U.S. action on the Korean peninsula. After 
receiving word that the North Koreans crossed the 38th parallel and were making 
headway into the south, the UNSC passed a resolution which condemned the action as a 
breach of the peace (UNSCR 82 1950). Following this first resolution on the crisis the 
UNSC passed UNSCR 83 (1950) which authorized member states to furnish assistance to 
the Republic of Korea for its defense, and UNSCR 84 (1950) which authorized a U.S. 
command for the forces defending against the North Korean invasion. The Soviet 
Union’s representative did not attend any of the meetings where these resolutions were 
discussed and thus did not use the Soviet veto in the UNSC. The Soviets argued that the 
resolution passed in favor of authorizing assistance for the Republic of Korea was illegal 
                                                 
70 In addition to the resolutions which authorized the U.S.-led UN coalition of forces in Korea, the UNSC 
did authorize one additional projection of military force during the Cold War. The British received UNSC 
authorization to enforce an embargo against Southern Rhodesia in 1966 (UNSCR 221 1966) which 
received much less attention than the Korean War. 
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since the Chinese71 and Soviet representatives were absent ("Security Council" 1950, 
436). This claim was rejected in because it was accepted practice that the absence of a 
permanent member did not constitute a veto of a resolution. It is noted that this was a 
practice previously accepted by the Soviet Union and thus an acceptable process outcome 
based on Security Council precedent. If material capabilities been a key factor in 
determining this outcome then the voting rules should not have affected the outcome of 
UN authorization for the Korean War. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
described this situation. 
Had the Soviet Ambassador been less terrified of Stalin or been able to 
obtain instructions more rapidly, he would surely have vetoed the Security 
Council resolution proposed by the United States asking North Korea to 
cease hostilities and to return to the 38th Parallel. By failing to attend the 
session and to cast the veto, the Soviet Ambassador gave Truman the 
opportunity to organize resistance as a decision of the world community 
and to justify the American role in Korea in the familiar Wilsonian terms 
of freedom versus dictatorship, good versus evil. America, said Truman, 
was going to war to uphold the orders of the Security Council. (Kissinger 
1994, 477)72 
Truman based his authority to project military force upon his powers as commander in 
chief and on UNSC Resolutions (Hess 2009,34-35).The voting rules of the Security 
Council did matter and the absence of the USSR representative mattered for the vote 
which produced the UNSC authorization for the U.S.-led multilateral operation. 
This incident is important as the first post-World War II decision by the U.S. to 
project military force. That it was carried out with international authorization by the 
UNSC suggests what might have been had cooperation between the great powers 
                                                 
71 The Soviets’ claim about the illegality of this resolution stemmed in part from the fact that the Taiwanese 
representative was not the legal representative of China. 
72 The position Truman took on the Korean War suggests that the UNSC authorization was an effective 
way to mobilize support from the domestic population of the U.S. 
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continued after World War II. The Korean War does not represent a return to the UN 
Charter proscribed action, nor was this move envisioned under the UN Charter (Blokker 
2000). This kind of mechanism had not been attempted before this event. The UN Charter 
proscribed that the MSC should be used to enforce international peace (Grove 1993; 
Wilson 2007). If international authorization was to become the way in which states acted 
after the end of World War II, the Korean War should have created a model of behavior 
which should have become path-dependent. Instead, international authorization and the 
Korean War were explained away as anomalies which could not be repeated under the 
structural conditions of the Cold War.  
First, the action was undertaken not under conditions of uncertainty but rather, 
without hope that the U.S. could repeat this kind of action. The U.S. and Soviet Union 
held positions which led them to employ a veto against each other’s interests. The 
relations were known to be structured along the lines of the Cold War’s bipolarity. The 
only uncertainty at this time was how long the Soviet Union would continue to boycott 
the UNSC. As delegates were assembling to attend the UNSC meeting where UNSCR 83 
was passed, the Secretary-General Lie suggested to the Soviet Ambassador that he should 
attend the meeting in the interests of the Soviet Union. Ambassador Malik stated that he 
would not and the U.S. Deputy Ambassador to the UN, Ernest Gross, was relieved (Paige 
1968, 203). The prevailing thought was that the Soviet Union was slow to change the 
instructions given to its representatives in the UN. With the return of the Soviet Union the 
U.S. moved to make the UN General Assembly (UNGA) take action under the “Uniting 
for Peace” Resolution when the UNSC was deadlocked due to the threat or use of the 
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veto (Zaum 2008).73 Moving to the UNGA showed that the U.S. did not think UNSC 
authorization could be repeated under the threat of Soviet veto. 
Second, as a foreign policy action the Korean War was not seen as a huge success 
and did not change the way people thought about the UN and the projection of military 
force. The conflict lasted between 1950 and 1953, so it was not over quickly. In fact, the 
conflict has not yet technically ended. Rather than a peace treaty, the conflict was stopped 
through a cease fire. This armistice is maintained today. Neither side gained much 
territory beyond what they had originally held. Thousands of U.S. soldiers died. UN 
participation did not make a material difference. The U.S. would not request a specific 
resolution to authorize the projection of military force for another 40 years.  
While the Cold War prevented international authorization from the UNSC of 
subsequent projections of military force, it did not prevent other sources from being 
approached. If demand for UNSC authorization was thwarted by the onset of the Cold 
War a different collective body could have been used for this purpose.74 NATO or some 
other form of RIO could have been used to provide political cover for many operations. 
In fact, NATO was not used for the political purpose of supporting the projection of 
military force until after the end of the Cold War. Like-minded states which make up 
NATO should have greater resonance with U.S. voters enhancing the support 
domestically which is a pathway for IOs to influence the foreign policy of states 
                                                 
73 The ‘Uniting for Peace’ process has been used relatively infrequently since the Korean War (see, "Uses 
of the Uniting for Peace Resolution, 1950-2006" 2008). 
74 Of course, this is an option when there is an alternative organization for states to turn. RIOs represent one 
particular kind of organization which can provide international authorization if the intervening state is a 
member of such an organization in the region or if the state is able to solicit an organization to which it is 
not a member. For instance, the U.S. is not a member of the Arab League, yet the Arab League has 
endorsed several actions of the U.S. and its allies. 
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suggested by the strategic information theory discussed below. The UN authorization did 
aid President Truman’s attempts to bolster support for the Korean War (Chapman and 
Reiter 2004, 892). Other options were also not considered. Discussions of the Military 
Staff Committee were absent in the high level discussion of how to response to the North 
Korean invasion of the South. The U.S. was willing go it along but preferred to get a 
response from the UNSC (Halberstam 2007). But in these discussion the MSC as an 
option was absent. 
The kinds of policy options evaluated for the Korean War runs counter to the 
expectation that the end of bipolarity should see less value attributed to IOs rather than 
more. This is the case since a powerful state, having fewer challengers or constraints, 
would be less likely to need international authorization. For the Korean War, the U.S. 
faced almost no opposition since the Soviet Union did not represent a veto threat. As with 
the Korean War, when the U.S. became the dominant power after the end of the Cold 
War, it should not need to use an IO to legitimate its foreign policy actions. In other 
words, the expectation is for the U.S. to turn to an IO less often rather than more. The fact 
that the empirical evidence shows a different pattern, where the U.S. has sought 
international authorization more frequently, suggests that something else is happening. 
The end of the Cold War looks like an easy way to account for the rise of international 
authorization but it does not satisfactorily answer the question. To form an explanation 
there must be a connection between the specific events that constitute the end of the Cold 
War and the change in the behavior of states towards the UNSC. There is no connection 
between the lack of international authorization outside the UNSC to specific dynamics of 
Cold War politics. 
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Dominican Republic, 1965 
The Johnson Administration made the decision to intervene in the Dominican 
Republic to prevent a communist takeover of the country (Crandall 2006). The initial 
decision did not have the authorization of the OAS but the organization did provide its 
blessing to the U.S. military operation at a later date. Despite the prior decision of the 
U.S. to turn to the UNSC in the Korean War, U.S. leaders were much less disposed to 
rely upon IOs at this time. President Johnson discussed the OAS and the Dominican crisis 
on April 30, 1965, with his advisers.  
They’re going to set up a Castro government [in the Dominican 
Republic]…We begged the OAS to send somebody in last night. They 
won’t move. They’re just phantoms. They’re just the damnedest fraud I 
ever saw, Mike [Mansfield]…They just talk. These international 
organizations ain’t worth a damn, except window dressing…The big 
question is, Do we let Castro take over and us move out?...the OAS called 
for a cease-fire last night, but they went home and went to sleep…I’m 
trying to get them back today. And suppose they don’t (meet) today? 
(quoted in Beschloss 2001, 300) 
Following this conversation, National Security Adviser, McGeorge Bundy warned 
Johnson against putting pressure on the OAS (Beschloss 2001, 304). Johnson, furious and 
shouting, replied 
All right, let’s see if we can satisfy that bunch of damn sissies [the OAS] 
over there on that question! Let’s cut it out and let’s just call them then 
and say that they’re [the rebels in the Dominican Republic] “great 
statesmen” 
President Johnson’s disposition towards the OAS suggests that IOs were unimportant to 
the U.S. while the Johnson Administration was in power. In the end, the OAS approval of 
the operation was given after the operation had already begun. The decision to project 
military force in the Dominican Republic was made prior to any decision to approach the 
OAS and in fact the actual deployment of marines was underway before the OAS voted 
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its international authorization for the U.S. to project military force (Palmer 1989, 29). 
The U.S. acted unilaterally, with the IO providing its authorization to support the U.S. 
efforts despite diplomatic misgivings about the approach taken by the U.S. 
Grenada, 1983 
An instance where the U.S. did project military force without UN authorization 
during the Cold War is the 1983 invasions of Grenada. The U.S. was, once again, 
concerned about a communist takeover of this Caribbean island. President Reagan 
claimed that he order the military operation to save lives, including around 1,000 
Americans, to prevent further chaos, and to restore law, order and democracy from the 
threat of leftist thugs (Reagan 1985). The American leaders made the decision to project 
military force and did not include a prominent role for IOs in their decision making 
process. The U.S. seemed willing at this time to press ahead with its plans to invade the 
island and make use of whatever support was available at the time rather than attempt 
work through an IO.75 IOs were available for international authorization including the 
UNSC and the OAS. Neither was approached. This incident displays exemplary 
characteristics of how decision makers in the U.S. were disposed toward the UN during 
this time period. In this instance, the U.S. did not seek nor did it receive the blessing of 
the UNSC. In fact, this projection of military force has been considered by many scholars 
                                                 
75 The U.S. did claim that it received a formal request from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States 
(OECS) (see Reagan 1985). This has been widely disputed (Waters 1989). Reasons are numerous, not the 
least of which is that Grenada, as party to the Treaty establishing the OECS, is required to approve any act 
of collective defense on the part of the organization (Joyner 1984, 137). Grenada did not have the 
opportunity to approve of such an action and even if it had, since it was in the midst of a coup, such 
approval would have been highly suspect. For the purposes of this project I categorize this action as one 
undertaken outside of the UNSC and RIOs but one where the U.S. acted with allies. The U.S. action 
included support of over 300 troops from six other states: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, 
Jamaica, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent, and the Grenadines. 
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to fail the necessary criteria for multilateral action despite the contributions of some 
Caribbean states (e.g., Finnemore 2003; Schultz 2003).76 The Reagan Administration’s 
response to the General Assembly’s condemnation of U.S. actions indicates the lack of 
respect which the President held for the UN. When questioned about the UN’s 
disapproval of the action the President responded by saying,  
…100 nations in the United Nations have not agreed with us on just about 
everything that's come before them where we're involved. And, you know, 
it didn't upset my breakfast at all. (Reagan 1983) 
POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS 
Cold War projections of military force vary greatly in when the U.S. requests 
international authorization. These cases include incidents where the U.S. did request 
international authorization from the UNSC, from RIOs, or acted under Article 51, but 
most frequently, the U.S. acted outside any IO when it projected military force. Three of 
the explanations put forward rely upon the characteristics of a state to aid in their 
rationale for the outcome of increased use of resolutions to authorization military force: 
Basic and Sophisticated variants of realism, and regime type. Realism relies on the power 
of states to explain their turning to IOs and their success at acquiring international 
authorization. The examination of the U.S. controls for this factor since the relative 
control over material resources does not vary greatly from case to case. As a developed 
country the U.S. tends to have abundant resources available for military actions. Regime 
                                                 
76 This intervention is considered to be a unilateral intervention by the U.S. despite the fact that other 
countries contributed to the forces which were deployed in Grenada. Six other countries contributed forces 
which combined totaled 300 (Joyner 1984, 132). This number is greater than the contributions from 
countries other than the U.S. during the 1994 intervention in Haiti. The four countries’ contributions to the 
Haitian endeavor totaled 266 (Schultz 2003, 121). This later intervention was considered to be multilateral, 
indicating that the UN authorization holds power over the interpretation of what is and what is not a 
multilateral use of force in the post-Cold War era. 
 118 
type relies on democratic institutions to explain certain states turning to international 
authorization when projecting military force. This pattern does not vary from projection 
to projection as the U.S. remains democratic throughout the Cold War. The alternative 
realist explanation based on the need for assistance when economic resources become in 
short supply was tested in the previous chapter. The remaining discussion in this chapter 
focuses upon the factors of information, constraints, multilateral norms and the authority 
of the UNSC. 
Anticipated Political Costs 
Strategic information transmission (Chapman 2011; Thompson 2009) focuses 
upon the notion of signaling intentions to other states through the commitment to IO 
requirements. This explanation focuses upon the anticipation of international political 
costs because international audiences are concerned about the intentions of the projector. 
Working through an IO signals that the projector’s intentions are benign. In situations 
where no attempt is made to request international authorization from an IO, leaders did 
not anticipate that there would be negative international reactions. However, projecting 
military force is often controversial. The idea that the U.S. did not approach other IOs 
besides the UNSC because the U.S. did not anticipate high political costs does not make 
sense especially because the Soviet Union would likley object to the U.S. projecting 
military force. 
IO Constraints 
If constraints imposed by an IO prevent or deter a state from requesting 
international authorization the expectation is that the U.S. did not make a request. An 
examiniation of the U.S. requests during the Cold War displays that the U.S. infrequently 
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requested international authorization from IOs. The Korean War was the one instance 
where the processs of authorization did not constrain the U.S. ability to project military 
force. The only member of the UNSC which would have imposed costs upon the U.S. for 
projecting military force in Korea was the Soviet Union. As it was absent when the police 
action was authorized, only light constraints were imposed. For the remaining instances 
of projections during the Cold War, the UNSC was not a viable option, not because the 
UNSC would not authorize action but the requirements of the USSR would be so severe 
that it was not worth discussing. The Soviet veto made the UNSC the least likely forum 
for international authorization for most of the Cold War.77 Alternative IOs are discussed 
in the next section on forum shopping. Based on the constraints factor, it makes sense 
that the UNSC was not approached during the Cold War. 
Forum Shopping 
The forum shopping perspective suggests when considered separately, anticipated 
political costs and IO constraints can explain when states request international 
authorization. Considering these two factors together should aid in explaining what kind 
of IO will be chosen. When a state anticipates high international political costs but is very 
sensitive to IO constraints it should request out international authorization from a RIO 
(Thompson 2009). Both the anticipation of high political costs and IO constraints, 
together, may indicate why states choose a particular IO. Table 4.2 shows the available 
                                                 
77 Importantly, as discussed later, there is an issue of whether international authorization was considered 
necessary. I argue that during the Cold War, for projecting military force, international authorization was 
not seen as a necessary component of a state’s foreign policy. This changed after the Persian Gulf War and, 
as demonstrated later, after the end of the Cold War international authorization was discussed in the context 
of the UNSC. During the Cold War, international authorization was not the focus of policy making 
discussion. Rather IO support was discussed as an issue of who supported the action rather than the IO 
authorizing the action. 
 120 
RIOs which could have been approached by the U.S. when considering the projection of 
military force during the Cold War. The last column indicates which, if any, IO was 
approached for international authorization. Most of the lines in this column are blank 
indicating that the U.S. pursued a strategy of projecting military force outside of any IO. 
The UNSC was a forum with IO constraints that were too high for the U.S. to consider as 
a source of international authorization. Other IOs, especially more like-minded ones, 
could have provided authorization and thus reduce the political costs anticipated by the 
U.S. during the Cold War. Based on this assessment of how anticipated international 
political costs should be associated with the decision to request international 
authorization from any IO, the Cold War should show more attempts to request 
authorization from RIOs. 
Multilateralism Norm 
The norm of multilateralism suggests that after 1945 there should be more 
multilateral attempts to project military force because this option is percieved as the 
appropriate procedure for states to use (Finnemore 2003). The problem with this pattern 
of U.S. action during the Cold War is that a brief push occurs right after the end of World 
War II where states turn to IOs but no significant practice emerges. This suggests that no 
norm emerged from the ashes of the Second World War and no norm became 
consolidated during the Cold War. This norm does not provide a compelling explanation 
of U.S behavior during the Cold War. The most frequent mode of projection of military 
force is the unilateral option exercised outside of a multilateral framework. If UNSC 
activity were the result of a broad norm of multilateralism a gradual change should have 
emerged during the Cold War, especially during the 1980s. At least there should be  
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Table 4.2. Available Regional International Organizations, 1946-1989 
Year Decision Admin. RIOs78 Actual IO 
1950 Korean War Truman SEATO UNSC 
1958 Intervention in Lebanon Eisenhower CENTO/LAS 
1961 Deployment in Thailand Kennedy SEATO/ 
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis Kennedy OAS OAS 
1964 Bombing in Pathet Lao War Johnson SEATO 
1964 Vietnam War Johnson SEATO 
1965 Dominican Republic Johnson OAS OAS 
1970 Cambodia Nixon SEATO/ASEAN 
1975 Mayaguez Incident Ford SEATO/ASEAN UN (Art. 51) 
1980 Iran Hostage Rescue Mission Carter LAS/CENTO/OIC UN (Art. 51) 
1982 Sinai Multinational Force Reagan LAS/OIC/GCC/AU 
1982 Intervention in Lebanon Reagan LAS/OIC/GCC 
1983 Grenada Invasion Reagan OECS/OAS 
1986 Libyan Airstrikes Reagan LAS/OIC/NATO 
1987 Tanker Reflagging Reagan LAS/OIC/GCC 
1989 Intervention in Panama Bush (41) OAS 
 
evidence of actors resisting the push to request international authorization. These 
indicators are lacking while in other areas, multilateralism did become more significant 
during this time period (Keohane 1990). The post-1945 multilateralism included norms of 
generalized principles of conduct (Ruggie 1992).79 However, the norm of multilateralism 
did not extend to international authorization for military force projection. The UNSC lay 
almost dormant during the 1970s and early 1980s. Only in the last two years of the Cold 
War does the UNSC become more active in dispute resolution, notably with the Iran-Iraq 
war (Malone 2007). But this spurt of activity did not include the practice of requesting 
                                                 
78 For this table the Regional International Organizations include: Southeast Asian Treaty Organization 
(SEATO), Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) [also known as the Baghdad Pact], League of Arab States 
(LAS) [also known as the Arab League], Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Organization 
of the Islamic Conference (OIC) [now known as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation], Organization of 
American States (OAS), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Organization of African Unity (AU) [now 
known as the African Union) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
79 An issue arises about the lack of consensus about appropriate standards of conduct for multilateralism 
(see van Oudenaren 2003). 
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international authorization. As the next chapter demonstrates, this changed with the 
Persian Gulf War. 
Authority of the UNSC 
The explanation based on the authority of the UNSC suggests that the norm of 
requesting international authorization was not in place during the Cold War. Figure 4.1 
displays the relative viability of the various options to project military force providing an 
assessment of the discursive context in which decision making took place in the U.S. The 
notion of requesting international authorization from the UNSC as appropriate was not 
strong. The discursive context of the Cold War made the possibility of using either a 
specific resolution from the UNSC or the MSC unviable. 
 
Figure 4.1. Discursive Viability of Authorization Choices, 1946-1989 
 
 
 
Outside RIO Article 51 Resolution MSC
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Even in the case of the Korean War, when there could have been a push to 
develop a solution to the crisis from within the UN Charter-based mechanism, there was 
no move to reignite the MSC. None of the major texts on the Korean War discuss the 
MSC (e.g., Cumings 2010). After the war was underway, the British Prime Minister, 
Clement Attlee, did suggest to President Truman that they could develop a committee 
similar to the MSC within the UN to run the war but Truman shot this idea down, 
stressing that war cannot be run by committee (Wainstock 1999, 105). This kind of 
option was not seriously considered during the Cold War. Even the notion of claiming 
self-defense was not widespread, being first use was in 1958 by Tunisia in defending 
itself against the French (Bailey and Daws 1998, 103). The U.S. did make use of the RIO 
option as the OAS was considered in two cases. Outside options were considered to be 
the perview of the U.S. and alternative IO arrangements were generally not on the table. 
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CHAPTER V 
JUNCTURES IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE UNSC: IS THE 
END OF THE COLD WAR CRITICAL? 
The end of World War II produced optimism that cooperation among the great 
powers would ensure international peace and security through the UNSC. The Cold War 
emerged before this potential could be realized and the UNSC retreated to marginal 
issues on the fringe of international politics (Malone 2007). After 1990, the UNSC 
expanded its range of activities to include conflicts well beyond those it could have 
undertaken during the Cold War (Malone 2010, 60). For the UNSC, the Cold War is 
characterized by one pattern described in the preceding chapter while the post-Cold War 
exhibits another. How the change came about is an important question. Was the end of 
the Cold War an eventful juncture for the UNSC where new choices were available, 
choices that would influence the future trajectory of the role of authorization-requesting 
behavior in international affairs, or was the future trajectory that developed a strongly-
determined consequence of the end of the Cold War itself in which choices were different 
than before but equally constrained by systemic forces?  
I argue that the end of the Cold War was an eventful juncture for the relationship 
between states and the UNSC over the projection of military force which became a 
critical one. The choices made during this juncture closed off options, creating a path-
dependent process encouraging states to request international authorization from the 
UNSC. In this chapter I establish that the end of the Cold War represents an eventful 
juncture for the UNSC where the kind of relationship states had with the organization 
was uncertain. Then I demonstrate the different options which were made available to the 
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U.S. when confronting Iraq before the Persian Gulf War. The options were not viable 
during the Cold War but became available with its end. Lastly, I test the explanations 
developed in Chapter II for why the U.S. turned to the UNSC for international 
authorization during this crisis. 
JUNCTURES AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR 
The end of the Cold War marks a point of change for the international system 
(Holsti 1994; Ikenberry 2001; Ruggie 1994). Even if we accept this claim, is there reason 
to accept the claim that the end of the Cold War represents a critical juncture in the 
authority accorded to the UNSC and that this led to the change in the frequency with 
which states request authorization from it? Despite the changes brought about by the end 
of the Cold War, many international organizations did not experience substantial changes 
in their operations, mandate, or authority. Even where the U.S. and the Soviet Union 
were major players in an IO, organizations did not experience anything that could be 
described as a critical juncture. As examples, the ways that the International Maritime 
Organization, the UN Economic and Social Council and the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty operated did not substantially change despite the role each rival played in these 
organizations during the Cold War.80 
                                                 
80 These three organizations are examples of the lack of change despite the existence of a critical break at 
the end of the Cold War. When change has occurred within the operation of these organizations it tends to 
be incremental rather than revolution. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty had a critical juncture when its 
extension was decided upon at its renewal conference in 1995 (Simpson and Howlett 1994). This was an 
institutionally imposed juncture for the treaty and the nonproliferation regime, since it was specified in the 
original treaty that its signatories would consider its renewal 25 years after it went into effect. Hence, there 
was a conference to extend the regime in 1995. The primary concerns were about regional threats in the 
aftermath of the Cold War (Cousineau 1994). Treaty membership did increase after the end of the Cold 
War; due in part to the dissolution of the USSR (Simpson and Howlett 1994). The functioning of the 
regime did not change. The U.S. and Russia, as successor to the Soviet Union, both still held interests in 
limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the uncertainty which accompanied the end of the Cold 
War may have served only to make these interests more acute. The International Maritime Organization has 
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While these organizations did not change, behavioral indicators suggest a change 
in how states view the UNSC which can provide an indication for where to look for an 
eventful juncture. The UN Charter provides the Security Council with the formal 
authority to evaluate situations where the use of force is an issue. Chapter VII of the 
Charter is the source of the claim that the UNSC has authority to enforce international 
peace and security. The preamble of Chapter VII states,  
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken … to maintain 
or restore international peace and security (Chapter VII, Article 39 ). 
Under the Charter, states have gone to the UNSC to send out peacekeeping missions and 
to resolve issues which threaten international peace and security. This is significant 
because the decision for states to use the Security Council is an indication of its relations 
with member states. The use of the UNSC indicates that states did not seek a different 
forum or construct ad hoc coalitions of states to resolve matters which threaten peace and 
often their own security. A first cut examination of the behavior of the UNSC should look 
at how often the group meets to discuss issues of international importance. Either the 
Secretary-General or member states must make a request for the UNSC to hold meetings 
on any given issue. Member states must prompt action in the UNSC. Figure 5.1 shows 
the frequency of UNSC meetings since the council was first formed. More meetings have 
been held each year after the Cold War except for the first two years at the beginning of 
the UN. 
                                                                                                                                                 
remained a key part of international cooperation in the regulation of maritime shipping since its inception 
in 1948 (Kraska 2009). The U.S. and the Soviet Union were powerful members of this organization. This 
organization has continued to function without substantial revision and members have adopted many 
treaties within the IMO framework. Lastly, despite calls for reform, the UN Economic and Social Council 
has changed very little since its origin in 1946 (Weiss 2010). 
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Figure 5.1. Number of Meetings Held by the UNSC 
 
Source: United Nations (Various Dates-a). 
The representatives of the member states who make up the United Nations push 
for resolutions from the Security Council.81 UNSC resolutions reflect the actions of the 
member states rather than an action which transcends the constituent parts. The number 
of resolutions suggests that in the post-Cold War time period the UNSC made decisions 
on matters of international security with dramatically increased frequency rather than 
                                                 
81 One line of constructivist theorizing about IOs suggests that by virtue of being organizations with a 
bureaucracy, IOs hold independent agency (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). This argument is often applied 
to international organizations with specialized technocratic expertise such as the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization. When it is applied to the United Nations it is 
often used to describe aspects of the bureaucracy of the secretariat rather than the intergovernmental 
aspects of member state interaction. A “third” UN could include nongovernmental organizations who 
attempt to influence the UN agenda through member states (Weiss 2008). See also Cronin (2002) on the 
development of transnational interests from the UN itself. However, the extent to which the UN Security 
Council can have an independent agency based on its independence from member states is questionable. 
The actual bureaucracy of the UNSC is small compared to other agencies of the UN and because of its 
topical focus on security, member states, especially the P-5, pays it a great deal of attention to its activities 
limiting the delegation to bureaucratic actors. Rotating members covet the position of sitting on the Council 
as enhancing their international reputation (Malone 2000, 6). These members take part in the various 
decisions of the council. 
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procedural issues. The UNSC met to talk more often but also came to a decision about 
the topic of its meetings (see Figure 5.2). Not only was the UNSC more active in its 
decision making, but the Council dealt with maters of international security with greater 
frequency.82 Procedural matters such as membership in the UN have to be approved by 
the Council before a state can join the organization. The point is that the Council is not 
simply more active in passing resolutions in greater frequency in the post-Cold War time 
period because, for instance, a large number of former Soviet republics have joint the UN 
as member states. Instead, these resolutions carry purported weight about how states are 
supposed to behave. Actions taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter are resolutions 
in which the UNSC exercises its authority to enforce international peace and security. 
The number of Chapter VII resolutions passed increased dramatically after the end of the 
Cold War (see Figure 5.3). In addition to absolute numbers, the UNSC passed a greater 
percentage of its resolutions under Chapter VII (see Figure 5.4). This indicates the UNSC 
devoted more of its agenda to security related matters. These resolutions passed by the 
UNSC include peacekeeping operations (Berdal 2008), sanctions (Cortright, Lopez, and 
Gerber-Stellingwerf 2008), terrorism (Boulden 2008), piracy (Percy 2008), and, of 
course, the projection of military force. Between 1946 and 1989 the Security Council 
passed twenty-two resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Voeten 2005, 530). 
Between the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and 2004, the UNSC has passed over 145 
resolutions under Chapter VII, for an annual rate of nine per year (Voeten 2005, 531). In 
the post-Cold War period, more of the UNSC’s agenda is devoted to issues of 
international security. 
                                                 
82 On this difference between procedural and substantive resolutions see Bailey and Daws (1998). 
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Figure 5.2. Number of UNSC Resolutions Passed 
 
Source: United Nations (Various Dates-b). 
Figure 5.3. Number of UNSC Chapter VII Resolutions Per Year. 
 
Source: UN Security Council Resolutions from the United Nations (Various Dates-b), for 
Chapter VII Resolutions and their classification see Appendix B. 
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These features suggest that something happened to the UNSC at the end of the 
Cold War. However, they do not suggest what took place to produce such a change nor 
do they suggest a causal mechanism which links the end of the Cold War to the changes 
in behavior of states toward the UNSC. The evidence is not yet compelling that a marked 
change in the relationship between the U.S. and the UNSC. Before turning to the 
substantive topic of whether the end of the Cold War was an eventful juncture it may be 
valuable to eliminate alternative explanations for these indicators based on changes in the 
organization. Organizational changes could feed into the pattern observed which show 
that the end of the Cold War is at least a turning point for the UNSC.83 
Organizational changes within the UNSC would suggest that the size, 
composition of the members, or decision making procedures changed to produce the 
change in the indicators discussed above. There should be substantial changes which took 
place around the end of the Cold War. However, there were no substantial organizational 
changes for the UNSC close to the end of the Cold War. The general composition of the 
UNSC membership and the size of the council remained the same during the period of 
time immediately before and immediately after the end of the Cold War (Bailey and 
Daws 1998). The procedures of the UNSC do not seem to indicate that there was any 
substantive change in the role of the UNSC in international affairs. The last major change 
                                                 
83 A turning point is a description of a point in time that marks the beginning of a different and strongly 
determined trajectory. This is distinct from an eventful juncture. Turning points do not afford the 
opportunity for change the pattern but are a response to strongly determined structures. During eventful 
junctures, actors face choices which can affect context in which subsequent decisions are made. 
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to the decision making procedures of the UNSC took place in 1983 (United Nations 
1983).84 
THE PERSIAN GULF WAR AND VIABLE CHOICES 
There is reason to think that the end of the Cold War changed the trajectory of the 
UNSC. However, the question remains whether the U.S. found new choices for the 
projection of military force which were not available during the Cold War. This section 
establishes the choices which were available when the U.S. crafted its response to the 
Iraqi invasion. 
On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein’s military began its invasion of Kuwait. 
Over the next five months the U.S. built an international coalition to oppose the Iraqi 
action and based its authority to act upon twelve resolutions passed by the UN Security 
Council (see Table C.2 in Appendix C). At this time, Europe was the focus of 
international affairs. The retraction of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe produced a 
sense of optimism, and the prospect of cooperation between the U.S. and Soviet Union 
was the highest since World War II. Within this context the U.S. made two separate 
requests for international authorization from the UNSC. The first was for the UNSC to 
authorize the enforcement of economic sanctions on Iraq through “measures 
commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary” (UNSCR 665 1990). 
Such measures were understood to include the use of military force. The second request 
was for the UNSC to authorize offensive military action to expel Iraq from Kuwait. The 
                                                 
84 The formal decision making procedures have not change but there has been a shift toward the use of what 
has come to be known as “informals” which are informal meetings usually between the P-5 where issues 
are discussed by members. This change in process is a direct result of the end of the Cold War but by itself 
it cannot account for the changes in UNSC behavior. 
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United States and its allies received authorization in Security Council Resolution 678 
(1990) which set January 15, 1991 as the deadline for Iraq to remove itself from Kuwait. 
President Bush gave the order to begin combat operations on January 16, 1991.  
Figure 5.4. Ch. VII Resolutions as Percent of UNSC Resolutions 
 
Source: UN Security Council Resolutions from the United Nations (Various Dates-b), for 
Chapter VII Resolutions and their classification see Appendix B. 
This section focuses on the Persian Gulf War and establishes that the choice to 
request international authorization was not the result of a strongly determined response to 
material or institutional pressures. This decision to request international authorization 
took place within a period of time marked by uncertainty over what the international 
order was becoming and as such it took place during time of increased freedom of action. 
As one diplomat described, the end of the Cold War left the role of the UN uncertain. 
[W]hen the Cold War so unexpectedly came to an end, no one could be at 
all sure how the removal of the distortions it had imposed would affect the 
UN's activities and how these would now develop in the absence of the 
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With this uncertainty as a backdrop that the U.S. faced a crisis from Saddam Hussein’s 
decision to invade Kuwait. The role the UN would take was not known beforehand by the 
U.S. President and other executive officials.  
While I was prepared to deal with this crisis unilaterally if necessary, I 
wanted the United Nations involved as part of our first response, starting 
with a strong condemnation of Iraq's attack on a fellow member. Decisive 
UN action would be important in rallying international opposition to the 
invasion and reversing it. I instructed Tom [Pickering, the U.S. 
Ambassador to the UN] to work with the Kuwaitis and to do all he could 
to convene an emergency meeting of the Security Council. Although I was 
optimistic, I was not yet sure what to expect from the UN. I was keenly 
aware that this would be the first post-Cold War test of the Security 
Council in crisis. I knew what had happened in the 1930s when a weak 
and leaderless League of Nations had failed to stand up to Japanese, 
Italian, and German aggression. The result was to encourage the ambitions 
of those regimes. The UN had been set up to correct the failings of the 
League, but the Cold War caused stalemate in the Security Council. (Bush 
and Scowcroft 1998, 303) 
The Persian Gulf War took place during a time of uncertainty around the UNSC. U.S. 
decision makers recognized the end of the Cold War produced more flexibility and 
greater opportunities for action when discussing policy options. During the August 3, 
1990 National Security Council meeting to discuss responses to Iraq’s invasion, Deputy 
Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger made this assessment: 
This is the first test of the post war system. As the bipolar contest is 
relaxed, it permits this [the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait], giving people more 
flexibility because they are not worried about the involvement of the 
superpowers. (Eagleburger in NSC 1990, 3).  
Within the uncertainty about how other states would respond, American leaders could 
have chosen between four different pathways.85 The alternatives which the U.S. could 
                                                 
85 Nominally, there were five pathways, with regional organizations representing an alternative if the U.S. 
selected an option outside the UN. The RIO option was not assessed by decision makers during the crisis 
despite its nominal availability. I would argue that the RIO option was not seriously considered by U.S. 
executive officials; the very notion of requiring international authorization was novel. Since getting 
authorization from an IO was first considered in the context of working through the UNSC there was no 
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have pursued vary along different degrees of UNSC involvement and would have 
resulted in distinct outcomes for the authority of the UNSC. The first path would have 
entailed the least involvement of the UNSC. The U.S. could have abandoned the 
involvement of the UNSC entirely as the U.S. negotiated the diplomacy of the anti-Iraq 
international coalition. This pathway involves a secondary choice where the U.S. could 
have sought out a surrogate IO to provide U.S. actions with political legitimacy, albeit 
from what was considered a weaker source. The second path would have been to 
continue to involve the UN as part of the diplomacy of the international coalition but not 
to request additional support through international authorization. Early in the crisis the 
U.S. expressed the preference for military action through the UN.86 Instead, the U.S. 
could rely upon the authority invested in the right of collective self-defense enshrined in 
Article 51 of the UN Charter. Exercising the right of self-defense did not require any 
additional action on the part of the UNSC. A third path, the one settled upon, was that of 
requesting an explicit authorization contained within a resolution passed by the UNSC. 
The fourth possible path which became possible was to revive the Military Staff 
Committee and run the operation through the UNSC as initially intended by the drafters 
of the UN Charter. Several of these pathways are more consistent with either expectations 
                                                                                                                                                 
need to turn to a different organization. The UNSC was the first IO to be considered and the appropriate 
locus of international authorization. Other statements of support came from RIOs but none were considered 
the end point for international authorization. Had an RIO been considered sufficient in this context, the 
pattern of state behavior would have been vastly different and the norm of international authorization may 
not have come into existence. The global scope of the UNSC provided it with greater claim over the 
projection of military force which cannot be claimed by a RIO.  
86 It was reported on August 10, 1990, that an anonymous administration official said that the Bush 
Administration would prefer any military action to be “wrapped in the U.N. flag” (quoted in Goshko 1990). 
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based on the preceding structure of the international system or the alternative 
explanations presented in Chapter II.  
UN or RIO based options were generally not considered viable during the Cold 
War. The end of the Cold War made these different paths possible but did not determine 
which path the U.S. would take. The point here is not that the U.S. did not have 
incentives to remain within the UN process. In fact, the U.S. did gain incentives to work 
diplomatically within the UN framework and resolutions which the U.S. was party to 
creating. However, the U.S. did face choices and costs to outside actions which did not 
stem from the preceding structural constraints encountered during the Cold War. The 
U.S. faced increasing costs because the Bush Administration pushed for UNSC 
resolutions. U.S. claimed that the UNSC should act and pass resolutions authorizing 
action against the Iraqis which legitimized the UNSC. Making these kinds of claims and 
then breaking away from the process and engaging in outside options would have 
burdened the U.S. greater costs for the diplomatic cooperation which it intended to 
preserve. The credibility of both the UN and the U.S. would have suffered and the 
coalition against Iraq would have collapsed. 
Path 1: Outside the UN Process 
Of the four pathways working outside the UN process is perhaps the least likely 
for the U.S. to have taken after the passage of UNSCR 660 (1990). This resolution 
declared that Iraq was responsible for breaking the international peace by invading 
Kuwait. The expectation from the preceding structural constraints of the Cold War was 
that the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Thomas Pickering, would respond to news of the 
Iraqi invasion by calling for a Security Council meeting as he, in fact, did. Pickering was 
 136 
going to start a process of negotiation with other UNSC members, which may have lasted 
months before producing a resolution. This was the situation faced by the members in 
1987 when the Security Council was involved in ending the Iran-Iraq War. It took six 
months to negotiate a finding of a breach of the international peace under the UN Charter 
(Hume 1994, 188). Ambassador Pickering managed to accomplish this task in a matter of 
hours (Malone 2006, 58). Prior expectations, even when the relations between the 
permanent five members of the UNSC (P-5) were friendly, suggested that if the U.S. 
wanted to accomplish anything quickly about the situation that it would have to act 
outside the UNSC.87 Ambassador Pickering and the U.S. Mission to the UN proceeded as 
normal but instead of encountering resistance, the Ambassador was able to quickly 
negotiate a text with the other UNSC members. Pickering credits the swift action to the 
clear aggression of Iraq which was “very much contrary to what people had come to 
expect the end of the Cold War might mean” (quoted in Rosegrant 1994, 4). Prior 
expectations suggested that coopeation in the Security Council was surprising. 
‘The Soviets saw any act of aggression by someone in their bloc as an act 
of liberation,’ says Jeane Kirkpatrick, President Reagan’s envoy to the 
U.N. ‘If this were two years ago, the Soviets and those associated with 
them would have defined what Iraq did as an act of liberation.’(quoted in 
Greenberger and Shribman 1990, A4) 
The initial draft for UNSCR 660 was written by the U.S. in consultation with the United 
Kingdom’s Ambassador to the UN, Sir Crispin Tickell (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 80). 
The two at a dinner party together when Ambassador Pickering received the call that Iraq 
had invaded Kuwait. He was instructed that should bring the UNSC together to address 
                                                 
87 The P-5 includes the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Soviet Union/Russian 
Federation. The remaining member states are elected to the UNSC for two year terms. 
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this emergent problem. After these two worked on the draft resolution they introduced it 
to the remaining UNSC members. They arranged for nine sponsors, including Ethiopia 
and Malaysia.88 Many U.S. decision makers feared that as the U.S. built the coalition 
within the UN, working outside increased the risks to undermine the cooperation within 
the coalition (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 148). Starting with UNSCR 660, and with each 
subsequent resolution, it became increasingly unlikely that the U.S. would step outside 
the UN process all together.  
At two additional points in the process the U.S could have chosen a path outside 
the UN process. The U.S. could have adopted a different path prior to the resolutions 
which authorized the coalition to use military force. This means the U.S. could have 
broken away from the UN process. However, the decision to request international 
authorization to project military force to enforce the embargo on Iraq led directly to the 
need to gain authorization for Desert Storm (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 144). Requesting 
international authorization made it harder to resist making a subsequent request. Hence, it 
became harder for the U.S. to change paths the further it went along the pathway. The 
implications of this pathway on the authority of the UNSC would have been considerable. 
Had the U.S. attempted to act outside the UN rhetorical devices could have been used, 
such as claiming that U.S. action was consistent with UNSC resolutions rather than 
legitimized by them. The UNSC would have been pushed to the margins of international 
politics, returning to its Cold War obscurity. The U.S. would likely rely upon its 
                                                 
88 The other sponsors included the U.S., the United Kingdom and France from the P-5. From the elected 
members, Canada, Colombia, Côte d’Ivorie and Finland agreed to sponsor the resolution. This initial 
condemnation stands in contrast to UNSCR 678 (1990) that authorized the use of offensive military force 
by the coalition and was sponsored by the Soviet Union. 
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developing bilateral relationships with states in the Middle East and Europe emphasizing 
the support it had garnered from its Arab allies but without UN cover. 
Path 2: Article 51 Justifications 
U.S. officials claimed they had the authority to enforce economic sanctions 
mandated under UNSCR 661 prior to the passage of UNSCR 665 on August 25, 1990. 
This authority came from Article 51 of the UN Charter and the request for help from 
Kuwait after the invasion (Fitzwater 1991a). UNSCR 661 imposed sanctions while 
UNSCR 665 authorized the use of force to enforce these sanctions. This basis for action 
differs substantially from the other possible paths. For this one the U.S. would have relied 
on the authority of the UNSC in name only. Article 51 asserts: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of 
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by 
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the 
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present 
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. (UN Charter 1945) 
Procedurally, all Article 51 requires is that member states report measures taken to 
defend themselves to the UNSC. This article reaffirms that the UN Charter in no way 
impinges upon the right of states to act in their own defense. To base the legitimacy of 
U.S. action to enforce the embargo on Article 51 is to base the legitimacy of this decision 
upon the moral authority of the U.S. to decide to come to the aid of another member of 
the UN. This right to self-defense includes the right to collective defense where other 
states come to the aid of the victim of armed attack. U.S. officials claimed that the 
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Kuwaiti request for assistance provides the U.S. and the other coalition members with the 
authority to enforce the embargo.89 
Things did not work out based on the original intent of U.S. officials. “The initial 
American intention was not to seek further authority from the United Nations to enforce 
the embargo” (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 144). The administrations initial strategy was 
to work unilaterally and if the UN went along that they would accept the support 
(Sciolino 1990). President Bush publically articulated the U.S. position based on Article 
51 when asked by reporters on August 14, 1990, if the U.S. exceeded its authority to 
interdict ships in the Gulf. 
I think we're acting legally. So, this little meeting that was called by Cuba 
yesterday—it doesn't disturb me in the least. I mean, there can be 
differences, people can discuss them. But I'm convinced we're acting 
properly, and we are determined to continue to act in that manner. You 
see, Perez de Cuellar [U.N. Secretary-General] apparently talked about 
only the U.N. through resolutions can decide about a blockade. But he also 
said every country has the right to bring up article 51, and the Secretary-
General had nothing to say against it. And we have good opinions that we 
are acting properly. And I have no intention to change at all. (Bush 1991b, 
1132-1133) 
On the same day, while discussing the issue of legal authority with the Turkish President, 
President Bush claimed the request for assistance from Kuwait constituted sufficient 
authority to act. 
President Ozal: One other thing: the Kuwaiti Prime Minister visited us 
today and brought with him letters from the Emir regarding Article 51. 
President Bush: Yes, That is what gives us the legal authority. (Bush 
1990e, 1) 
                                                 
89 Kuwait requested aid from the U.S. in the midst of the invasion. The first request for aid came from the 
Crown Prince about three hours after the invasion began (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 67). This request 
included the condition that the request be neither public nor official. A second request followed but without 
the conditions. This was later confirmed as the Kuwaiti ambassador to the UN worked with Ambassador 
Pickering to pass UNSCR 660 (Hume 1994, 187-188). The official request was received on August 12 
(Fitzwater 1991a). 
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Ambassador Pickering pushed the U.S. position in the UNSC on August 9, 1990. 
We are in the course of informing this Council officially by appropriate 
letter of our action taken under Article 51 of the Charter. As President 
Bush said yesterday, this is entirely defensive in purpose, to help protect 
Saudi Arabia, and is taken under Article 51 of the Charter and indeed in 
consistency with Article 41 and resolution 661 (1990). 
As resolution 661 (1990) affirms, Article 51 applies in this case. The Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait and the large military presence on the Saudi frontier 
create grave risks of further aggression in the area. This being the case, my 
Government and others are, at the request of Saudi Arabia, sending forces 
with which to deter further Iraqi aggression. (UNSC 1990b, 8-9) 
Support for this position was also forcefully advocated by the British Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 148). Throughout the Gulf Crisis she 
thought that Article 51 and UNSCR 660 were sufficient, while requiring an additional 
resolution suggested that sovereign states did not have the moral authority to act on their 
own behalf. 
This meeting also saw the beginning of an almost interminable, argument 
between the Americans—particularly [Secretary of State] Jim Baker—and 
me about whether and in what form United Nations authority was needed 
for measures against Saddam Hussein. I felt that the Security Council 
Resolution which had already been passed, combined with our ability to 
invoke Article 51 of the UN Charter on self-defence, was sufficient … 
[A]lthough I am a strong believer in international law, I did not like 
unnecessary resort to the UN, because it suggested that sovereign states 
lacked the moral authority to act on their own behalf. If it became 
accepted that force could only be used—even in self-defence—when the 
United Nations approved, neither Britain's interests nor those of 
international justice and order would be served. The UN was a useful—for 
some matters vital—forum. But it was hardly the nucleus of a new world 
order. (Thatcher 1993, 821) 
Thatcher used a similar rationale to support action over the Falkland Islands during the 
1980s (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 84). The United Kingdom’s Ambassador to the United 
Nations, Sir Crispin Tickell also defended this position in the Security Council. 
Members of the Council will also know that at the request of the 
Government of Saudi Arabia my Government has agreed to contribute 
forces to a multinational effort for the collective defence of the territory of 
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Saudi Arabia and other threatened States in the area. We will do so in 
accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, which 
members will recall was specifically reaffirmed in the preambule to 
Security Council resolution 661 (1990). (UNSC 1990b, 17-18) 
While the U.S. and the United Kingdom stood together on this issue, others did 
not see it the same way. Iraq, of course, rejected this interpretation of UNSCR 661, 
calling any attempt to interdict Iraqi oil tankers as an act of aggression (Freedman and 
Karsh 1993, 144). Pickering defended against this ironic accusation by suggesting that 
looking to Iraq to interpret UNSC resolutions was “…setting the fox to watch the hen 
house” (UNSC 1990a, 52). Others had perhaps more noble concerns about unilateral 
enforcement of UNSCR 661 in the Gulf. Tears lingered that, if unchecked by other 
powers, the U.S. may return to imperialist designs in the Middle East (Dannreuther 
1991/1992, 24). France and China looked for an additional resolution as the best way to 
place limits on U.S. action (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 145). The preferred option of the 
Soviet Union was to resurrect the Military Staff Committee (MSC) to command 
enforcement of UNSC resolutions (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 145). The Soviet Union 
did agree with the French and Chinese that Article 51 was insufficient grounds for 
enforcement actions. The intended content of the ideal French or Chinese resolution was 
unclear but France and China seemed to want to limit the freedom of U.S. national 
decision making. Their ideal point may have been closer to the Soviets in intent but 
perhaps with a different coordinating mechanism from the MSC. This kind of rhetoric in 
the decision making process suggests that the initial intent of the U.S. was to conduct 
itself as it had during the Cold War and claim that its unilateral decisions were consistent 
with international standards. 
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The decision to turn from this path towards requesting international authorization 
emerged from a meeting between President Bush and his top advisers on August 22, 
1990.90 This meeting took place three days before the UNSC passed UNSCR 665 which 
authorized coalition forces to use force when enforcing the UN mandated embargo. At 
this meeting the key issue was whether to wait for a UN resolution before interdicting 
ships in the Gulf. The concern was that Saddam’s challeng of the embargo put the 
credibility of the U.S. at stake requiring immediate action (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 
147). The other issue was based on the calculation that if the U.S. waited and sought a 
resolution but did not secure enforcement authorization, this would be the worst of all 
possible outcomes for the U.S. The leadership of the U.S. over the coalition and its 
Article 51 justifications would be harmed (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 148). It is notable 
that of President Bush’s advisers, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft was the 
strongest advocate against requesting an additional UNSC Resolution. Secretary of State, 
James Baker argued that an additional resolution was necessary to hold the coalition 
together. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Powell expressed that the U.S. could 
afford to wait to begin enforcement. President Bush was persuaded that it was worth the 
risk to wait and request an additional UNSC resolution to enforce the embargo. 
Thus, after a false start, the Americans had accepted that they had to keep 
working within an international consensus in a manner that would have 
been inconceivable just a few years earlier (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 
150). 
The Article 51 pathway dominated the understanding of U.S. policy making prior 
to the decision to request international authorization. The consequences for the UNSC, 
                                                 
90 Secretary Baker contributed from Wyoming (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 147). 
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had the U.S. remained on this path seem readily apparent. The U.S. would not have based 
their action upon decisions in the UNSC but instead would have relied on its Article 51 
claims to defend Kuwait. The U.S. requested and recieved international authorization to 
enforce the embargo on Iraq. Interestly, the statement the White House put out after the 
passage of UNSCR 665 did not even mention the Article 51 justification for enforcement 
action (see Fitzwater 1991b). In the aftermath of the passage of UNSCR 665 President 
Bush invoked the notion that the UN authorized all necessary means to enforce the 
embargo when briefing Congress on the situation in the Gulf.91 
With great speed, the United Nations Security Council passed five 
resolutions. These resolutions condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, 
demanded Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal, and rejected 
Iraq's annexation of Kuwait. The U.N. has also mandated sanctions against 
Iraq, those chapter VII sanctions, and endorsed all measures that may be 
necessary to enforce these sanctions. And the United Nations has 
demanded that Iraq release all foreign nationals being held against their 
will without delay. (Bush 1991d, 1173). 
Bush also cited UNSCR 665 for the contributions from Coalition members to the effort to 
monitor the seas and enforce the embargo on Iraq. 
This effort has been truly international from the very outset. Many other 
countries are contributing. At last count, 22 countries have either 
responded to a request from Saudi Arabia to help deter further aggression 
or are contributing maritime forces pursuant to United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 665. (Bush 1991a, 1177) 
                                                 
91 It is also interesting to note that the Bush Administration did not treat the authority of the UNSC in the 
same manner that it did for some U.S. domestic institutions. When it concerns war powers the Bush 
Administration claimed sole authority to command the military and did not need the support of Congress. It 
did welcome the support of Congress but did not recognize that it carried authority over the decision of the 
President to order the beginning of combat operations. This holds certain distinctions which are relevant for 
the discussion about invoking the legitimacy of action under Article 51 of the UN Charter. If the Bush 
Administration did not recognize the authority of the UNSC, its response to the passage of UNSCR 665 
should have been similar to its reaction to the U.S. Congress passing the authorization to use military force. 
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President Bush justified U.S. actions from the UN mandate and suggested that this is 
what the UN is supposed to do in these situations. 
Well, I don't particularly see more hope [for a diplomatic solution] now 
because it's so clear what the world is demanding of Saddam Hussein 
[President of Iraq]. Clearly the objectives remain the same: Get out of 
Kuwait and restore the rightful leaders to their place. But the Secretary-
General, I understand, will be meeting with Foreign Minister of Iraq 
[Tariq ‘Aziz]—I think it's in Amman, Jordan. I haven't talked to him yet. I 
have a call in to him and will probably get him. But the U.N. mandate is 
so clear and, on the other hand, Saddam Hussein has been so resistant to 
complying with international law that I don't yet see fruitful negotiations. 
But the Secretary-General, knowing the U.N. mandate, is a very good 
man. And I might add, parenthetically, the Prime Minister [Brian 
Mulroney of Canada] and I both did talk about this, and we both agree that 
the U.N. has perhaps demonstrated its finest in recent actions. So, if Perez 
de Cuellar, an old friend of mine, wants to go forward and try to find some 
way to get the U.N. action complied with, so much the better. (Bush 
1991c, 1167-1168).  
In these and similar statements President Bush ceased to use Article 51 as a justification 
for U.S. enforcement action. Had U.S. officials continued to press Article 51 as the 
source of legitimacy rather than request international authorization for U.S. action, it is 
likely that the decisions made in the UNSC would have been seen as mere talk rather than 
binding on member states. 
Path 3: Requesting a Resolution 
Whereas paths one and two rely upon the authority of states to act on their own 
behalf, the third path relies upon a specific delegation of authority by resolution from the 
UNSC to a coalition of willing members. The process upon which this path relies is for 
the UNSC to pass a resolution authorizing the use of military force. This discussion of the 
decision to request international authorization differs from the other three pathways in 
one key respect. The U.S. officials chose to request international authorization from the 
UNSC for both embargo enforcement and for their offensive military operation under 
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Desert Storm. Since the U.S. decision makers decided to pursue international 
authorization it was clearly a possible avenue of policy. 
The UN Charter does not offers a specific provision for international 
authorization delegating the authority to use military force to member states (Blokker 
2000; Wilson 2007). The first time the UNSC delegated its enforcement authority 
occurred in 1950 for the Korean War. The Soviet Union was boycotting the Security 
Council over the permanent membership of Taiwan. Due in no small part to the Soviet 
return to the Security Council, the only other time during the Cold War in which this 
instrument was used by the UNSC was UNSCR 221 (1966). This delegation was to the 
United Kingdom to enforce an embargo upon Southern Rhodesia. It was not used again 
until the Persian Gulf Crisis after the end of the Cold War. Due to Cold War dynamics its 
accompanying great power politics the UNSC was not initially used as the primary forum 
to address issues of peace and security. The diplomacy of the United States leading up to 
the Persian Gulf War did not focus on the United Nations in any substantial capacity. The 
initial characterization of the diplomatic strategy pursued by the White House in this 
situation was that it was a "box to be checked" rather than the centerpiece (Thomas 
Pickering quoted in Rosegrant 1994, 13). However,  
With the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait … the US approach to the Security 
Council diplomacy changed dramatically. Resolutions, once drafted 
entirely in New York, were crafted instead within the State Department, 
passing through a laborious, multi-bureau clearing process before [the 
Ambassador to the UN, Thomas] Pickering began his negotiations in New 
York (Rosegrant 1994, 14). 
The basis of authority which the U.S. used to justify its action during this crisis changed 
with the decision to request international authorization to enforce the embargo on Iraq. 
This decision was made within an uncertain environment. While urging the U.S. to make 
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a request for international authorization Canadian Ambassador, Yves Fortier “said that 
these are uncharted waters, that there are no precedents” (quoted in Sciolino 1990). The 
U.S. decision to request international authorization for its embargo enforcement actions 
had lasting effects. 
[T]he decision to turn the embargo into an effective blockade … set the 
precedent for international support for the use of force and, in so doing, 
shaped future American decision-making” (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 
144). 
This decision paid off for the Bush Administration. In making the decision to continue 
along the UN path, the U.S. gained support for enforcing the embargo. 
[T]he U.N. has emerged as an invaluable tool. President Bush, himself a 
former U.N. delegate, understood the potential of the organization for 
providing cover and legitimacy for his response to Iraq's invasion of 
Kuwait. Without the prospect of U.N. support, he might not have been 
able to persuade Saudi Arabia to accept U.S. troops. Without U.N. action, 
it would have been more difficult for an Islamic state such as Turkey to 
close its oil pipelines. Without the U.N., the likelihood of Soviet 
involvement in international action was slim; from the outset, Moscow 
made it clear that it would not move without the UN. The administration 
has at some points in the current crisis moved at a slower pace, or shown 
more caution, than officials would have preferred-specifically in order to 
keep the five permanent members of the Security Council moving in 
unison. For instance, Mr. Bush held off on unilaterally enforcing the 
embargo. That was a deliberate strategy chosen in hopes that the crisis 
could set a precedent in which the Security Council showed it would take 
concerted action against international aggressors, something it has seldom 
done in the past. (Greenberger and Shribman 1990, A4) 
The decision to request international authorization for both offensive action and 
embargo enforcement reflected a new reality for U.S. decision makers. Concerns arose 
that action outside of the UN would unravel the coalition (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 
145), coupled with concerns that the Soviet Union may not support a resolution to 
authorize force. Both the USSR and China had threatened to veto a resolution which 
looked to authorize force on the basis of ships already in the Gulf (Freedman and Karsh 
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1993, 146). However, indications from France, the USSR, and China suggested that they 
all would support some enforcement activities. (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 147). 
Ambassador Pickering thought that there were good prospects for the U.S. to get 
authorization within the UNSC (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 146). Secretary Baker felt 
that the USSR could be persuaded to support a UNSC resolution in time (Freedman and 
Karsh 1993, 148). Part of the issues revolved around the content of a resolution 
authorizing the enforcement of the embargo. When attempting to figure out the content of 
such a resolution the U.S. ran into some stumbling blocks. The U.S. preference was for a 
UN mandate without an effect upon national decision making. Such a resolution should 
“be confined to a request for assistance from member states to enforce the embargo” 
(Freedman and Karsh 1993, 146). This would in effect give member states the authority 
to enforce UNSC resolutions as they saw fit. Other states were concerned that this gave 
the U.S. a free hand for any chosen military action. The U.S. needed to accept greater 
limits on its actions to gain the support of other states. In the end, Bush decided to press 
for and received international authorization from the UN Security Council. 
One crucial aspect in securing international authorization from the UNSC does 
concern the goals of U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf. Concerns arose about the intentions 
of the U.S. In this instance U.S. diplomacy worked to assure other countries prior to 
securing authorization from the UNSC. The Bush Administration worked hard to reassure 
members of the coalition and of the United Nations that its goals were the ones enshrined 
by UNSCRs. The September 1990 decision to remove Air Force Chief of Staff, Michael 
Duggan, from his post reinforced this notion (Dannreuther 1991/1992, 33). Duggan had 
told the press that Saddam Hussein would be deliberately targeted. The Bush 
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Administration had stressed that U.S. goals did not include an attempt to remove Hussein 
from power but were limited, when asked on August 27, 1990. 
Q. Mr. President, how would you describe your policy for ousting Saddam 
Hussein right now, as of this moment? Would it be fair to describe it as 
wait and see? 
The President. No. My policy is to do everything we can, working with 
other nations, to enforce the sanctions. We have moved forces, 
considerable forces, and I hope that that has safeguarded Saudi Arabia, 
which in my view was clearly threatened when Saddam Hussein moved 
his forces south from Kuwait City. So, I think it is now: Get plenty of 
force in place—we're still doing that. Enforce the United Nations 
sanctions rigorously-and for the U.S., we will do that and encourage others 
to do it. And that's about where we are right now. (Bush 1991c, 1170).92 
U.S. officials attempted to reassure others that the U.S. did not have imperial intentions. 
Baker attempted to reassure the Soviet Union that American troops were going to be in 
the Middle East only for the duration of the crisis (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 80). The 
American mission to convince King Fahd that U.S. intentions to defend Saudi Arabia 
were credible also stressed that the U.S. was not looking to permanently station troops 
there (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 92).  
The ability to secure international approval from the UNSC hinged more on the 
limited U.S. goals rather than the issue of getting other states to support the U.S. because 
of UN authorization. In other words, the U.S.’s limited goals prompted support from the 
USSR, China, France, and Arab states rather than the support of those states prompting 
the U.S. to limit its goals. Had the U.S. pressed for regime change in Iraq this support 
may have not been forthcoming and there may have been a veto of the authorizing 
resolution. Ultimately, the U.S. requested a resolution from the UNSC with explicit 
                                                 
92 On August 30, 1990, President Bush did indicate that the U.S. would welcome a change from inside Iraq 
but would not work from outside to produce a change in Iraq’s regime (Bush 1991a, 1179). 
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authorization for the enforcement of sanctions and repelling the Iraqi invasion while other 
states were open to the U.S. pursuing other pathways.  
Path 4: The Military Staff Committee 
The fourth pathway the U.S. could have taken centers on the MSC of the UN 
Security Council. When the UN Charter was signed the original intent was for members 
states to contribute troops and equipment to be used by the UNSC and commanded 
through the MSC (Bailey and Daws 1998, 274-275). These military units were to be used 
to enforce peace and ensure security to produce a true collective security system (Grove 
1993). This model of enforcement action failed to emerge due in large part because 
member states did not place military troops, equipment, or other resources under the 
control of the MSC. Member states are still unlikely to do so to this day. During the 
Persian Gulf Crisis the MSC experienced a brief revival but it failed to reach the heights 
envisioned by those who wrote the Charter. The MSC still meets regularly as proscribed 
by the Charter but the content of these meetings usually only concerns scheduling the 
next meeting (Bailey and Daws 1998, 274). 
The end of the Cold War brought about the possibility for this mechanism to be 
used by the UNSC and the member states to provide a mechanism for coordination and 
control over military forces. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the international military 
response created an opportuinty to use the MSC. This option to coordinate military 
activities in the Persian Gulf was favored by the Soviet Union over other options 
considered by the U.S. when forming its policy response to the developing crisis 
(Freedman and Karsh 1993, 146). The Soviet Union’s preference for the MSC emerged 
from the tensions between two aspects of the context in which the USSR found itself at 
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the end of the Cold War (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 125). The Soviet Union’s post-Cold 
War foreign policy committed President Mikhail Gorbachev to find common interests 
with the U.S. (Fuller 1991). The Soviet policy of perestroika (new thinking) and 
Gorbachev’s domestic support would suffer if Iraq was allowed to retain Kuwait. The 
emergent international order may have suffered as well. On the other hand, Iraq was a 
long standing ally of the USSR. It was difficult to alter the effect of these ties and the 
Soviet stance towards Iraq. These two pressures placed the Soviet Union in a difficult 
position of siding with a former enemy against a state which the USSR claimed as an 
ally. The use of Soviet armed forces fighting alongside its former enemy was a difficult 
image for many in the USSR to contemplate (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 127). The 
solution to resolve this tension was through the United Nations. This push to focus on the 
role of the UN led to an emphasis on what the UN was originally set up to do—control 
military force through the MSC. Working through the UN was consistent with the “new 
thinking” of Gorbachev and could allow for the USSR to justify its position alongside the 
U.S. in the Gulf crisis. 
For the enforcement of the sanctions upon Iraq, UNSCR 665 recommended the 
MSC as a mechanism to help coordinate efforts, reflecting the idea that many thought the 
entire program of the UN could be rejuvenated in response to aggression. This is the first 
time the MSC had been activated since the Soviet Union boycotted its meetings in 1950, 
and the first time it could be used to coordinate information among members since it 
became deadlocked in 1948 (Bailey and Daws 1998, 279). However, the UNSC did not 
make this mechanism mandatory and it was used only briefly to share embargo 
enforcement information (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 149-150). When discussing the 
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crisis with Japanese Prime Minister, Toshiki Kaifu on August 13, 1990, this option was 
initially considered by President Bush as the most likely route to coordinate action among 
the different national militaries taking part in preventing trade with Iraq. 
The multinational peacekeeping effort will probably be coordinated 
through the UN military staff committee and perhaps Japan could 
participate in those consultations. Although these issues require further 
consultation, initial ideas being kicked around are mine sweeping and 
ships to carry equipment to Saudi Arabia—something of that nature. 
(Bush 1990g) 
Since the French and Chinese wanted to limit the United States’ freedom of action, it 
seems likely they would have accepted the MSC as a way to do so. The French in 
particular may have seen this as a better alternative to direct U.S. control over the French 
forces. In fact, the French insisted their troops were to be deployed outside of the chain of 
command of the Coalition forces assembling in Saudi Arabia. Despite this independent 
political position there was tacit recognition on the ground that in the event of military 
action the French forces would have to act under U.S. command (Freedman and Karsh 
1993, 118).93 There was even support for reactivating the MSC from the Labour party in 
the United Kingdom, exhibited during the House of Commons debates on September 6th, 
1990 over the authority to use military force in the gulf: 
It is lawful if, at some time, the United Nations judges that the action 
taken thus far has been "inadequate" for the purpose of fulfilling its 
resolutions, in which case military action under article 42 of the charter 
could be taken, either by reference to the Security Council or the military 
staff committee, or both. Those who say that there cannot be a public 
declaration of the possibility of a strike do not take into full account the 
reason for the existence of the military staff committee. Given the military 
realities, if it were acceptable that a strike took place against an aggressive 
enemy, the process would be much more likely to go through the MSC 
                                                 
93 There was a private agreement that the French forces would be integrated into the coalition command as 
early as October of 1990 (Dannreuther 1991/1992, 44). 
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than the Security Council. (Neil Kinnock, Leader of the Opposition in the 
House of Commons 1990) 
The U.S. had concerns about working through the MSC. The primary concern was that 
the United States wanted to preserve its national command structure as the most effective 
and practical means for military action rather than operating directly under UN-command 
(Freedman and Karsh 1993, 146). The U.S. wanted control over its own operations, 
especially since it was the state contributing the majority of the military forces in the 
Gulf. The MSC was not considered an attractive option for offensive military action. The 
MSC was reactivated but only to exchange evidence of sanctions violations. It did not 
alter the national command structures put into place by the U.S. over coalition forces 
(Dannreuther 1991/1992, 29). A second issue for the U.S. concerned the possibility that 
the USSR would contribute troops which would operate side-by-side with American 
forces. Had the USSR made the decision to contribute troops or ships, the MSC may have 
served as the needed mechanism to coordinate military activities.94 Without contributing 
military assets to the coalition, the USSR’s opinion on the day-to-day operation of the 
military forces was not very compelling. 
The U.S. military focused on two issues about the MSC. The first, they were 
reluctant to cede command of U.S. troops to an entity that is not within the U.S. 
command structure. Thus, one pertinent issue concerns placing troops under foreign 
command. The second was the root of the initial problem of activating the MSC. The 
Cold War imposed constraints such that placing troops at the disposal of the MSC would 
provide the Soviet Union with the ability to override U.S. commands. The Soviet Union 
                                                 
94 Shevardnadze had even suggested the USSR would contribute troops to a multinational force through the 
MSC (Dannreuther 1991/1992, 85). 
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held up the formation of stand-by agreements that would have provided military 
resources for the use of the MSC. Stalin did not want these forces to be used around the 
world and thus institutionalize the strategic superiority held by western powers (Grove 
1993, 178). The easing of tensions between the U.S. and the USSR did relieve this issue. 
The end of the Cold War meant that policies were no longer discussed in relation to the 
overwhelming issue of how they would affect the Soviet Union. The role of the MSC 
could be assessed according to its merits without reference to the Cold War. In the 
balance of things, the reason why one option was chosen over others was because the 
policy makers thought it was the best policy option. In this instance they assessed the 
MSC and found it wanting. They did so because they were concerned about the MSC 
overriding the national military commands. In fact, when drafting UNSC resolutions U.S. 
policy makers explicitly did not include reference to Articles 42 and 46 of the UN 
Charter which dealt with the MSC because it could invite the MSC or the UNSC to 
interfere with the conduct of the war (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 229). The U.S. accepted 
the MSC as a mechanism to coordinate the embargo on Iraq but did not think the MSC 
was necessary unless the USSR contributed military resources to the coalition (Freedman 
and Karsh 1993, 126). The MSC was considered a policy option but there was an 
alternative which provided the U.S. with more flexibility in conducting war operations 
while maintainong cohesion in the coalition against Iraq. Had this alternative not been 
available, or if France and China did not see a UNSC resolution as acceptable, the MSC 
may have been the only option to ensure that the U.S. continued to work through the UN 
and thus maintain the coalition. Failing to work through the UN, the U.S. would not have 
maintained the coalition that included the Soviet Union. 
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Had the U.S. acceded to the preferences of the USSR and elected to work through 
the MSC, the outcome for the authority of the UNSC may have been very different. The 
process of using authorizing resolutions to delegate enforcement tasks in the Persian Gulf 
War looked workable. Had the MSC been successful as the UNSC’s mechanism to 
ensure collective security, and, if the coalition forces had removed the Iraqi military from 
Kuwait, the UN would have dramatically enhanced authority. To acomplish this it would 
have had to successfully create channels for conducting military operations including 
coordinating between varied national militaries, selecting proper targets, and executing 
missions in Iraq to repel the invaders of Kuwait. This organ would report directly to the 
UNSC rather than operate through a national command. Based on the assessment of 
recent NATO activities the ability of the MSC to achieve this is highly unlikely.95 Under 
such a scenario it would have been the UN acting through the MSC taking command of 
coalition operations rather than the U.S., even if the U.S. provided the bulk of the military 
assets and resources. 
Alternatively and, much more likely, even if the overarching goal of removing 
Saddam’s troops from Kuwait had been reached, it would have been difficult to call the 
operation a success. If the operation was an outright failure, the UNSC would have been 
too intimately connected with the conduct of the operation to avoid blame. As a test, the 
UNSC would have failed and thus in subsequent crises, such as Somalia in 1992 and 
                                                 
95 Two recent NATO operations have illustrated difficulties in managing national militaries in cooperation. 
The U.S. involvement in the operation in Kosovo in 1999 illustrated the difficulties of coalition warfare 
under the NATO command (Dunn 2009). The second is the Libyan operation which NATO recently 
undertook in 2011. The assessment of this operation is that NATO could not successfully undertake 
missions such as this in the future without disproportionate leadership and support from the U.S. (Schmitt 
2012). The implications of these operations suggest that the earlier operations Desert Shield and Storm 
would not have been seen as successful had the U.S. not taken the lead in providing a military role. 
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Bosnia in 1995, the UNSC most likely would not have been used. Such consequences 
were not clear to decision makers at the time. The MSC was considered a viable choice 
which could have been used by the coalition during the Persian Gulf crisis. 
POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS 
American officials made the decision to request a resolution from the UNSC to 
authorize the use of force to enforce sanctions on Iraq, thus laying the foundation for 
international authorization of offensive military operations. The previous constraints 
which structured the relationship between the U.S. and the UNSC suggest that three of 
these alternative pathways would not have been available. Authorizing resolutions, using 
the MSC, or using a RIO would not have been options considered under the Cold War 
competition. World leaders were surprised about the role of the UNSC in the emerging 
crisis between Iraq and Kuwait. Many thought that the resolutions which emerged from 
the UNSC were not possible even a few years before.  
If somebody had told you 2 years ago that this kind of crisis would emerge 
and the Soviet Union would repudiate Iraq and that the United Nations 
Security Council would stand in unanimous support of five resolutions and 
that you would see this kind of support emerge, as I say, from Canada to 
Australia, you would have bought him a ticket to the funny farm right 
away. This is an historic achievement by the United Nations, by members 
of the alliance, and by the President of the United States. This is a 
remarkable achievement. There are few parallels for it, certainly, in 
modern history. (Brian Mulroney in Bush 1991c, 1171). 
The choices which American officials faced included those which were not previously 
available. Nominally, these choices were there but they were not considered viable. Of 
the alternatives which were assessed by the U.S., the use of authorizing resolutions was 
the most appealing, precisely because it preserved the international coalition by 
continuing to work through the UN and ensure that the U.S. maintained control over 
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military decisions. Working through the UN also carried the added benefit that it helped 
with domestic support from both Congress and the American public opinion. This section 
now turns to the explanations for why the U.S. turned to the UNSC to gain international 
authorization. 
Sophisticated Realism 
The Persian Gulf War shows the limits of a sophisticated realist explanation of the 
request for international authorization. A sophisticated realist explanation suggests that a 
state’s power over others should translate into that state requesting international 
authorization because the state’s leaders think they can use this power to gain greater 
international support for authorization for the projection of military force. Under this 
conception of how international politics works, U.S. leaders are expected to focus on the 
geopolitical power of other states. U.S. executive officials did focus on the power of Iraq 
and its potential to gain more upon acquiring more resources. President Bush expressed 
in a National Security Council meeting on August 4, 1990, that the first thing the U.S. 
needed to do after Iraq invaded Kuwait was to deter an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia 
(Baker 1995, 277). U.S. decision makers were concerned that if Iraq gained control of 
Saudi Arabia that with the resources of both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia combined with its 
own, Iraq would control over a quarter of the world oil supplies. In such as case, Iraq 
could project immense power over the Middle East and beyond and hold the potential to 
disrupt the world economy. In the National Security Council meeting, the solution to the 
threat which Iraq represented to Saudi Arabia was to convince Saudi Arabia to accept 
U.S. troops (Rosegrant 1994, 10). However interesting this preoccupation of U.S. 
decision makers with the threat which Iraq represented may be by itself, the concern with 
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Iraq’s rising power needs to be connected to the decision to request international 
authorization. This is a problem for sophisticated realism. The sophisticated realist claim 
is that the U.S. holds more power than other states and thus is able to get its way in the 
UNSC, which logically make sense. This claim is supported by the position many states 
took on the crisis. Since the Cold War ended and the U.S. was the last superpower 
standing, many states wanted to ally themselves with the U.S. According to one State 
Department official, 
The truth of the matter is we were in the process of seeing the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Everybody wanted to be 
close to the United States of America. (quoted in Rosegrant 1994, 20) 
This standing made it easier for the U.S. when considering inducements to gain support, 
but the U.S. still considered side payments and sanctions for support of coalition 
activities. These included debt forgiveness for Egypt, increasing textile quotas for 
Turkey, and the promise of future economic assistance to the Soviet Union (Rosegrant 
1994, 20). The most expressive inducement came in the form of a negative sanction 
against Yemen. After the September 29, 1990, vote on UNSCR 678 which authorized the 
projection of military force, with Yemen voting against international authorization, a U.S. 
official was quoted telling the Yemeni Ambassador, "That was the most expensive vote 
you will have cast" (quoted in Atkinson and Gellman 1991). The U.S. proceeded to cut 
aid to Yemen from $22 million to $3. The U.S. needed China’s acquiescence to avoid its 
veto in the UNSC. China saw the crisis as a means to escape the isolation from great 
powers which it faced after the Tiananmen Square massacre (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 
232). Once the decision was made to request international authorization the power of the 
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U.S. made it easier to secure international authorization from the UNSC.96 The initial 
decision to enforce the embargo on Iraq was considered independently of the decision to 
request international authorization. However, the U.S. decided to accept restraint when its 
initial intentions were met with concern by observer states. The U.S. thus made the 
decision to project military force after it had acquired international authorization. 
The exercise of power within the framework of the UN did have an effect upon 
international politics during this crisis. However, the expectations of a sophisticated 
realist explanation are more consistent with a different outcome than the request for 
specific resolutions providing international authorization to enforce the embargo and 
repel Iraq from Kuwait. The initial intentions of the U.S. were to act under the collective 
self-defense provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter. The U.S. convinced the UNSC to 
act immediately after receiving news of the invasion of Kuwait. With the request for aid 
from the Emir of Kuwait, U.S. executive officials thought they had all the legal standing 
to act, including the use of military force. Under the expectations of this explanation the 
U.S. should have been able to convince others that this constituted legitimate grounds to 
act and that further resolutions were unnecessary. Something which the U.S. failed to do. 
This explanation is more consistent with outside options or Article 51. France and China 
saw a specific resolution as a way to limit the exercise of power by the U.S. Outside 
options or acting under Article 51 would represent the unfettered exercise of U.S. power. 
The Article 51 pathway is more consistent with a power-based explanation. Conflicting 
                                                 
96 The power of the U.S. did make it easier to secure international support for the coalition against Iraq. 
What also helped were the positions that naked aggression along the lines of the invasion of Kuwait should 
be opposed and other less direct factors. It is certainly not a single issue which facilitated international 
cooperation. It there was a single issue which did so, working through an IO would neither have been 
necessary nor useful. 
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interests of the varied members of the UNSC should have prevented even the first 
condemnation of Iraqi action, let alone eleven resolutions which followed. A perspective 
which focuses upon the issue of raw material power suggests that the U.S. should have 
opted for policy options outside of the UNSC. The notion that the U.S. would alter its 
policy to account for other members of the Coalition should make the outside options 
much more attractive, especially since these interests would work against the national 
interest of the U.S. While the influence of power upon the outcome within the UN 
framework is clearly present, the contribution of a sophisticate realist explanation to the 
decision to request international authorization is limited. 
Regime Type 
An explanation of the decision to request international authorization which relies 
upon the regime type of the projector of military force rests upon the notion that 
democratic institutions are the important causal factor. This explanation suggests that 
U.S. decision makers should have justified their actions in terms of international law. One 
limitation that emerges from this explanation is that the U.S. did initially defend its 
actions and its ability to project military force as consistent with international law but 
without the requirement of an additional UNSC resolution. The initial resolution coupled 
with a request for aid was initially considered sufficient to justify the projection of 
military force under international law. However, to satisfy its partners in the anti-Iraq 
coalition the U.S. sought an additional resolution which justified the projection of 
military force. An additional issue is the fact that nondemocracies including the Soviet 
Union and China pushed for the U.S. to involve the UN despite their interests in the U.S. 
action. Their support was contingent upon the U.S. working through the UN under a 
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specific resolution. The Soviet Union held the position that projecting military force 
through the MSC was its preferred option but could still accept action through a Chapter 
VII resolution authorizing the projection of military force. Regime type does not seem to 
guide the reactions of different states to the projection of military force under the 
authorization of the UNSC. 
The emphasis this explanation places upon the role of law in democratic societies 
makes the option of the MSC the most logical one. The MSC is the original mechanism 
envisioned by the UN Charter to which the U.S. did agree. Essentially, this is the 
mechanism through which the UNSC was supposed to function. The UN Charter does not 
make any provisions for a delegation of enforcement to member states. Under the 
international law made by the UN Charter the MSC, under the control of the UNSC, was 
the only actor designated to project military force. The democratic impulse here should 
have led the U.S. to push for the involvement of the MSC as the outcome which makes 
the most sense from the perspective of this explanation. 
Information Transmission and Anticipated Political Costs 
The U.S. executive officials did not anticipate international political costs when 
they expressed their intent to enforce the UN’s embargo on Iraq. When they encountered 
resistance they justified their actions in terms of international law on the basis of 
collective self-defense. This justification received objection from other states, notably the 
Soviet Union, France, and China. The decision to act was in response to these concerns. 
The information transmission explanation suggests that the decision to turn to an IO for 
international authorization signals benign intentions when the leaders think they will 
encounter international political costs with their action. The U.S. did want to keep the 
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coalition together and so worked to pass a resolution which provided authorization for the 
coalition to project military force to repel Iraq from Kuwait. Initial drafting of the UNSC 
resolution took place in the UN Mission but as the crisis moved forward and the U.S. 
pressed for enforcement authorization, the drafting moved to Washington DC. This fits 
with the expectations of this explanation. 
If the desire to signal credible information about the intentions of the U.S. were 
the rationale for requesting international authorization, then using Article 51 justifications 
for U.S. action would have been the pathway selected by the American decision makers. 
Article 51 claims would signal to both Arab states and the U.S.’s Western allies that the 
U.S. did not have imperial aims as the U.S. attempted to communicate to other states. 
During August and early September, USSR officials expressed unease at the presence of 
U.S. troops in the Gulf region, but Bush managed to quell these fears by stressing that 
their presence was only for the duration of the crisis with Iraq (Dannreuther 1991/1992, 
33). Importantly, the U.S. relieved these fears by communicating its intentions directly to 
the USSR. Because of this treatment by the Bush Administration Gorbachev formally 
joined the coalition opposing Iraq on September 9, 1990. This occurred between the two 
resolutions authorizing the use of force for the different enforcement actions. UNSCR 
665 was passed on August 25. The decision by the Soviet Union to join the coalition does 
not seem to be directly connected to the passage of this resolution. The passage of 
UNSCR 678 was in November, over two months later, so the decision to join the 
coalition cannot have been influenced by its passage. The issue of U.S. intentions does 
not appear to be connected to resolutions passed by the UN. There is no indication why 
the U.S. would have sought a different mechanism which had not been used to signal its 
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benign intentions to other states. U.S. officials had other means beside UN resolutions to 
credibly convince participants in the international coalition of its benign intentions. The 
U.S. had been using these methods and they were successful at convincing other states to 
support the U.S. without relying on the UN to signal its intentions. 
A comparison with the Panamanian intervention which was conducted by the U.S. 
the year before the Persian Gulf Crisis erupted is interesting. The primary difference 
between these two instances is the end of the Cold War which made the UNSC a possible 
fora. The two cases are dissimilar in that the Persian Gulf War concerned a reaction to 
state aggression which is generally seen as inappropriate state behavior while the U.S. 
action to intervene in Panama was seen by many as aggression. Such actions in Latin 
America are contentions making it more likely that U.S. decision makers would have 
anticipated international political costs. This anticipation should have made it more likely 
for the U.S. to request international authorization in the Panamanian instance rather than 
the Persian Gulf crisis. The fact that the U.S. was responding to Iraqi aggression in the 
Persian Gulf War made it possible for the U.S. to acquire international authorization. 
Selling the U.S. action through the UN to the Soviet Union for their domestic 
political considerations explains why the U.S. did go to the UN. The intent was to keep 
the USSR in the coalition. The reason for requesting a specific resolution is a different 
matter. While the USSR wanted some form of UN action to justify its support, any kind 
of UNSC approval would have sufficed for Soviet domestic politics including the Soviet 
preference for the MSC, or the French and Chinese preference for a specific resolution. 
The U.S. chose the approach which would maximize its flexibility while maintaining the 
coalition. 
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IO Constraints 
An explanation based on the concerns of a projector of military force about the 
constraints imposed by an IO would focus on the ability of the projector to maintain 
flexibility and retain autonomy. After the first condemnation of the Iraqi invasion the 
Bush Administration began working the diplomatic front to produce an international 
coalition. U.S. officials thought that Article 51 and a request for aid by Kuwait gave the 
coalition the needed authority to enforce the embargo. Based on expectations of what was 
needed the U.S. initially chose this path. U.S. decision makers chose to leave this path 
because they thought that an additional resolution would bolster support from the 
international community. The concern was the international coalition rather than 
domestic political support. The U.S. had lingering fears that the push for time to let 
diplomacy work out a solution between Iraq and Kuwait was a ploy by the Soviet Union 
and its allies to support Iraq (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 188). Having lived through the 
Cold War, many U.S. policy makers did not want to sacrifice national interests to those 
on the side of the Iraqis. These concerns suggest that the U.S. did not want to endure the 
constraints of the UNSC especially when the U.S. could get the needed support from 
allies without requesting additional resolutions from the UNSC. This would balance the 
aversion to IO constraints with the advantages that come from working within the UNSC. 
Forum Shopping 
Forum shopping expectations suggest it should be more likely that the U.S. would 
have proceeded with the endorsement of a RIO. Decisions makers did not discuss the 
relative merits of IOs and whether they could achieve the same political ends as they 
could by going through the UN. The issue is that the UNSC was the organization in 
which great powers such as France, China, and the Soviet Union wanted to be involved. 
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The initial actions of the UNSC in the passage of UNSCR 660 increased the liklihood 
that the UNSC would be involved, but necessarily through the actions undertaken. The 
U.S. could have made the decision to act with only the first UNSC resolution which 
identified the breach of the international peace and then use regional endorsements as 
justification for their military actions. These endorsements included the support of Saudi 
Arabia, the Organization of Islamic Conference, and the Arab League, among others. The 
idea of using one of these organizations to provide political cover was not seriously 
considered by the Bush Administration. As noted above, the Bush Administration held a 
preference for military action within the UN framework but reserved the option of acting 
outside. 
Multilateralism Norm 
The norm of multilateralism stresses the idea that the process of multilateralism is 
the most appropriate method of projecting military force. This explanation suggests that 
the U.S. made the decision to request international authorization because of the idea that 
this was the right thing to do. This belies the process of decision making on the part of 
the U.S. The initial press for the UNSC to identify the invasion of Kuwait as a breach of 
international peace makes sense as part of this explanation but the turn to the UNSC for 
international authorization does not. The U.S. initially set its preference for action under 
Article 51 which did not require any additional resolutions for the U.S. to act. This 
suggests that the process of requesting a resolution to provide explicit authorization for 
the projection of military force was not considered by the U.S. as the “right” thing to do 
at the time. 
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Some indicators are consistent with this explanation. The Bush Administration 
did limit its goals in response to the concerns of its allies and attempted to accommodate 
interests of others. The Administration did also consult with allies, such as the inclusion 
of the British Prime Minister Thatcher in planning discussions and numerous 
conversations between President Bush and foreign leaders to gain their support.97  
The multilateralism norm explanation is consistent with the MSC pathway which 
stresses the process of multilateral operations. The MSC pathway was not pursued 
because to do so would incur greater constraints on the freedom of action than the path 
selected. In other words, this pathway demonstrates restraint. This option is a mechanism 
for using U.S. power through an institutionalized organization. It is one which would 
have been accepted by all of the major actors as an appropriate way for the U.S. to 
demonstrate restraint and support the goals of the U.S. The MSC pathway would not 
allow for mission creep. The MSC is the process initially set up by the UN Charter. This 
option should be the preferred process if a norm of multilateralism holds the key factor in 
U.S. action during the Persian Gulf crisis. Other forms of action should not have been 
seen as determining the behavior of states. The process established by the UN Charter 
was never followed during the Cold War nor during the Persian Gulf War. The U.S. 
found a way around this problem in response to North Korean aggression. The Korean 
War has been described as an “ambiguous precedent” for international cooperation 
                                                 
97 The Bush Presidential Library has records of some of the conversations which President Bush had with 
foreign leaders. In August 1990, there were 68; in September 1990, 42; in October 1990, 30. A sample of 
these conversations include on August 2nd, 1990: King Fahd of Saudi Arabia (Bush 1990h), King Hussein 
of Jordan (Bush 1990d), President Saleh of Yemen (Bush 1990i), on August 3rd, 1990: Prime Minister 
Kaifu of Japan (Bush 1990a), Chancellor Kohl of Germany (Bush 1990j), President Mitterrand of France 
(Bush 1990c), President Özal of Turkey (Bush 1990f), Prime Minister Thatcher of the United Kingdom 
(Bush 1990b). President Bush made extensive use of his international contacts during the crisis. 
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(Dannreuther 1991/1992, 41). However, the action taken by the UNSC during the Korean 
War gave the U.S. decision makers the argument to keep national control over the 
military operations when it came to the situation between Iraq and Kuwait. Authorizing 
resolutions provide a role for the UN and required that the coalition of willing states 
report to the UNSC. The UN’s role proved acceptable to the P-5 member states whose 
support the U.S. wanted for the operation in the Persian Gulf. 
The MSC represents a better pathway if the pressures for conforming to the norm 
of multilateralism can explain the behavior of the U.S. during the Persian Gulf crisis. 
This process should be focused on the MSC as the initial process for using military force 
under the UNSC. When the U.S. sought international authorization, the Korean War was 
looked upon at the time as a political anomaly. It was something which could not be 
repeated because the Soviet Union would not let the same circumstances reemerge. The 
police action in Korea did not have the support of the USSR or other communist 
countries. It was claimed as illegal and illegitimate in the debates between members of 
the UNSC. If this were the controlling factor in explaining why there was a turn to the 
UNSC during the Persian Gulf War, then it is more likely that arguments about the use of 
the MSC would have been the option which emerged from U.S. decision making. It 
would have been much more compelling to reject the precedent of the Korean War as 
antithetical to the process of multilateralism. The Korean War did not use the procedures 
envisioned under the UN Charter and did not have the support of various interests whose 
support was necessary to be represented on the UNSC. 
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UNSC Authority 
Under conditions of uncertainty the United States sought UNSC authorization to 
use military force to repel Iraq from Kuwait. It is hypothesized that upon this particular 
action upon which expectations about future behavior converged. This period of time is 
marked by increased opportunities which the U.S. did not have before. This decision to 
request international authorization from the UNSC became a precedent around which a 
pattern of behavior became institutionalized.  
The rise of international authorization, then, is the result of action by the U.S. 
during the 1991 Persian Gulf War which produced a change in the authority of the UNSC 
over the projection of military force. This action was taken during a time of great 
uncertainty not just for the international system but also for the relationship between the 
U.S. and the UN. A crucial aspect of this explanation is that the response to the UNSC 
role in the Persian Gulf War shaped the expectations of future behavior. Strategic actors, 
which included both decision makers within the U.S. and those from observer states, 
made use of the Persian Gulf War to press states to authorize their actions with the UNSC 
when using military force. 
This action could have been defined by the participants as aberrant behavior, an 
exception to what is expected of states when they project military force.98 The process of 
authorization during the Persian Gulf War created a different understanding of what was 
                                                 
98 Most actions which can change trajectories do not become ruptures breaking with conventional practices 
(Sewell 1996a, 843). Most potential precedents get reabsorbed, neutralized, ignored or explained away. The 
issue of the definition of the proper behavior for states to take when using force does have its historical 
antecedents. The Korean War presents itself as one of the rare Cold War instances where there was 
international authorization for the projection of military force. However, the Korean War and its associated 
authorization by the UNSC are defined as a political aberration and hence an exception to normal practice 
and thus not a precedent to guide future actions. 
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possible, but it did not automatically result in the requirement of authorization for future 
state action. It required discussion and interpretation by many pundits and world leaders 
before this became a mode which held influence over the actions of states. 
Subsequent actions using military force by the U.S. and many other states 
followed the model used for the Persian Gulf War because of the path created by the U.S. 
action. This reinforced pattern of behavior thus became institutionalized. The U.S. and 
other countries bestowed legitimacy on the UNSC by engaging it to endorse a particular 
form of action.99 In the initial episode, through both rhetoric and action, the U.S. 
constructed the defining characteristics of an appropriate form of behavior.100 The action 
taken was a strategic application of principle to bolster the legitimacy of U.S. policy.  
The U.S. declared that UNSC authorization was necessary for the projection of 
military force and then to back up this rhetoric, the U.S. sought authorization in the 
Persian Gulf War and in subsequent situations.101 These subsequent actions enhanced the 
legitimacy of the institutional model and the body required to authorize the action. The 
U.S. put forth claims that the UNSC was authoritative when U.S. officials claimed the 
U.S. would use military force authorized by the UNSC and when the U.S. worked within 
the standards set by UNSC resolutions. In effect, the U.S. claimed that the UNSC was 
                                                 
99 Legitimacy is the “belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed” (Hurd 1999, 381). In 
that sense, the enhanced legitimacy increased the power of the UNSC since authority is legitimized power 
(Hall 2005, 66; Hurd 2007, 3). 
100 Linking the notion of rhetoric with practice can produce different effects than either one alone. On 
practice see Adler and Pouliot (2011), Hopf (2010), Pouliot (2008), Neumann (2002), and Mitzen (2006). 
On the importance of rhetoric see Risse (2000), Schimmelfennig (2001, 2003), Krebs (2007), and Rothman 
(2009). 
101 This pattern is similar to the notion of “rhetorical entrapment” (Schimmelfennig 2001). See also Keck 
and Sikkink (1999). 
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important and then acted as if it were important. Acting in this way meant that the next 
time the U.S. was considering the use of military force, a logical question became 
whether to request international authorization. The U.S. would expose itself to criticism if 
it did not request international authorization from the UNSC in the future and the U.S. 
would have to explain why it would not. At each subsequent instance where the 
institutional model was invoked, the pattern became harder to break with and viable 
alternative paths became more difficult to find. Each time the U.S. sought UNSC 
authorization the political costs of doing something different increased because 
expectations converged around the UNSC as the place to go if any state, including the 
U.S., wanted to project military force. The formation of an institutional model through 
precedent then can influence the decision to request international authorization at later 
points in time.102 Since making the decision to request authorization during the Persian 
Gulf War, the U.S. has continued to use rhetoric which reinforced the notion that the 
UNSC was an authority over the projection of military force and just as importantly has 
acted as if this were the case. Richard Haass, then special assistant to President Bush for 
Near East and South Asian affairs was concerned that requesting authorization would 
create a precedent for future U.S. behavior (Rosegrant 1994, 15). Working through the 
UNSC changed the way people thought about the UN, how states should project military 
force and provided a potential model for future UN-based action. 
                                                 
102 This is not a tautological argument about how we can observe a norm about international authorization 
from the behavior of requesting international authorization. This is an argument of how prior experience 
influences subsequent behavior. Each instance contributes what has happened in the past leading to the 
progression for what follows. The decision to request international authorization at time T1 contributes to 
the outcome at time T2. What happens at times T1 and T2 contribute to T3, and so on. Rather than a 
tautological form of argument (i.e. there is a norm, how can we see the norm, we see behavior, the behavior 
influenced the outcome) this is a product of history. What happens prior contributes to outcomes which 
occur later in time. 
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[T]he Iraq invasion of Kuwait, besides upsetting the balance of power in 
the Mideast, has promoted a radical change in the views of the U.N. held 
by American policy makers and others. The U.N. has won praise in recent 
years for its role in brokering an end to the Iran-Iraq war and the 
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. For the first time since its 
founding 45 years ago, however, the organization seemed poised to realize 
its potential, coming of age as a formidable instrument for resolving 
international conflicts before they erupt into war. Today with Secretary-
General Javier Perez de Cuellar set to meet with Iraq’s foreign minister in 
Jordan in an effort to end the Persian Gulf standoff, even a lot of longtime 
U.N. skeptics believe that the organization may have been born again … 
But, it was Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait earlier this month that turned all eyes 
toward the U.N. A series of unanimous Security Council votes on steps to 
counter Saddam Hussein’s expansionism suddenly presented a picture of 
the world body acting as the world always hoped it could. “If we can pull 
this off we have a model…with the U.N. … of how to deal with the next 
half-century,” Sen. Moynihan says. (Greenberger and Shribman 1990, A1, 
A4) 
This precedent has guided subsequent U.S. decision making when considering the 
projection of military force beginning with President Bush. 
In Desert Storm I hope we set positive precedents for future responses to 
international crises, forging coalitions, properly using the United Nations, 
and carefully cultivating support at home and abroad for US objectives 
(Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 565). 
Other U.S. executive officials recognized the potential for using this model in future 
operations. As then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney suggested "the overwhelming 
success of this operation, combined with its lessons, comprises a possible model for 
international cooperation in a future crisis" (quoted in Prados 1992, 100). The Bush 
Administration’s Post-Cold War intervention thinking was guided by the precedent set by 
U.S. actions in the Persian Gulf War. 
[T]he ODS [Operation Desert Storm] experience is relevant to an analysis 
of EN&SC [Ethnic, Nationalist, and Separatist Conflicts] decisionmaking 
if only because it is regularly invoked as a successful model and precedent 
when EN&SC interventions are being considered (Kanter 1996, 163). 
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Internationally, other leaders used the Persian Gulf War as a standard. For instance 
Margaret Thatcher compared the international community’s reaction in Bosnia to the 
Persian Gulf standard. 
The Gulf War which followed was a superb example of how best to 
manage conflict. It was marked above all by the closest cooperation 
between Britain, the United States and of course our host country, Saudi 
Arabia. The policy worked but it has been abandoned in the case of 
Bosnia. (Emphasis in originalThatcher 1996, 45)103 
James Baker also made the comparison between the Persian Gulf War and the situation 
faced by the international community in Bosnia. 
The limits of UN peacekeeping have been revealed in Bosnia. So has the 
danger of ambiguous authority over operations on the ground. Here, as in 
so much else, the multilateral effort on Bosnia stands in stark contrast to 
the one undertaken just a few years before in the Persian Gulf. During the 
Gulf Crisis, the UN's role as the legitimating voice of the international 
community complemented, not complicated, the military efforts of the 
U.S.-led coalition. In Bosnia, on the other hand, the UN's role has, 
unfortunately, led to confusion and delay in military decision-making. 
(Baker 1996, 33) 
This precedent was also utilized by later administrations. The Clinton White House 
publically discussed the option of proceeding in Haiti without a mandate from the UNSC. 
The Administration is following much the same path as President Bush 
took nearly four years ago in seeking to persuade President Saddam 
Hussein of Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, and White House officials were 
quick to draw that parallel (Jehl 1994). 
That the action by the U.S. during the Persian Gulf War was perceived of as successful 
provides reinforcement of the action as a standard for others to emulate. Had it been a 
failure, no doubt it would have been ignored. However, leaders do want successful 
                                                 
103 It should be noted that even though Thatcher did compare Bosnia to the Persian Gulf War, she did not 
accept the idea that states should request international authorization through UNSC resolution. As 
discussed earlier, she thought that self-defense under Article 51was sufficient authority for military action 
in the Persian Gulf War. 
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foreign policies and one route to find them is to build on and emulate the successes of 
others. I argue that others hoped to repeat the success in subsequent operations. 
Nominally, there were five different pathways which could have been taken. Figure 5.5 
shows the discursive viability of these options relative to the others. These choices 
included the availability of specific resolutions from the UNSC as well as the re-
activation of the MSC which lay dormant during the Cold War. 
Figure 5.5. Discursive Viability of Authorization Choices, 1990-1991 
 
 
The authority of the UNSC was not high at the outset of the crisis. The UN was 
not without appeal as it does carry with it a notion of legitimate social purpose that 
provides some degree of legitimacy for the organization and its operations. In other 
words, that the UN is devoted in its mandate to reduce the scourge of war endows it with 
some degree of legitimacy even if it is seen as doing a poor job of achieving its goals. 
However, as the organization lay stagnant many were not prepared for the role the UNSC 
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was called to play in the crisis. There was no precedent of the U.S. request for 
international authorization. U.S. officials struck a balance between differing instrumental 
concerns about the varied foreign policy goals within the national interest. The 
instrumental concerns for policy independence and support were not determined by the 
Cold War competition or even the lack therein. In other words, the U.S. made the 
decision to request international authorization for reasons having little to do with the 
authority of the UNSC.104 This contingent decision became important beyond the 
immediate concerns the U.S. faced at this time. The U.S. opted for the UN process 
because American officials saw the UN as way to keep together the international 
coalition of support. The UN provided some legitimacy to the U.S. action but this 
provision was not determinative. Outside options, reserved as a possible choice at each 
diplomatic interaction, were not pursued. The structure of the Cold War made the option 
of working through the UNSC a surprise to almost all parties but especially to those who 
were inside the policy making circles and even Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi leadership’s 
expectations were based on the crumbling structures of the Cold War, assuming that even 
if the UNSC did condemn the Iraqi action, as occurred with UNSCR 660, that it would 
not be able to muster support for enforcement actions.  
This does not deny logical reasons for the U.S. to prefer one pathway over 
another. The initial preference for action under Article 51 gave way to a preference of 
requesting a resolution to authorize military force. The MSC, while viable, was not a 
preferred pathway for two reasons. First, military commanders would be extraordinarily 
                                                 
104 It should be noted here that these reason also had little to do with the notion that the Bush (41) 
Administration could reduce international political costs, a norm of multilateralism, or other alternative 
explanations. 
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reluctant to cede command of their troops to an entity that is not within the U.S. 
command structure.105 In essence, this would place U.S. military resources outside the 
control of the U.S. military. Second, the original problems with concluding stand-by 
agreements for the MSC remained. These agreements would provide the MSC with 
military resource that could be used to fulfill its mandate under the UN Charter. The Cold 
War imposed constraints such that placing troops at the disposal of the MSC would 
provide the Soviet Union with the ability to override the U.S. commands through the 
UNSC veto. However, the Soviet Union held up the formation of stand-by agreements 
that would have provided resources for the use of the MSC. The obsticle was that Stalin 
did not want the agreements to be used to form a set of bases around the world which 
would institutionalize the strategic superiority held by western powers (Grove 1993, 
178). Thus, there is one issue about the East-West conflict which is pertinent which 
leaves the issue about putting troops under foreign command. 
The result of gaining international authorization for the Persian Gulf War was 
vastly different than the effect of international authorization for the Korean War. The 
Cold War structure prevented this model from being applied to other crises. The Persian 
Gulf War became the precedent by which future decisions to project military force have 
been judged. Leaders often refer to similar situations of the past to inform their 
contemporary decisions (Khong 1992). Precedents function by creating expectations 
about future behavior (Kier and Mercer 1996). In terms of domestic audiences, President 
Bush’s decision to secure UNSC authorization for the projection of military force in the 
                                                 
105 This debate was raised after the problems with the U.S. intervention in Somalia. President Clinton 
passed Presidential Decision Directive 25 which distinguished between command, held by the President, 
and operational control, which came from UN commanders (Snyder 1995).  
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Persian Gulf War produced expectations that future interventions would follow this same 
pattern, “bind[ing] his successors” to seeking the same form of authorization before 
intervening (Russett 1994, 193). The expectations of this form of behavior emerge both 
from external actors (other states’ expectations) and from domestic sources (such as the 
U.S. Congress or domestic groups), resulting in a change in the trajectory of U.S. 
behavior towards the UNSC. The act of requesting international authorization for 
enforcing the sanctions on Iraq had far reaching ramifications. 
[T]he enforcement of sanctions also demonstrated that there was no clear 
dividing line between economic and military measures, for it was through 
this means that the precedents were set for gaining international authority 
for the use of military force (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 143). 
This process formed the basis of subsequent claims to legitimate actions and shaped 
perceptions of how states should proceed in the future. The UNSC Authority explanation 
makes the most sense out of the decision to request international authorization in this 
instance. The U.S. requested international authorization for reasons which had less to do 
with the authority of the UNSC than it did with instrumental needs to prosecute an action 
against Iraq.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The end of the Cold War was an eventful juncture for the UNSC and produced 
uncertainty in how members would act within the institutional context of the UN. 
However, this eventful juncture did not automatically result in greater authority for the 
UNSC but instead brought about the possibility that states who rivals at one time could 
change their position and cooperate (Crockatt 2005). This change contrasts with the 
experience of the Korean War where the U.S. sought authorization for collective military 
action from the Security Council, but with different results. Instead of enhancing the 
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authority of the UNSC, the passage of the Korean War resolutions were seen as an 
exception to what normally would take place. The pattern of behavior reverted back to 
the original where the actors were once again constrained by the structure of the Cold 
War.106 
After the Persian Gulf War a sense of euphoria about the prospects for 
cooperation on matters of international peace and security took hold (Malone 2004, 5). 
This period is marked by substantially increased UNSC activities. The perceived 
performance of international authorization presented by the Persian Gulf War helped to 
empower the UN (Russett 1994).107 The success of the coalition of forces seems to have 
enhanced the legitimacy of the UN as an actor in security affairs. While the U.S. was the 
primary player in military terms, the UN received credit which outlasted the rally-around-
the-flag effect linked to the U.S. This “authorization model” (Berman 2004) became the 
standard by which latter delegation for enforcement action and projections of military 
force were evaluated. This period of time is marked by increasing UN peacekeeping 
missions authorized through the UNSC. The failure of UN peacekeeping and intervention 
in Somalia illustrated a problem for humanitarian missions. This poor performance 
contributed to a pullback in the allocation of resources to humanitarian missions. 
However, this particular episode did not concurrently reduce the demand for such 
missions and thus there was recognition of the particular need for peacekeeping missions 
                                                 
106 This illustrates the difference between critical and uncritical junctures. The examination of both can 
contribute to understanding why critical junctures lead to the changes in institutionalized patterns of 
behavior. 
107 See also Constable (1990). 
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(Jakobsen 2002). Consequently, resources were made available for additional future 
missions (Malone and Thakur 2001).  
Why did the end of the Cold War result in a change in U.S. policy? The U.S. did 
not change its policy simply because the Cold War ended. The end of the Cold War 
opened space for the U.S. to consider several options which were not previously viable. 
The U.S. chose one of these options which made the others less viable in the future. The 
evidence of the change in policy comes from contingent action undertaken during a 
period of uncertainty. U.S. decision makers expected that the Soviet Union was not 
prepared to support U.S. action in the Persian Gulf War as part of the post-Cold War 
diplomacy. They were unprepared for this change and had to adjust their strategy to 
account for this new context. The decision to focus on the UNSC as the center of 
diplomacy during the crisis was due to the change in available options in front of U.S. 
decision makers. The result was a change in the trajectory of what kinds of projections of 
military force were considered viable. This change stands in contrast to the case of the 
Korean War. This was an instance where the structural constraints did not produce a 
change in the trajectory of state behavior toward the UNSC. Instead of creating a separate 
institutionalized model of action the Korean War international authorization was 
explained away as an aberration from normal Cold War politics. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE NORM OF REQUESTING INTERNATIONAL AUTHORIZATION: 
CHALLENGING AND CONSOLIDATING PRACTICE 
The preceding chapter established that out of the choices available at the time of 
the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. chose to request international authorization through the 
explicit resolutions from the UNSC. This precedent made the practice more common as 
the U.S. made requests for international authorization for the projection of military force 
often after the Persian Gulf War. Why did U.S. officials decide to request international 
authorization for the projection of military force in some instances and not in others? The 
decisions examined in this chapter emerge from different contexts and different 
presidential administrations with very different assessments of the U.S. role in foreign 
affairs. I evaluate competing hypotheses developed from explanations of the decision to 
pursue international authorization for the projection of military force. I examine three 
cases in this chapter. First is the case of the airstrikes on Iraq in 1998 when the Clinton 
Administration did not request international authorization yet claimed it was acting under 
UNSC resolutions. Second is the Iraq war in 2003, when the U.S. did make a request but 
failed to receive international authorization. Third is the Libyan intervention where the 
administration requested and was given international authorization from the UNSC to 
project military force. Each of these three cases had a different executive administration. 
For two of these cases the presidencies were Democrats and the third was from the 
Republican Party. These cases display variance in their disposition towards IOs. Despite 
these differences we see both Democratic and Republican administrations requesting 
international authorization for the projection of military force. The outcome of the 
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request is different for the Iraq War and the Libyan intervention, but both made strong 
attempts to secure the support of the UNSC and placed great emphasis on doing so. I find 
that the decision in both cases was driven, at least in part, by the norm that states are 
supposed to request international authorization for the projection of military force. This 
norm emerged from the precedent set during the Persian Gulf War when the U.S. 
requested international authorization to use military force against Iraq. The expectation 
that states are supposed to make this request seems to be absent from the situation in 
1998 when the U.S. conducted Operation Desert Fox. 
RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES 
The U.S. projected military force without making a request for international 
authorization in Iraq in 1996 and in 1998 for Operation Desert Fox. The U.S. did request 
international authorization from the UNSC in the cases of Kosovo (1999), Iraq (2003), 
Haiti (2004), and Libya (2011).108 Why did the U.S. make the decision to request 
international authorization for the projection of military force in some situations but not 
in others after 1989? This central research question can be answered by explanations 
from different theoretical traditions. These hypotheses were developed in Chapter II and 
are presented in Table 6.1.  
A realist perspective suggests that the U.S. should request international 
authorization when U.S. officials want material support in order to share the burden of 
projecting military force. The institutional perspective suggests that IOs should be 
valuable to the U.S. because of the information they convey to other states (Chapman 
                                                 
108 In cases of Kosovo (1999) and the Iraq War (2003) the U.S. failed to acquire international authorization 
from the UNSC. For Kosovo the U.S. did gain authorization from NATO. 
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2011; Thompson 2009). Decisions to request international authorization are seen by this 
perspective as a function of the anticipated international political costs of a proposed 
action assessed along with the constraints which IOs place upon the U.S. Rather than the 
materialist-institutional explanation an alternative perspective suggests that a multilateral 
norm drives the behavior of states to use a multilateral process when using military force 
(Finnemore 2003). All of these are compared to the explanation which suggests the path-
dependent development of a precedent from the Persian Gulf War. An explanation from 
this perspective suggests that precedent influenced the expectations of other states as to 
the behavior of the U.S. when projecting military force and the authority of the UNSC. 
 
Table 6.1. Hypotheses 
Burden Sharing Hypothesis 
The need for help with material costs of the proposed projection increases the 
likelihood of requesting international authorization. 
Information Transmission Hypothesis 
The anticipation of high political costs for the proposed projection of military 
force increases the likelihood of requesting international authorization. 
IO Constraints Hypothesis 
The insensitivity to constraints imposed by IOs increases the likelihood of 
requesting international authorization. 
Forum Shopping Hypothesis 
Anticipation of high political costs of a projection of military force and high 
sensitivity to IO constraints will increase the likelihood that leaders will request 
international authorization from a RIO. 
Multilateral Norm Hypothesis 
The high value projectors’ leaders place on the process of multilateralism 
increases the likelihood of requesting international authorization. 
UNSC Authority Hypothesis 
The expectation from other states that the projector should seek authorization 
increases the likelihood of requesting international authorization. 
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CASES 
After the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. projected military force 18 times between 
(see Table 6.2). It is remarkable duing this time period that the decision to project 
military force is almost always accompanied by a decision to request international 
authorization. There are few instances where the U.S. did not request international 
authorization from the UNSC. Even in the circumstances of the Kosovo airstrikes in 
1999, the U.S. made an attempt to secure international authorization before turning to a 
different IO in the face of a threatened UNSC veto. The decision to turn to NATO was 
not the result of the view that this organization was the choice for the U.S. to get 
international authorization but that having some form of IO authorization was a necessary 
step to projecting military force. Each of the three presidential administrations within this 
time period made the decision to project military force without making a request of the 
UNSC.109 The contexts in which these decisions were made are different. The projections 
for each administration are discussed showing that while there are exceptions, the 
decision to request international authorization became more common. 
The Clinton Administration projected military force without putting forward a 
request for international authorization from the UNSC more often than the others. Three 
times the U.S. did not make such a request. The decision to retaliate against Iraq for the 
assassination attempt on former President George H. W. Bush in 1993 was not 
accompanied by a specific request for a resolution authorizing. Instead, the legitimacy of 
the Baghdad Raid was not substantially questioned. The U.S. put forward the claim that 
                                                 
109 Albeit, President Obama did act under Article 51 when raiding Pakistan for Osama bin Ladin. This does 
qualify as a form of international authorization but the U.S. did not make a specific request for a resolution. 
The Obama Administration does not have any other projections during the time frame. 
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Table 6.2. Decisions to Project Military Force and International Authorization, 1989-2011 
Year Decision to Project Military Force Administration Attempt IO Mode 
1989 Intervention in Panama Bush (41)    
1991 Persian Gulf War Bush (41) Yes UN UNSCR 678 (1990) 
1991 Iraqi No Fly Zone Bush (41)  UN UNSCR 688 (1991) 
1992 NATO Embargo on the Former Yugoslavia Bush (41) Yes UN UNSCR 787 (1992) 
1992 Somalia Bush (41) Yes UN UNSCR 794 (1992) 
1993 Bosnia Clinton Yes UN UNSCR 816 (1993) 
1993 Baghdad Raid Clinton  UN UN Charter, Article 51 (1945) 
1993 Macedonia Clinton Yes UN UNSCR 842 (1993) 
1994 Haiti Clinton Yes UN UNSCR 940 (1994) 
1995 Bosnia Clinton Yes UN UNSCRs 1031 (1995) & 1088 (1996) 
1996 Iraqi Airstrikes Clinton 
1998 Afghanistan/Sudan Bombing Clinton  UN UN Charter, Article 51 (1945) 
1998 Operation Desert Fox Clinton 
1999 Kosovo Airstrikes Clinton Yes NATO NATO Press Release 038 (1999) 
1999 Kosovo Peacekeeping Clinton Yes UN UNSCR 1244 (1999) 
2001 Afghanistan Bush (43)  UN UN Charter, Article 51 (1945) 
2003 Iraq War Bush (43) Yes  
2004 Haiti Bush (43) Yes UN UNSCR 1529 (2004) 
2011 Libya Obama Yes UN UNSCR 1973(2011) 
2011 Osama Raid Obama  UN UN Charter, Article 51 (1945) 
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this was an instance of self-defense authorized under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The 
U.S. reported this action to the UNSC and received support from an easy majority of the 
other UNSC members (Allies Back U.S. Strike 1993; UNSC 1993). These two instances 
of the projection of military force relied upon the authority of the UNSC in some fashion. 
In 1998, there were two operations where the Clinton Administration decided to 
project military force without an accompanying request for international authorization 
from the UNSC. These both involve the use of airstrikes against a perceived threat. The 
first operation was the airstrikes against Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network in 
retaliation for the attacks on the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. U.S. officials did 
claim that this was an act of self-defense (UNSC Document 1998). There is some 
controversy about the legitimacy of the U.S. action (Lobel 1999). However, despite this 
controversy many in the international community did support the U.S. actions and 
rejected acts of terrorism (Franck 2002, 94-96).The decision to act without consulting the 
international community seems to stem from the issue that doing so would have resulted 
in a failed operation. U.S. officials did suggest that secrecy was considered 
“indispensable” to the success of the operation (Albright and Berger 1998). Yet this 
operation was consistent with the Baghdad Raid in 1993 where the U.S. acted under 
Article 51 and received substantial international support. The second, Operation Desert 
Fox, is covered in the next section. 
Under the Bush Administration the U.S. took a turn towards a policy of 
unilateralism in the conduct of foreign affairs. In particular, the Bush Doctrine with its 
emphasis on prevention and self-reliance embodies this unilateral shift in U.S. foreign 
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policy (Jervis 2003).110 The U.S. along with several allies began conflicts in Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and a projection of military force in Haiti. The response to terrorism started with the 
Afghani conflict, a response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and came to 
include operations in Yemen and Pakistan. This was the only decision by the Bush 
Administration to project military force which was not accompanied by a decision to 
request international authorization. Instead, the U.S. relied upon its own authority to 
defend itself which was accepted under Article 51 of the UN Charter (Drumbl 2003; 
Franck 2001). This operation received widespread support from the international 
community and was seen as an act of self-defense. The U.S. action also received support 
from the UNSC from resolutions passed on September 12, 2001 (UNSCR 1368 2001) 
and subsequently on December 20, 2001 (UNSCR 1386 2001). This latter resolution was 
passed after the initiation of combat operations but it did express the support of the 
organization. It was passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and included the 
pertinent language which authorized the projection of military force. The U.S. returned to 
the UN Security Council to request international authorization for the Iraq War (a request 
that failed) and for a deployment in Haiti (where it was secured). For all the talk of the 
unilateralist preferences, the Bush Administration did attempt to secure international 
authorization for its projections of military force. 
The Obama Administration inherited a global war on terror centered in 
Afghanistan and a struggle to occupy Iraq after the fall of Saddam’s regime. 
Understandably, many in the U.S. were reluctant to project military force beyond these 
                                                 
110 This emphasis on the rhetoric of unilateralism continued after the Iraq War began but the reality of the 
U.S. foreign policy was a return to multilateral institutions of the UN in the second term of the Bush (43) 
Administration (Schlesinger 2008). 
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particular conflicts. During 2011, the Obama Administration did request international 
authorization for its projection of military force against the Gaddafi regime in Libya but 
did not pursue international authorization for a raid in Pakistan which resulted in the 
death of Osama bin Laden. The Libyan intervention is discussed later in this paper. The 
Osama Raid was claimed as an act of self-defense by the United States (Reauthorize 
2011). The U.S. received support from the UNSC in the form of a presidential statement 
which welcomed the end to the activities of bin Laden (UNSC 2011a). The debate over 
the legality of the bin Laden raid focuses on the difference between arresting him rather 
than killing him outright. The claim to self-defense by the U.S. has not been substantially 
questioned. Where the legality of the raid is being questioned is on the authority of the 
U.S. to kill bin Laden, in contrast to whether the U.S. should have only been able to take 
him into custody to stand trial (Lewis 2011). The Administration claims that the raid was 
entirely legal (Bin Laden Death 2011). Despite this issue, the question of whether the 
U.S. should have engaged in projecting military force is not being seriously debated. 
Some Pakistani leaders have expressed frustration and claimed that the U.S. violated 
Pakistan’s sovereignty (Perlez 2011a, b). However, this behavior follows the agreement 
established by George W. Bush with Pakistan in the aftermath of 9/11 if the U.S. were to 
pursue bin Laden into Pakistani territory (Walsh 2011). Even the claims from bin Laden 
family members is over whether he should have been tried, rather than challenging the 
legitimacy of the U.S. decision to project military force (Shane 2011; Statement 2011).111 
                                                 
111 For additional debate about the legality of this action, including the issue of international authorization, 
see Thorp (2011). 
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Because this projection was generally seen as a legitimate exercise of the defense of the 
U.S. an explicit resolution was not needed for international authorization. 
SUMMARIZING THREE KEY CASES 
The remainder of this paper tests the hypotheses developed in Chapter II and 
compares the decision to request international authorization in the cases of the Iraq War 
and the Libyan intervention and the decision not to make a request for Operation Desert 
Fox. These three cases concern decisions to project military force from presidential 
administrations with different perspectives on the U.S. role in international affairs and 
policy towards IOs. They vary on several of the substantial variables which are potential 
explanations for why states should turn to the UNSC for international authorization. An 
examination of these cases should help illuminate the process and factors which 
contribute to the changes that drive the U.S. and other states to request international 
authorization from international organizations. This design allows for a comparison of 
cases with both similar and different outcomes of interest. When the outcome is for a 
request there is a common factor from which a causal claim is developed.  
Operation Desert Fox 
Operation Desert Fox was a four-day bombing campaign against Iraq which took 
place in December 1998. It was conducted by the U.S. and the United Kingdom. This 
was the second operation where the Clinton Administration did not request a specific 
resolution providing UNSC authorization to project military force. The U.S. initiated 
airstrikes to diminish Iraq’s capabilities. While lacking specific authorization to act, 
President Clinton did claim to be acting in support of the UN against the violations of 
UNSC resolutions placing limits on the ability of Iraq to produce weapons of mass 
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destruction (WMDs) (Clinton 2000a, c). Neither of these operation garnered widespread 
support from other UNSC Members nor the international community at large. 
The year 1998 proved to be one of high tension between the U.S. and Iraq. Many 
confrontations preceded this operation. The end of the Persian Gulf War introduced 
weapons inspections to Iraq to confirm its compliance with the terms of UNSCR 687 
(1991). These inspectors were to help ensure that Iraq did not develop weapons of mass 
destruction which could be used to threaten its neighbors. Despite the cease fire and 
accepting the terms of UNSCR 687 Iraq continued to engage in provocative acts. In the 
immediate aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, Saddam began to crack down on Kurds 
and other dissenters, which generated a massive humanitarian crisis as refugees fled the 
killings (Dannreuther 1991/1992, 63-67). The Iraqi government was complicit in a plot to 
kill then former President Bush in 1993 (Bernstein 1993). Iraq threatened to invade 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia again in 1994 when it massed troops along its southern border 
(Byman and Waxman 2000). Escalation was averted under the threat of force as the U.S. 
mobilized to meet this provocation. In 1996, Saddam attacked a Kurdish group in the 
north of Iraq (Knights 2005, 153-156). This history set up the tensions which coalesced 
into airstrikes on Iraq. 
The next year Iraq began to evade the weapons inspectors from the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and UN Special Committee (UNSCOM). Saddam 
targeted Americans and eventually expelled American nationals who were part of the 
inspection teams. Frustrated with Saddam’s noncompliance with the inspectors the 
UNSC passed UNSCR 1137 (1997) which warned of “serious consequences” if Iraq did 
not comply. For a short time this pattern continued. Iraq would withhold compliance until 
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threatened and then back off for a little while. This situation came to a head in November 
of 1998 when the lack of Iraqi compliance prompted the U.S. to mobilize for an attack. 
Iraq somehow gained word of the impending attack and as the planes flew closer to their 
targets they announced Iraq would unconditionally comply with the UN, including 
UNSCOM and the IAEA inspectors. This averted the attack but the U.S. was wary of 
Iraq’s actions. The decision was made to reset the airstrikes to proceed after the release of 
UNSCOM’s report which was to be completed by December 15, 1998. Richard Butler, 
the head of UNSOCM completed his report indicating that Iraq had not fulfilled its 
obligations to the international community under UNSC resolutions. The U.S. and the 
United Kingdom proceeded to strike at Iraq. President Clinton justified the military 
action by stressing that the U.S. was defending previous UNSC resolutions. 
This action, carried out in concert with military forces of the United 
Kingdom, enjoys the support of many of our friends and allies. It is 
consistent with and has been taken in support of numerous U.N. Security 
Council resolutions, including Resolutions 678 and 687, which authorize 
U.N. Member States to use "all necessary means" to implement the 
Security Council resolutions and to restore peace and security in the 
region and establish the terms of the cease-fire mandated by the Council, 
including those related to the destruction of Iraq's WMD programs. 
(Clinton 2000b) 
Despite this attempt to justify the U.S. actions in UNSC terms the international reactions 
criticized this action as usurping the UNSC’s role as the sole authority to authorize the 
projection of military force. The Russian Federation reaction demonstrates the 
expectations for states to approach the UNSC. 
In carrying out this unprovoked act of force, the United States and the 
United Kingdom have grossly violated the Charter of the United Nations, 
the principles of international law and the generally recognized norms and 
rules of responsible behaviour on the part of States in the international 
arena…The Security Council alone has the right to determine what steps 
should be taken in order to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. (Ambassador Lavrov in UNSC 1998, 4) 
 189 
The Iraq War 
On March 19, 2003, offensive operations against Iraq began. The Bush (43) 
Administration focused on the threat that Saddam Hussein’s regime posed to the United 
States and the international community since it invaded Kuwait in 1990. President Bush 
inherited the policy of regime change in Iraq from a 1998 law passed by Congress during 
the Clinton Administration. 
Another element was the standing policy inherited from the Clinton 
administration. Though not widely understood, the baseline policy was 
clearly ‘regime change.’ A 1998 law passed by Congress and signed by 
President Bill Clinton authorized up to $97 million in military assistance 
to Iraqi opposition forces ‘to remove the regime headed by Saddam 
Hussein’ and ‘promote the emergence of a democratic government’ 
(Woodward 2004, 10). 
The lead up to the projection of military force in 2003 involved heated international 
diplomacy and substantial planning after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It is clear that in the 
aftermath of removing the Taliban from control of Afghanistan the Bush Administration 
turned its attention to the issue of Iraq.112 On September 7, 2002, there was a decision by 
President George W. Bush to request UNSC authorization for the Iraq War (Danner 
2005).The central question here does not concern the motivation for starting the Iraq War 
but instead why the Bush Administration decided to pursue a resolution from the UNSC 
authorizing the U.S. to project military force against Iraq. The decision to do so seems 
puzzling, especially when considering that the U.S. failed to secure a resolution which 
would have given the blessing of the organization to this endeavor. Often the U.S. action 
in Iraq is cast as if it is the U.S. who was in opposition to the mandates of the UNSC. The 
                                                 
112 There is speculation by many that the Bush Administration intended to go to war with Iraq since 
assuming office. Whether this is the case and the motivations for starting the Iraq are beyond the scope of 
this inquiry. 
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interesting aspect is not that the U.S. eventually pursued the projection of military force 
through an ad hoc coalition of states outside of the UN framework but that an executive 
administration which was opposed to the notion of relying upon other states or IOs for 
security would even attempt to secure international authorization. With respect to the 
questions posed in this study, then, the outcome of interest here is the same for both this 
and later cases such as the Obama Administration’s policy towards Libya in 2011. 
The effect of the failure to secure international authorization was costly for the 
U.S. This episode provides additional evidence of the importance of the Security Council 
after the end of the Cold War. For many states the decision to support the war was 
contingent upon Security Council authorization. Canada indicated support for the U.S. 
policy towards Iraq in January 2003 before the action began (Where the World Stands 
2003). Due to the lack of explicit authorization by the UNSC, the Canadian government 
made the decision not to contribute troops and resources to the U.S.-led war efforts. India 
also represents a change in stance away from the U.S.’s foreign policy. India initially 
indicated that it would contribute to the U.S. cause (Where the World Stands 2003). Due 
to the lack of UN authorization, India declined to contribute troops to the U.S. effort in 
Iraq (Thakur 2003). India is one of the most significant supporters of UN Peacekeeping 
(Krishnasamy 2003) demonstrating that UNSC authorization makes it easier for many 
state leaders to participate in the external use of force (Voeten 2005, 532).113 
                                                 
113 This is also the case for leaders in the U.S. (Chapman and Reiter 2004). 
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The Libyan Intervention 
Eight years to the day after the Bush Administration began its attack against the 
Iraqi regime, the Obama Administration initiated the use of military force against another 
Arabic state, in Northern Africa. The situation in Libya began with social protest against 
the regime of Muammar Gaddafi towards the beginning of 2011. This movement as part 
of the Arab Spring met with fierce resistance from Gaddafi’s forces and swift repression 
ensued. The U.S. placed sanctions on the Gaddafi regime after American diplomats were 
able to leave the country (DeYoung and Lynch 2011). Protesters and civilians became the 
target of loyalist forces and the violence escalated to civil war. Because of the 
humanitarian suffering the international community began calls to stop this action and 
eventually for Gaddafi to step down. Neighboring countries and international 
organizations, concerned about the humanitarian problems, began to look at military 
action as a way to handle this crisis. The Gulf Cooperation Council called on the UNSC 
to authorize a no-fly zone on March 7, 2011 (Washington’s Options 2011). On March 12, 
the Arab League did the same (Bronner and Sanger 2011). It is important to note that 
Libya is a member of the Arab League and this request of the UNSC was passed over its 
objections. The pressure from Western countries with the support of Arabic states led the 
U.S. to push for authorization from the UNSC while they feared loyalist gains would 
mean the end of the rebels (Landler and Bilefsky 2011). In the Security Council, 
Germany, India, Russia and China opposed military action (Dempsey 2011). The UNSC 
passed UNSCR 1973 on March 17, 2011 with ten votes in support, none in opposition 
and Brazil, China, Germany, India, and Russia abstaining (UNSC 2011b). The resolution 
was sponsored by the U.S., the United Kingdom, France and Lebanon (UNSC Document 
2011a). Two days later the U.S. led the first airstrikes to enforce the UNSC resolution 
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and protect the civilian population of Libya. The remaining sections of this chapter test 
the hypotheses for these cases. 
POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS 
Burden Sharing 
Realist theory suggests that states balance against power (Waltz 1979). If they 
cannot enhance their own power by developing their resources internally they need to 
seek allies to balance power. When making the decision to project military force the 
leaders of states should consider whether they need additional resources to achieve their 
goals. If they think that international authorization from an IO can aid in their quest for 
allies to shoulder the burden of military action, then authorization may be seen as 
beneficial. Reducing or sharing the burden of using military force is thus a relevant 
motivation for states to request authorization from an IO. If realism is largely correct 
about how international politics work we should see the U.S. requesting international 
authorization when it has fewer resources to devote to military action. 
The need for material resources does not really distinguish between these cases. 
For both all three cases, the U.S. held a preponderance of military resources such that aid 
from others may have been considered desirable to reduce costs but not necessary. 
However, such assistance does not appear to be a determining factor in the decision to 
request international authorization. For the action agaisnt Iraq, the U.S. was in a very 
strong military position compared to Iraq and even to other militaries in the world. The 
military planning did assess what resources the U.S. military needed to accomplish the 
task set by the respective presidents. The material costs of the Iraq war would most likely 
have been shared by other states had the U.S. been able to secure international 
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authorization from the UNSC (Malone 2007,132). Rather than suggest that the U.S. 
needed more resources or additional military assets to remove Saddam Hussein from 
power, the issue was basing or fly-over rights (Woodward 2004, 81-82). The initial 
planning stressed the need for cooperation from the United Kingdom but even this 
country was considered useful but not a needed military partner. When asked if the U.S. 
would go to war without Great Britain at a DoD briefing for the press, then Secretary of 
Defense Rumsfeld answer suggested that the U.S .would and that the British may not 
participate. 
I had a good visit with the Minister of Defense of the U.K. about an hour 
ago. Their situation is distinctive to their country, and they have a 
government that deals with a parliament in their way, distinctive way. And 
what will ultimately be decided is unclear as to their role; that is to say, 
their role in the event that a decision is made to use force. There's the 
second issue of their role in a post- Saddam Hussein reconstruction 
process or stabilization process, which would be a different matter. And I 
think until we know what the resolution is, we won't know the answer as 
to what their role will be and to the extent they're able to participate in the 
event the President decides to use force, that would obviously be 
welcomed. To the extent they're not, there are workarounds and they 
would not be involved, at least in that phase of it. (Rumsfeld in Rumsfeld 
and Meyers 2003) 
President Bush reassured Prime Minister Blair about the need for the UK in the coalition 
despite statements from the Secretary of Defense which indicated that the U.S. could act 
unilaterally. In terms of basing, crucial support was supposed to come from Turkey. The 
support of Turkey would have meant a two-front conflict rather than a single one from 
the south (Malone 2006, 200-201). General Tommy Franks was the Commander of the 
United States Central Command which included overseeing operations in the Middle 
East. Franks was not convinced of Turkish cooperation for the Iraq war and did not begin 
planning a two front conflict until after Turkey had been contacted (Woodward 2004, 83, 
123). This suggests that the issue of allies and securing additional material resources 
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through the UN was not considered by the planners of the Iraq War. The issue of 
international authorization was one of political significance rather than of material need. 
In the Libyan intervention European states wanted the assistance of the U.S. and 
were reluctant to act without U.S. support. There is evidence to support the motivation 
that the U.S. wanted others to help shoulder the burden of its military action in Libya.114 
The U.S. took the lead in the initial stages of the operation and after NATO assumed 
control of the operation on March 31 2011, the U.S. still provided logistical support. A 
NATO report on the conflict suggested that European countries could not function 
without the logistical support of the U.S. if a similar situation were to arise in the future 
(Schmitt 2012). The need for material resources does not appear to be a strong motive in 
the decision of the U.S. to request international authorization for these conflicts.115 
Based on the size of the operation between the three cases, the U.S. did not make 
a request for the smallest one. The other two were projections which included projections 
carried out by a large coalition of forces. The U.S. shouldered the bulk of all of the 
operations but the Iraq War and the Libyan intervention did include more allies while 
U.S. Operation Desert Fox was conducted by only U.S. and United Kingdom forces. 
Information Transmission: Signaling and Political Costs 
This perspective focuses on the role of IOs in providing information about a 
proposed use of military force. Strategic information transmission holds that audiences 
who are concerned about the projection of military force want reassurance about the 
                                                 
114 Interview with State Department Official, September 19, 2011, Washington, DC. 
115 This is supported by other research on burden sharing (Thompson 2009, 15). 
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consequences of the proposed action (Voeten 2005).116 International authorization signals 
to others that the consequences of the action will be limited (Chapman 2011; Thompson 
2006, 2009). As independent actors, IOs can transmit credible information about the 
relative merits of a proposed projection of military force. According to this explanation 
there are two factors which influence the decision to request international authorization: 
the anticipation of international political costs of the proposed action and the sensitivity 
of the intervening state’s leaders to IO constraints. 
When a projection of military force is likely to encounter political opposition 
from other states a projector is more likely to request international authorization. Through 
gaining international authorization the projector can reduce political controversy for a 
proposed military action. Projecting military force can alter the international order and 
hold greater potential to run counter to the interests of other major states. The perceptions 
of international political costs for the proposed action were higher for the Iraq War 
compared to the Libyan intervention. The controversy surrounding the intentions of the 
U.S. during the run up to the Iraq War was certainly more pronounced when compared to 
that of the Libyan Intervention. The U.S. started its political strategy from a position of 
greater sympathy in light of the 9/11 terrorist attack. The attempt to press the position that 
Saddam’s regime in Iraq must go encountered great resistance from the international 
community. The disposition of other powers towards the notion of regime change was 
maintained even in later intervention in Libya. Russia and China did not support the 
notion of regime change but in the case of Iraq neither did France and many other states. 
                                                 
116 Target audiences may also include domestic elites such as the U.S. Congress (Schultz 2003) or domestic 
public (Chapman 2009, 2011; Fang 2008). 
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In the Libyan context the U.S. did accept a more limited form of authorization which 
prohibited troops on the ground in Libya. In Iraq, the Bush Administration wanted 
international authorization for an invasion. What the U.S. was willing to accept in these 
two different circumstances provides some leverage over why one received authorization 
from the UNSC while the other did not. The Bush Administration encountered greater 
resistance to the notion of U.S. involvement while the Obama Administration was 
reluctant to act. In fact, the U.S. in this later case can better be characterized as coaxed 
into action by its allies. 
This theory explains decisions to request international authorization as a function 
of anticipated political costs and IO constraints. However, it seems unlikely that the 
political costs anticipated by U.S. decision makers during the Cold War are 
comparatively lower than after. It is equally implausible that IOs such as the UNSC 
would ease the constraints required for authorization after the end of the Cold War which 
encouraged more frequent attempts to acquire international authorization. In fact, 
institutional features of the UNSC make it unlikely to provide international authorization 
for the projection of military force. These features did not change with the end of the 
Cold War.117 Even if we assume that the constraints the UNSC would place on projectors 
are vastly different between the two time periods, this theory still does not provide an 
explanation for the observed pattern. This could only help explain why the pattern shows 
                                                 
117 It is actually easy to think that the constraints which would be placed on the projector in order to secure 
authorization from the UNSC during the Cold War could be high. Perhaps it was too high for either the 
U.S. or the USSR to contemplate seeking international authorization from this source. However, the 
changes in the requirements from the UNSC would not stem from the institutional features but instead from 
the preferences of its members. The institutional features highlighted in Thompson (2009, 34-35) and 
Chapman (2011, 10) refer to decision making procedures and diverse membership. These have not changed 
with the end of the Cold War. 
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that the UNSC was used infrequently during the Cold War. Only in rare instances was the 
UNSC able to be used for this purpose. However, if only the constraints from the UNSC 
increased, then potential projector should turn to regional organizations (Thompson 2009, 
38-39). The empirical pattern documented in Chapter I does not display this trend. In six 
instances prior to 1990 states sought international authorization. Only half of these were 
from RIOs and half were states turning to the UNSC. States did not turn to RIOs with 
greater frequency during the Cold War. The theoretical expectations also stand in contrast 
with the evidence of cooperation and optimism which accompanied the end of the Cold 
War. This period suggests that rather than an increase in the need for external 
authorization the U.S. should have expected fewer political problems from other states. 
Since the U.S. sought out authorization with greater frequency in the post-Cold War 
period this expectation does not seem to have borne out. This theory does not appear to 
explain the observed variance between the Cold War and post-Cold War time periods. 
If, on the other hand, decision makers have no discussion about the costs, this lack 
of discussion does not mean that there were no costs anticipated by them. It may merely 
indicate that decision makers thought the costs were not worth mentioning because they 
were willing to pay them and the issue did not need any discussion. Alternatively, such 
lack of discussion may mean that the decision makers were unaware that working 
through a particular IO would entail such costs.  
IO Constraints 
While the some factors may push the U.S. to request international authorization, 
others factors push against making a request. If American officials are especially 
sensitive to constraints imposed by a formal IO for authorization they may prefer to 
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operate outside of the IO framework. This variable is certainly difficult to measure, but in 
comparison between the cases it is apparent that the Bush Administration is certainly 
more sensitive to IO constraints than either the Clinton or Obama Administrations. The 
Bush Administration even placed John Bolton, a neoconservative thinker, as the U.S. 
Ambassador to the UN. Bolton thought of himself as  
“the last person in their [the G-77] midst to favor reducing national 
sovereignty to enhance the position of the SG [UN Secretary-General] … 
Of course what we really wanted was not more authority in the secretary-
general, or more authority in the General Assembly, but more 
responsiveness to the United States throughout the UN system. (Bolton 
2007, 213).  
In the run up to the beginning of the Iraq War, Bolton served as Undersecretary of State 
for Arms Control and International Security Affairs. Bolton expressed his preference for 
direct unilateral action outside the UN, especially in comparison to the preferences of 
European states. 
Moreover, we cannot ignore the EU's proclivity to avoid confronting and 
actually resolving problems, preferring instead the endless process of 
diplomatic mastication. In certain circumstances, this approach may have 
its uses, but for the EU, it is essentially now their solution to everything. 
This decline in European will and capacity is matched by the related 
phenomenon, beloved by many Europeans, of using multilateral bodies for 
"norming" both international practice and domestic policy, a development 
that, over time, most profoundly threatens to diminish American 
autonomy and self-government, notions that to us spell ‘sovereignty.’ It is 
clear that the United Nations remains unreformed. Whether it is in fact 
unreformable remains to be seen, but the EU's almost invariable proclivity 
to turn to the institution makes this question of far more than academic 
interest. (Bolton 2007, 429-430) 
The Obama Administration has a greater commitment to multilateral cooperation through 
the UN than the Bush Administration (Patrick interviewed by Zhenqiu and Xiangjiang 
2008).  
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It is clear that the lack of international authorization from the UNSC did cost the 
U.S. in its Iraqi adventures, but the attempt to secure authorization also created two kinds 
of costs which would otherwise not have been encountered. The U.S. faced scrutiny over 
its intention which would not have been encountered if the U.S. had stayed outside of the 
UN process. It is through the UN process that other states and interested observers had 
the opportunity to examine the case the U.S. made against Saddam. This process 
scrutinized the justifications the U.S. offered. A second cost from the attempt is that the 
U.S. delayed action against Iraq because of the UNSC (Krauthammer 2003). The military 
planning suggested that the best time for the U.S. to begin its campaign against the Iraqi 
regime was December through February (Woodward 2004, 100). March and April were 
considered too late to begin the campaign because of windstorms and then rains which 
would hamper military effectiveness. The U.S. efforts were in fact hampered by a five-
day sandstorm after the initiation of conflict (Drews 2004). The drive to Baghdad was 
halted because of the sandstorm and the U.S. military equipment ill-suited for these 
conditions. Equipment including M-16 rifles were considered by many of the American 
soldiers to be useless during the storms. 
Forum Shopping  
Empirically, few cases are available for testing the forum shopping hypothesis. In 
many cases the projector has few alternative fora. As identified earlier, the U.S. has few 
cases where there was no attempt to request international authorization from the UNSC. 
The case examined in this chpater was the 1998 Operation Desert Fox where the U.S. and 
Great Britain conducted airstrikes against Iraq. In this case no real alternate forum was 
available to the U.S. The Middle East has no organization which parallels NATO in 
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which the U.S. is a member. In most other cases the primary IO is the UNSC. It is not 
clear if this theory can account for why a projector did not turn to the UNSC. 
Process of Multilateralism 
According to the logic of the process of multilateralism, states should request 
authorization because of the perceived appropriateness of the approval of a formal IO and 
its procedures when projecting military force (Finnemore 2003). A norm of 
multilateralism developed in the aftermath of the Second World War which produced 
pressures for states to cooperate through multilateral organizations (Ruggie 1992). The 
process of securing international authorization is the appropriate method for projecting 
military force. It is the symbol of the process of the UNSC which matters for states (Hurd 
2002).  
The issue of process for the Libyan intervention is not substantial since the U.S. 
and its allies worked to get international authorization through the UNSC.118 The debates 
over the efficacy of the UNSC suggest that holds a unique position compared to other 
organizations regarding security affairs. The issues about the lack of UN-authorization 
for the Iraq War provide evidence that it is not multilateralism which was at stake but the 
lack of UNSC authorization which mattered. Had NATO or some other organization 
provided international authorization, the objection likely would have been about the lack 
of UNSC international authorization. This difference suggests something about the 
UNSC which matters when states project military force. The U.S. did have allies, for the 
Iraq War, which provided some degree of multilateralism but this level of support does 
                                                 
118 The debate here is whether the Western powers exceeded the UNSC mandate, not the legitimacy of the 
mandate itself (Arab League Criticizes Allied Airstrikes on Libya 2011; Marcus 2011). 
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not represent the substantive multilateralism, envisioned by those who suggest that a 
norm of multilateralism for the use of military force has emerged. However, rather than 
an issue of having a formal organization involved, the issue is having the proper IO 
providing international authorization. 
UNSC Authority 
The 2003 conflict over Iraq shows that even powerful states framed their 
arguments around the Council since both sides in the debate accepted that UNSC 
approval was a powerful resource for states (Hurd 2006). The scenario of the 2003 Iraqi 
invasion provides some evidence of the importance of the UNSC. For many states the 
decision to support the war was contingent upon UNSC authorization. In the case of the 
U.S. invasion in 2003, Canada indicated support for the U.S. in January, months before 
the invasion (Where the World Stands 2003). After the invasion and a lack of explicit 
authorization by the UNSC, the Canadian government made the decision not to 
contribute troops and resources to the U.S.-led war efforts. The lack of authorization by 
the UN seems to have heavily contributed to this decision. India also represents a change 
in stance away from the U.S.’s foreign policy. India initially indicated that it would 
contribute to the cause of the U.S. (Where the World Stands 2003). Due to the lack of 
UNSC authorization India declined to contribute troops to the U.S. effort in Iraq (Thakur 
2003). India is one of the most significant supporters of UN Peacekeeping (Krishnasamy 
2003). These instance demonstrate that the authorization of the Council makes it easier 
for many state leaders to participate in the external use of force (Voeten 2005, 532).119 
                                                 
119 This is also the case for leaders in the United States (Chapman and Reiter 2004). 
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This explanation suggests that changes in leaders’ calculations emerged as a 
consequence of the U.S. decision to request authorization from the UNSC during the 
Persian Gulf War in 1991. The precedent of requesting international authorization 
became the model for projecting military force in the post-Cold War international 
environment. The U.S. changed the appropriate action for states when considering the 
projection of military force. It became appropriate for the potential projector to consult 
the proper body to consider international authorization. This body is the UNSC. Since the 
U.S. provided evidence that the UNSC was endowed with the authority to make decisions 
about the legitimacy of projections for military force, other actors and domestic 
populations came to expect that the U.S. and states more generally should request 
international authorization from the UNSC. The viability of different options changed 
after the Persian Gulf War. U.S. decision makers had a different set of viable options 
where outside options were no longer considered the most legitimate. Figure 6.1 shows 
the relative discursive viability of the options during this time period. 
British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, was perhaps the most significant American 
ally to weigh in on the decision to request UNSC authorizaiton. The initial decision to 
work through the UN by President Bush came after a meeting to discuss the issue with 
Blair at Camp David. Blair told President Bush that for the United Kingdom to work with 
the U.S. the UNSC needed to be involved (Woodward 2004, 178). Blair needed the UN 
for United Kingdom domestic public opinion (Woodward 2004, 177-178). The leaders of 
other states, including Australia and Spain, who supported the U.S. echoed the British 
sentiment, suggesting that even if approval was not forthcomming that the U.S. had to  
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Figure 6.1. Discursive Viability of Authorization Choices, 1992-2011 
 
 
make the effort to secure it (Woodward 2004, 183). Russia supported UNSC action 
(Where the World Stands 2003). The expectations of other states were that the U.S. 
should request international authorization. They pressed the Bush Administration to 
request a resolution containing a specific authorization for the U.S. and its allies to wage 
war. Prior to the 2003 Iraqi invasion, George W. Bush suggested that while the UN 
authorization may not be necessary for the U.S. to project military force, an effective UN 
is a normatively good thing. 
Q [Mark Knoller] Mr. President, are you worried that the United States 
might be viewed as defiant of the United Nations if you went ahead with 
military action without specific and explicit authorization from the U.N.? 
THE PRESIDENT [George W. Bush]: No, I'm not worried about that. As 
a matter of fact, it's hard to say the United States is defiant about the 
United Nations, when I was the person that took the issue to the United 
Nations, September the 12th, 2002 [when he spoke in front of the UN 
General Assembly]. We've been working with the United Nations. We've 
been working through the United Nations. I'm confident the American 
people understand that when it comes to our security, if we need to act, we 
will act, and we really don't need United Nations approval to do so. I want 
Outside RIO Article 51 Resolution MSC
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to work—I want the United Nations to be effective. It's important for it to 
be a robust, capable body. It's important for its words to mean what they 
say, and as we head into the 21st century, Mark, when it comes to our 
security, we really don't need anybody's permission.” (Bush 2003) 
This stands in contrast to the description which President Regan provided of the UN after 
the invasion of Grenada. Diplomacy through the UN was considered by the President to 
be more important than military concerns. The planning put the initial start date 
somewhere between April and June 2002 (Woodward 2004, 60). As the commander 
responsible for planning the military operation which became the Iraq War, General 
Franks recommended operations to begin between December 1, 2002 and February 2003 
(Woodward 2004, 100). Franks’ concern was that sandstorms begin in March and last 
through April which would hamper the ability of the military to conduct operations. 
Covert operations at the Central Intelligence Agency briefed President Bush that their 
Iraqi operatives could only last until the end of February (Woodward 2004, 252). Covert 
operations thought that the war would begin mid-February at the latest (Woodward 2004, 
302). After the end of February, operatives risked discovery which meant they would be 
killed or they would cease providing intelligence to the U.S. to avoid detection. Despite 
these operational concerns President Bush ordered military action to begin on March 19, 
2003. He ordered the military to change its timetables to adapt to the needs of diplomacy 
rather than military necessity. 
“Slow down your troop movements,” Bush later recalled telling Rumsfeld. 
Franks and the military then said they could use a little more time and it 
seemed to Bush that they were shoving the start date back a bit 
themselves. Then the president shoved it back further, telling Rumsfeld, 
“Don, we're accelerating too fast relative to where we need to be because 
of the diplomatic side.” (Woodward 2004, 319) 
For the Libyan Intervention the issue of requesting international authorization was 
less of an issue with the Obama Administration. However, major U.S. allies—the United 
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Kingdom and France—were strong supporters of the U.S. action and pushed for the 
UNSC to provide international authorization. France and Britain also took a strong role in 
the military action itself (Erlanger 2011). Had the U.S. deviated from the UNSC process, 
it seems likely that these states would respond similarly to their previous positions and 
push the U.S. to work through the UNSC. The experience of U.S diplomacy when 
considering the projection of military force in Iraq and Libya shows support for the 
hypothesis that the expectations of other states during the post-Cold War time period 
pressed the U.S. to request international authorization from the UNSC. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The authority of the UNSC based on the norm of requesting international 
authorization display leverage over the decision to request international authorization for 
the projection of military force in the cases exameind in this chapter. Table 6.3 
summarizes the findings of this chapter. The other material, institutional, or ideational 
explanations do not hold as leverage over these cases. The information transmission 
theory does not explain the variance. The informational approach suggests that when the 
leaders of a projector are sensitive to the constraints imposed by an IO but they anticipate 
very high international political costs, an IO different from the UNSC may be approached 
(Thompson 2009). This leads to the decision to pursue international authorization from a 
RIO which may be more pliable than the UNSC. The Bush Administration pushed a more 
unilateral agenda compared to other post-Cold War presidencies which was a part off the 
Bush Doctrine. The Bush Administration was the post-Cold War presidency most likely 
to request international authorization from a RIO rather than the UNSC if an IO was 
considered at all. This is not observed in the Iraqi case, where it could be argued that 
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other IOs were not an option. However, when an RIO was an option, such as in the case 
of Haiti (2004), the Bush Administration did. The U.S. requested international 
authorization from the UNSC for the projection of military force into Haiti.This took 
place the year following the Iraqi invasion. The OAS was available and considering the 
political fallout from Iraq a projection of military force by the U.S. was political 
controversial. Rather than pursue a strategy with a RIO, in this case and others the Bush 
Administration made the decision to request international authorization from the UNSC. 
The fact that the norm-based explanations both generally point in the same 
direction does make sense because they rely on similar causal logics. Examining the 
criticism of the U.S. in the aftermath of the Iraq War can help disentangle these two 
explanations. The criticism focused upon the lack of legitimacy which came from acting 
outside the UN framework. It did not come from a lack of multilateral organizational 
support. Had NATO authorized the U.S. action, the U.S. still would still have faced 
criticism that the UNSC did not provide its authorization. This is the basis of 
international criticism encountered by the U.S. for its 1999 action in Kosovo which was 
authorized by NATO (Henkin 1999). The inclusion of over 30 countries supporting the 
U.S. in the coalition did not substitute for international authorization from the UNSC. It 
was not seen as a multilateral action since it did not go through the UNSC. The basis of 
the criticism against the U.S. action in Iraq provides support for the explanation that the 
projection of military force requires a request to the UNSC for international 
authorization. 
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Evidence suggests that in both the Iraq War and the Libyan Intervention the U.S. 
had an interest in requesting international authorization, despite the fact that in 2003 the 
prospect of securing authorization for regime change in Iraq was very low. The fact that 
the Obama Administration used this process when projecting military force in Libya 
returns the U.S. to this particular model of behavior when contemplating the projection of 
military force in the future. For the near future the expectation of allies and major powers 
is that the U.S. will continue to request international authorization when projecting 
military force. The Iraq War has been perceived as a foreign policy failure for the Bush 
Administration and for the U.S. in general (Pressman 2009). Rather than increase security 
it has resulted in a conflict which produces more experienced and better trained 
insurgents and terrorists. It has helped to generate the perception that the U.S. is in 
decline relative to other states (Wallerstein 2007). This situation helps to bolster the 
perception that the UNSC is authoritative since it cannot be pushed around by the 
preponderant state in the international system and that it is not willing to support abuses 
of this power. Martin Wolf (2007) has suggested that the real victor in the Iraq war has 
been the UN. The UNSC has also gained wider prevue against terrorism (Boulden 2008). 
In the aftermath of the Iraq War the U.S. returned to the UNSC to request international 
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authorization for the 2004 projection of military force in Haiti. In his second term Bush 
made greater use of the UNSC (Schlesinger 2008). Obama’s strategy in Libya in 2011 
returned to the UNSC and generated what has been perceived of as a foreign policy 
success for the U.S. and NATO (Daalder and Stavridis 2011).  
If the Iraq War had been seen as a foreign policy success it may have changed the 
position of the UNSC. Had the Bush Administration not encountered the decline in the 
popularity for the war it may have severely affected the status of the UNSC. Since the 
UNSC refused to sanction the Iraq War it was vindicated when the action proved to be a 
foreign policy disaster for the U.S. If this had not been the case then it would lend 
credibility to the claim that the UNSC is an irrelevant institution in the international 
system. Rather the UNSC has gained considerable ground in its perceived legitimacy, 
even from the U.S. which continues to request international authorization for the 
projection of military force.  
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
This project looked at what options are available for states when requesting 
international authorization for the projection of military force. States have requested 
international authorization more often since 1989. This increase came about because, of 
the choices available, projecting military force with international authorization was seen 
as the most important and effective way to do so. States have significantly altered their 
practices by requesting international authorization more frequently after 1989. Several 
competing explanations for this phenomenon are drawn from realist, institutionalist, and 
constructivist theoretical perspectives. In presenting these competing explanations I 
empirically test them in comparison with the argument I develop. The constructivist 
explanation based upon the precedent of the U.S. request for international authorization 
and the authority of the UNSC offers the most compelling answer to the research 
question. This explanation contributes a nuanced perspective on how actors make 
strategic use of norms bridging the divide between rationalist and constructivist 
understandings of international politics and how international norms emerge from the 
practices of states. 
The Argument 
The norm of requesting international authorization from the UNSC for the 
projection of military force emerged because of the precedent of U.S. action during the 
Persian Gulf War. The norm remains in place because the UNSC is viewed as the proper 
actor for deciding the legitimacy of the projection of military force in the international 
system. This international behavioral norm accords the UNSC with authority over 
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decision by states to project military force. During the Cold War, the U.S. did not view 
international authorization as important. Discursively, options outside of IOs were the 
most viable choice. These options structured the foreign policy decision-making in the 
U.S. such that international authorization was considered as an afterthought at best. The 
Korean War was the only incident where the U.S. turned to the UNSC. The Cold War 
structures of international politics limited the implications of the turn to the UNSC. It did 
not change the thinking either about the projection of military force or the UNSC. The 
Cold War put security and quick, forceful actions at the forefront of foreign policy 
making. Working through IOs for projecting military force was not considered a priority. 
During this time period the UNSC did not hold authority over the projection of military 
force by states. The end of the Cold War changed the politics towards the UNSC. The 
end of the Cold War ushered in uncertainty over the international order and how states 
should relate to the UNSC. During those unsettled times, the U.S. requested international 
authorization to project of military force during the Persian Gulf War. This conflict was 
seen as a dramatic success for both the U.S. and for the UNSC. The act of securing 
international authorization prior to engaging military force came to be seen by many as 
the proper course of action in the post-Cold War era. This shift set the tone for 
subsequent decisions about the projection of military force and made other options less 
viable and more costly. 
Alternative explanations for the change in the viability of requesting international 
authorization for the projection of military force include those derived from realism, 
institutionalism, and versions of constructivism. These alternative explanations were 
empirically tested in comparison with the constructivist argument I develop. The realist-
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based explanations are based on power calculations and the need for additional resources. 
Two explanations rely on institutions as a key component. The first suggests that states 
with democratic domestic regimes follow international law and thus will request 
international authorization more than nondemocracies. The second explanation looks at 
the value of information signaled through formal IOs. There is also an alternative 
constructivist explanation. The norm of multilateralism is offered as an alternative 
constructivist explanation of the changes in state behavior.  
These alternatives do not make sense of the change in the viability of different 
choices available to states after 1989. Empirically, the realist power-based arguments do 
not account for the motivations for states to request international authorization. The 
institutional arguments do not account for the drive to go to the UNSC rather than to 
alternative IOs. The alternative constructivist approach does not account for the timing of 
the strength of the norm coalescing in 1990 rather than after 1945. These alternatives do 
not hold up the empirical argument about how the viability of alternatives changed with 
the precedent of requesting international authorization for the Persian Gulf War. 
The argument I make about why states request international authorization makes a 
contribution by specifying the mechanism through which this international norm 
emerged. The general understanding of how norms emerge is through norm entrepreneurs 
who work to create and push others to follow the norm (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). In 
defining the new standard of behavior as appropriate and legitimate the norm spreads and 
others adopt the behavioral norm (DiMaggio and Powell 1991a). The entrepreneur 
attempts to persuade or coerce others into accepting and following a standard which is 
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preferred by the actor. Norm entrepreneurs use different frames to achieve their ends 
(Payne 2001). 
The precedent of distinctive action represents a different model for the emergence 
of international norms. Precedent becomes legitimated through practice rather than 
through the specific intent of a norm entrepreneur. I argue that the norm of requesting 
international authorization has emerged through such a precedent. The research question 
focuses on the change in state behavior. I argue that this behavioral change emanates 
from the emergence of a norm of state behavior which proscribes that states should 
request international authorization for the projection of military force from the UNSC. 
States engage in this specific behavior because the UNSC is seen as the proper authority 
to make decisions about the legitimacy of the projection of military force. The authority 
of the UNSC was enhanced by the practice of requesting international authorization after 
the end of the Cold War. This mechanism for the spread of norms works differently than 
a norm entrepreneur. Norm entrepreneurs set out to change the way others act. With 
precedent there is no intent. After precedent has been created the role of the actors 
involved is in justifying their actions. Their justifications lend credibility to their initial 
action and legitimize the action for subsequent emulation and repetition. 
Theoretically, identifying the reasons why states have looked to IOs provides a 
contribution to the understanding of state behavior. This research contributes to the 
debates over when structures and agency matter for interesting outcomes in international 
politics. The argument I develop in contributes to the discussion between rationalist and 
constructivist approaches to scholarship (Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998). 
Rationalism and constructivism should be used to contribute something different to the 
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understanding of international politics (Fearon and Wendt 2002). They should not be 
mutually exclusive. The rationalist logic of consequences (March and Olsen 1998) is 
often thought to be the logic used in the instrumental or strategic calculations of actors in 
international politics. This logic stands in contrast to the rule based normative logic of 
appropriateness (March and Olsen 2006). The argument I develop reaches beyond this 
understanding of strategic action as only proving the rationalist perspective, to 
demonstrate that actors engage in strategic calculations using norms and common 
understandings as they purposefully attempt to achieve their goals. Actors strategically 
use claims of appropriateness. This argument helps to bridge a divide in the 
understanding of these two theoretical positions.  
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APPENDIX A 
CONCEPTUALIZING THE DECISION TO PROJECT  
MILITARY FORCE 
States use force. They do so domestically and internationally. The difference 
between these domains is the character of how force is used (Waltz 1979, 103). Within 
the domestic sphere states hold the ability to decide when force is legitimate (Weber 1921 
[1918]). A state holds sovereignty over its territory. Force used outside of this territory 
inherently occurs in a place where the state does not claim authority to decide its 
legitimacy. This makes decisions to use force outside a state’s territory all the more 
interesting. This study uses the concept of force within the international realm rather than 
the conventional notion of military intervention or armed conflict. 
This study defiens the projection of military force in the following way: The 
decision to project military force is the purposeful deployment of regular military forces 
of a state outside their internationally recognized boundaries which destroys, or prevents 
an adversary from using, some resource. The projection of military force holds 
similarities to the conventional understanding of war and international intervention. This 
latter term is especially problematic (Rosenau 1969). The concept of intervention can 
have military and humanitarian connotations (Finnemore 2003). Intervention is often 
applied to covert or atypical military actions (e.g., van Evera 1991). It has also been 
applied to any action which attempts to change the characteristics of the target society 
(e.g., Falk 1992). This term becomes confused in its application. Humanitarian 
intervention is often used with the implied comparison to military intervention. However, 
discussion of military intervention includes those missions or operations which are 
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motivated by humanitarian concerns (e.g., Haass 1999), illustrating the conceptual 
confusion which emerges when two terms are compared that are at different places along 
the ladder of abstraction.120 The projection of military force aims to clear some of the 
confusion which exists as part of the conceptual landscape of intervention. 
The conventional notion of military intervention is often either left undefined or 
the scholar focuses on a single instance known to be an intervention. Often military 
intervention is understood as a form of conflict. Conflict is a ubiquitous phenomenon in 
international politics. Conflict continues to occur in many areas despite attempts to 
prevent its occurrence. The multicausal, equifinal nature of conflict creates very large 
problems for scholars trying to understand the reasons for its persistence. These problems 
are embodied in the debates over the concept of intervention and using force in 
international politics. Intervention as a concept is difficult to define and reflects 
characteristics of an essentially contested concept.121  To make matters more complicated 
there is often a difference between meaning when the conception used colloquially and 
when it is used in scholarly research.  
The issues surrounding this concept are continued in the distinction between 
military and nonmilitary conceptions of intervention. James Rosenau’s (1968, 1969) 
classic statement on intervention is an attempt to address these problems by constructing 
an analytic, narrow conception of intervention which can be used in systematic inquiry. 
Rather than focus on force, Rosenau looked towards the effect a state has on the authority 
                                                 
120 The ladder of abstraction refers to the idea introduced by Sartori (1970). A concept’s position on the 
ladder changes through increasing the number of attributes which are covered under a particular concept. 
Greater attributes holds greater intention for a concept. According to Sartori, the intention is inversely 
related to the extension or the empirical cases to which a concept can be applied. 
121 For more on essentially contested concepts (see Collier, Hidalgo, and Maciuceanu 2006; Gallie 1956). 
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structures of another. However, while his conception holds merit, it deliberately would 
not include some clear instances of the use of military force. Some scholars focus on the 
legalistic aspects of intervention which imply interference with the domestic society of 
another state (Bull 1984). Other scholars have attempted to solve the problems 
surrounding the conception of intervention by focusing on clear instances of military 
deployment (e.g., Grimmett 2010; Haass 1995; Tillema 1989). 
Some eschew dealing with the concept of intervention altogether. For instance, 
Martha Finnemore (2003) takes a more historical approach to solving the dilemma. She 
focuses on a methodological solution where the instances of intervention require the 
participants to describe the incident among themselves as a form of intervention. Other 
scholars use notions of coercion (Thompson 2006, 2009) or military disputes (Chapman 
2009) to focus their inquiry. Often setting the boundaries of the concept under scrutiny is 
deemed to be unnecessary since the object of inquiry is generally understood to be 
intervention. 
None of these attempts have solved the issues about the term. Rather than add to 
the conceptual confusion about the meanings and understandings of the term I choose to 
employ a different term to guide this study. The concept of intervention is a poor one to 
use when studying the reasons for why foreign policy decisions are made. Decisions to 
intervene militarily are not qualitatively different than the decisions to project military 
force. Using the concept of military force projection has the benefit of carrying an easily 
understood meaning while encapsulating the most significant aspects of the decision 
making process. In other words, the projection of military force is easily understood by 
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academics and by those outside of academia while holding clear boundaries that 
distinguish an incident from that which is not. 
The concept would include phenomena where the object of the military 
deployment is not changing the domestic authority or political structures of another state. 
This concept is distinct from a conception of military intervention which requires at some 
level the interference in the domestic politics of another state. The projection of military 
force can be distinguished from the broader concept of armed conflict or war on the basis 
of its international character. Armed conflict, as a concept, includes things such as civil 
war or conflicts which occur within the domestic sphere.122 
The first significant characteristic of the concept of military force projection is the 
deployment of regular military forces of a state. These troops are not from irregular or 
civilian forms of military organization. Covert actions taken by irregular troops do not 
fall within the identified conceptual boundaries. 
The second signficant characteristic is their deployment outside the state’s 
internationally recognized boundaries, including regular military troops being deployed 
outside of a state’s territory. This represents a clear demarcation of the area where a state 
controls the territory. Inside the state’s internationally recognized boundaries would be a 
police action such as the use of domestic force. Decisions regarding the legitimacy of the 
use of force by a state are limited to the territorial boundaries of that state. Internationally 
recognized boundaries represent the limit of a state’s authority to make these kinds of 
decisions. The focus of the concept of military force projection deals with actions taken 
                                                 
122 Civil wars and similar kinds of conflicts involve determining which actor or groups of actors have the 
authority to define what is considered to be a legitimate use of force. These are uses of force that are 
inherently domestic whether they are considered domestic or not. 
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outside of the limit where state sovereignty dictates that the state can decide the 
legitimacy of the action. In this realm, the state is not supreme by right but instead may 
have to rely on other resources or tools aside from sovereignty to justify its actions, 
whereas in the international realm no particular institution holds the ability to decide the 
legitimacy of force. A use of force is international when the state acts outside of the 
boundaries where it can decide the legitimacy of the use of force. This includes areas 
where control of a territory is in dispute. That is, areas where the control over territory is 
in dispute are areas where the holder of the ability to decide the legitimacy of force is in 
dispute. It makes sense that this would be outside the area where a state had the ability to 
make decisions about the use of force. Disputed territories are not internationally 
recognized but there is a territory which is internationally recognized as the undisputed 
territory of a state. When states act outside this territory the action becomes international. 
The third characteristic of the concept of military foce projection is that the 
deployment destroys or prevents an adversary from using a particular resource. 
Deployment to a military base for sustained presence or to act as a supply facility thus 
does not fall within this concpet. The deployment has to be a physical rather than a 
peaceful use of force (Art 1980). This distinction matters, for the interpretation of 
military force projection. Peaceful uses of military force, such as swaggering or 
deterrence, are not relevant attributes for the concept. 
The fourth characteristic of military force projection is the purposeful nature of 
the action. The focus of the concept is upon the decision to project military force. This 
includes purposeful decisions to use military troops rather than accidents and other forms 
of military activity which do not involve the decision. For instance, a projection of 
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military force would include the North Korean decision to invade South Korea in 1950, 
but it would not include the South Korean decision to resist the North Korean’s use of 
force. It includes the U.S. deployment of troops to attack Iraq and repel the invaders from 
Kuwait in 1991, but not the attempt by the Kuwaitis to resist Iraq in 1990. The U.S. 
engaged in a purposeful deployment to destroy Iraqi resources but the Kuwaiti resistance 
was the attempt to repel the Iraqi attacks. 
Conceptually the phenomenon classified as projections of military force should 
include instances of military intervention but not all instances of intervention. 
Intervention and military force projection are neither equivalent nor comparable concepts 
but they are overlapping concepts. The projection of military force includes instances 
which would not be included in the more conventional notions of military intervention. 
These additional phenomena have more in common with other forms of military force 
projection than they do with the broader conception of intervention. 
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APPENDIX B 
LIST OF UNSC RESOLUTIONS UNDER CHAPTER VII OF  
THE UN CHARTER 
1946-1949 
UNSCR 54 (1948) 
UNSCR 62 (1948)* 
1950-1959 
UNSCR 82 (1950)♯ 
UNSCR 83 (1950)♯ 
UNSCR 84 (1950)♯ 
UNSCR 146 (1950)* 
1960-1969 
UNSCR 161 (1961) 
UNSCR 169 (1961) 
UNSCR 217 (1965)♯ 
UNSCR 221 (1966)♯ 
UNSCR 232 (1966) 
UNSCR 253 (1968) 
1970-1979 
UNSCR 277 (1970) 
UNSCR 288 (1970) 
UNSCR 314 (1972) 
UNSCR 386 (1976)* 
UNSCR 388 (1976) 
UNSCR 409 (1977) 
UNSCR 418 (1977) 
UNSCR 421 (1977)♯ 
1980-1989 
UNSCR 502 (1982) 
UNSCR 598 (1987) 
1990-1999 
UNSCR 660 (1990) 
UNSCR 661 (1990) 
UNSCR 664 (1990) 
UNSCR 665 (1990)ᶿ 
UNSCR 666 (1990) 
UNSCR 667 (1990) 
UNSCR 669 (1990)* 
UNSCR 670 (1990) 
UNSCR 674 (1990) 
UNSCR 677 (1990) 
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UNSCR 1897 (2009) 
UNSCR 1900 (2009) 
UNSCR 1901 (2009) 
UNSCR 1903 (2009) 
UNSCR 1904 (2009) 
UNSCR 1905 (2009) 
UNSCR 1906 (2009) 
UNSCR 1907 (2009) 
2010-2011
UNSCR 1910 (2010) 
UNSCR 1911 (2010) 
UNSCR 1915 (2010) 
UNSCR 1916 (2010) 
UNSCR 1924 (2010) 
UNSCR 1925 (2010) 
UNSCR 1927 (2010) 
UNSCR 1928 (2010) 
UNSCR 1929 (2010) 
UNSCR 1931 (2010) 
UNSCR 1932 (2010) 
UNSCR 1938 (2010) 
UNSCR 1940 (2010) 
UNSCR 1942 (2010) 
UNSCR 1943 (2010) 
UNSCR 1944 (2010) 
UNSCR 1945 (2010) 
UNSCR 1946 (2010) 
UNSCR 1948 (2010) 
UNSCR 1950 (2010) 
UNSCR 1951 (2010) 
UNSCR 1952 (2010) 
UNSCR 1954 (2010) 
UNSCR 1955 (2010) 
UNSCR 1956 (2010) 
UNSCR 1957 (2010) 
UNSCR 1958 (2010) 
UNSCR 1961 (2010) 
UNSCR 1962 (2010) 
UNSCR 1964 (2010) 
UNSCR 1966 (2010) 
UNSCR 1967 (2011) 
UNSCR 1968 (2011) 
UNSCR 1970 (2011) 
UNSCR 1971 (2011) 
UNSCR 1972 (2011) 
UNSCR 1973 (2011) 
UNSCR 1975 (2011) 
UNSCR 1977 (2011) 
UNSCR 1980 (2011) 
UNSCR 1981 (2011) 
UNSCR 1982 (2011) 
UNSCR 1984 (2011) 
UNSCR 1985 (2011) 
UNSCR 1988 (2011) 
UNSCR 1989 (2011) 
UNSCR 1990 (2011) 
UNSCR 1991 (2011) 
UNSCR 1992 (2011) 
UNSCR 1993 (2011) 
UNSCR 1995 (2011) 
UNSCR 1996 (2011) 
UNSCR 2000 (2011) 
UNSCR 2001 (2011)ᶿ 
UNSCR 2002 (2011) 
UNSCR 2003 (2011)ᶿ 
UNSCR 2008 (2011) 
UNSCR 2009 (2011) 
UNSCR 2010 (2011) 
UNSCR 2011 (2011) 
UNSCR 2012 (2011) 
UNSCR 2016 (2011) 
UNSCR 2019 (2011) 
UNSCR 2020 (2011) 
UNSCR 2021(2011) 
UNSCR 2023 (2011) 
UNSCR 2025 (2011) 
UNSCR 2029 (2011) 
UNSCR 2032 (2011)
* This resolution makes reference in its text to a specific article within Chapter VII but 
not explicitly to Chapter VII itself. 
♯ This resolution contains an implicit reference to Chapter VII. 
ᶿ Resolution makes reference to Chapter VII resolution in its preamble. For instance the 
resolution contains a ‘recall’ of a Chapter VII resolution. 
Source: 1946-1995 from Bailey and Daws (1998, 272), 1996-2002 from Johansson 
(2003`), 2003-2011 are coded by the author from UN Security Council Resolutions 
(United Nations Various Dates-b). 
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APPENDIX C 
LIST OF UNSC RESOLUTIONS FOR SPECIFIC CASES123 
Table C.1. The Korean War, 1950 
Resolution Date Meeting Vote Notes on Vote 
UNSCR 82 (1950) June 25 473rd 9-0-1 Yugoslavia in abstention, the USSR was absent. 
Identified the North Korean invasion as a breach of the peace. 
 
UNSCR 83 (1950) June 27 474th  7-1-0 Yugoslavia in opposition; Egypt and India did not  
      participate in the vote; the USSR was absent. 
Authorized military assistance to be provided to the Republic of Korea by members of the United Nations. 
 
UNSCR 84 (1950) July 7 476th 7-0-3 Egypt, India and Yugoslavia in abstention, 
      the USSR was absent. 
Authorized a unified command led by the United States of America. 
 
UNSCR 85 (1950) July 31  479th 9-0-1 Yugoslavia in abstention; the USSR was absent. 
Requested that the Unified Command coordinate and administer aid to civilian population of Korea. 
 
UNSCR88 (1950) November 8 520th 8-2-1 China and Cuba in opposition; Egypt in Abstention. 
Procedural resolution inviting a representative from the People’s Republic of China to be present when discussing the matter of aggression in Korea. 
 
UNSCR 90 (1951) January 31st 531st 11-0-0 
Removed the “Complaint of Aggression upon the Republic of Korea” from matters upon which the UNSC was seized. 
 
                                                 
123 The voting for this appendix is cataloged as Support-Opposition-Abstention. 
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Table C.2. The Persian Gulf War, 1990-1991124 
Resolution Date Meeting Vote Notes on Vote 
UNSCR 660 (1990) August 2, 1990 2932nd 14-0-0 Yemen did not participate in the vote. 
Condemned the invasion of Kuwait and identified it as a breach to international peace and security. 
UNSCR 661 (1990) August 6, 1990 2933rd 13-0-2 Cuba and Yemen in abstention. 
Imposed sanctions on Iraq. 
UNSCR 662 (1990) August 9, 1990 2934th 15-0-0 
Condemned Iraq’s formal annexation of Kuwait and declared it null and void. 
UNSCR 664 (1990) August 18, 1990 2937th 15-0-0 
Demanded that Iraq allows the immediate departure of foreign nationals from Kuwait and Iraqi territories. 
UNSCR 665 (1990) August 25, 1990 2938th 13-0-2 Cuba and Yemen in abstention. 
Authorized the enforcement of the economic embargo against Iraq through the use of force. 
UNSCR 666 (1990) September 14, 1990 2939th 13-2-0 Cuba and Yemen in opposition. 
Established process to determine when humanitarian need justified the provision of food supplies to Iraq. 
UNSCR 667 (1990) September 16, 1990 2940th 15-0-0 
Condemned Iraq’s treatment of diplomatic personnel and property. It also demanded the release of foreign nationals. 
UNSCR 669 (1990) September 24, 1990 2942nd 15-0-0 
Established procedures to address requests for assistance arising from the invasion. 
UNSCR 670 (1990) September 25, 1990 2943rd 14-1-0 Cuba in opposition. 
Extended the Embargo to include air traffic in addition to naval traffic. Did not include the use of force but included nonviolent means. 
UNSCR 674 (1990) October 29, 1990 2951st 13-0-2 Cuba and Yemen in abstention. 
Concerned the Iraqi treatment of foreign nationals. 
UNSCR 677 (1990) November 28, 1990 2962nd 15-0-0 
Response to Iraqi attempts to change the demographic characteristics of Kuwait. 
UNSCR 678 (1990) November 29, 1990 2963rd 12-2-1 Cuban and Yemen in opposition. China in abstention. 
This resolution authorized Member States to use all necessary means to implement Security Council resolution 660 (1990) and all relevant resolutions. 
UNSCR 686 (1991) March 3, 1991 2978th 11-1-3 Cuba in opposition. China, India and Yemen in abstention. 
Defined Iraq’s international obligations and set initial conditions for peace and a provisional end to hostilities. 
UNSCR 687 (1991) April 3, 1991 2981st 12-1-2 Cuba in opposition. Ecuador and Yemen in abstention. 
The Gulf Crisis ceasefire resolution which sets up the international position against Iraq domination and military aspirations. 
 
                                                 
124 Resolutions in bold include authorization for the projection of military force. 
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Table C.3. Operation Desert Fox, 1998 
Resolution Date Meeting Vote Notes on Vote 
UNSCR 686 (1991) March 2, 1991 2978th 11-1-3 Cuba in opposition; China, India, and Yemen in abstention. 
Provided a provisional cease fire for the Persian Gulf War. 
 
UNSCR 687 (1991) April 3, 1991 2981st 12-1-2 Cuba in opposition. Ecuador and Yemen in abstention. 
Provided a ceasefire for the Persian Gulf War and defined the international obligations of Iraq and established the United Nations Special Commission 
(UNSCOM). 
 
UNSCR 699 (1991) June 17, 1991 2994th 15-0-0 
Confirmed UNSCOM’s and the IAEA’s mandate from UNSCR 687 and deplored Iraq’s lack of cooperation. 
 
UNSCR 707 (1991) August 15, 1991 3004th 15-0-0 
Demanded that Iraq fully disclose its weapons program and authorized fixed-wing and helicopter flights for inspections purposes in Iraq. 
 
UNSCR 715 (1991) October 11, 1991 3012th 15-0-0 
Established an ongoing monitoring and verification regime for Iraq. 
 
UNSCR 949 (1994) October 15, 1994 3438th 15-0-0 
Demanded Iraq’s cooperation with UNSCOM and for Iraq to return the recently deployed troop from southern Iraq and refrain from provocations which 
threaten its neighbors. 
 
UNSCR 1060 (1996) June 12, 1996 3672nd 15-0-0 
Rebuttal to Iraqi claims that “Presidential” sites were off-limits to UNSCOM and IAEA weapons inspectors. 
 
UNSCR 1137 (1997) November 12, 1997 3831st 15-0-0 
Cited Iraq for expelling American-national weapons inspectors and warned of “serious consequences” if Iraq failed to comply with its international 
obligations. 
 
UNSCR 1284 (1999) December 17, 1999 4084th 11-0-4 China, France, Malaysia, and Russia in abstention. 
Established the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace UNSCOM. 
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Table C.4. Iraq War, 2003 
Resolution Date Meeting Vote Notes on Vote 
UNSCR 678 (1990) November 29, 1990 2963rd 12-2-1 Cuban and Yemen in opposition. China in abstention. 
This resolution authorizes Member States to use all necessary means to implement Security Council resolution 660 (1990) and all relevant resolutions 
for the Persian Gulf War. 
 
UNSCR 687 (1991) April 3, 1991 2981st 12-1-2 Cuba in opposition. Ecuador and Yemen in abstention. 
Provided a ceasefire for the Persian Gulf War and defined the international obligations of Iraq and established the United Nations Special Commission 
(UNSCOM). 
 
UNSCR 1441 (2002) November 8, 2002 4644th 15-0-0 
Established an enhanced inspections regime for Iraq and provided Iraq a “last” chance to meet its international obligations set by UNSCR 678 and other 
relevant resolutions. 
 
Draft Resolution 
UNSC Document (2003) March 7, 2003 S/2003/215 Withdrawn without a vote. 
The draft of the “second resolution” withdrawn on March 17, 2003 by its sponsors Spain, the United States and the United Kingdom. Upon passage this 
resolution would have reactivated UNSCR 678. 
 
UNSCR 1483 May 22, 2003 4762nd 14-0-0 Syria did not participate in the vote. 
Lifted sanctions on Iraq and recognized the U.S. and the UK as occupying powers. 
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Table C.5. The Libyan Intervention, 2011 
Resolution Date Meeting Vote Notes on Vote 
UNSCR 1970 (2011) February 26, 2011 6491st 15-0-0 
Condemned the situation in Libya, referred the situation to the ICC and implemented sanctions. 
 
UNSCR 1973 (2011) March 17, 2011 6498th 10-0-5 Brazil, China, Germany, India & Russia in abstention 
Established a No-Fly Zone around Libya, authorized the use of military force to protect civilians and enforce the No-Fly Zone. 
 
UNSCR 2009 (2011) September 16, 2011 6620th 15-0-0 
Established the United Nations Support Mission in Libya. 
 
UNSCR 2016 (2011) October 27, 2011 6640th 15-0-0 
Terminated the mandate to use military force contained in paragraphs 4, 5, 6 through 12 of UNSCR 1973. 
 
UNSCR 2017 (2011) October 31, 2011 6644th 15-0-0 
Established the United Nations Support Mission in Libya. 
 
UNSCR 2022 (2011) December 2, 2011 6673rd 15-0-0 
Extended the mandate for the United Nations Support Mission in Libya. 
 
UNSCR 2040 (2012) March 12, 2012 6733rd 15-0-0 
Extended the mandate for the United Nations Support Mission in Libya. 
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